Kinney v. City of Corona

317 Cal.Rptr.3d 545

Alisha KINNEY, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.CITY OF CORONA, Defendant and Appellant.

E079840

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2.

Filed December 29, 2023

As Modified January 24, 2024

Certified for Partial Publication.^*

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Harold W. Hopp, Judge. Reversed with directions. (Super.Ct.No. RIC2000404)

Dean Derleth, City Attorney, John D. Higginbotham and Neil D. Okazaki, Deputy City Attorneys, for Defendant and Appellant.

Law Office of Brent J. Borchert and Brent J. Borchert, Sherman Oaks, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

OPINION

FIELDS Acting P. J.

I. INTRODUCTION

On December 23, 2019, plaintiff and respondent, Alisha Kinney, sent an e-mail request to defendant and appellant, City of Corona (City), asking City to make a public record available to Kinney: the name of the owner of a vehicle reported stolen in City on May 23, 2019, according to an online news article. (Gov. Code, former § 6254, subd. (f)(2)(A).) Kinney’s request is governed by the California Public Records Act (the CPRA), codified at Government Code former section 6250 et. seq.¹

On January 6, 2020, City denied Kinney’s request on the ground the stolen vehicle owner’s name was "confidential." (Gov. Code, former § 6259, subd. (a).) On January 28, Kinney petitioned the superior court for declaratory relief and a writ of mandate ordering City to disclose the name. On May 3, 2021, following a trial on the petition, the court ordered City to disclose the name to Kinney. (Gov. Code, former § 6254, subd. (f).) On July 1, 2021, this court denied City’s petition to this court for an extraordinary writ directing the superior court to set aside the May 3, 2021 order. (Gov. Code, former § 6259, subd. (c).) Kinney later filed a motion for attorney fees, and, on August 2, 2022, the trial court entered judgment awarding Kinney $43,300 in attorney fees. (Gov. Code, former § 6259, subd. (d).)

City appeals from the judgment awarding Kinney $43,300 in attorney fees. City claims Kinney is not entitled to recover any of her attorney fees because she was not the prevailing party on her CPRA petition, given that her petition was not the "catalyst" that caused City to disclose the crime victim’s name to a member of the public. (Gov. Code, former § 6259, subd. (d).) Rather, on February 20, 2020, before City disclosed the name to Kinney, City disclosed the name to Ronald Austin pursuant to Austin’s CPRA request for the name. Austin was a client of attorney Brent Borchert, and, on May 20, 2020, Borchert became Kinney’s attorney of record on Kinney’s CPRA petition against City.

City claims Austin’s knowledge of the name was imputed to Kinney through Borchert, as soon as Borchert became Kinney’s attorney of record in this case. (Civ. Code, § 2332.) Thus, City argues Kinney’s petition became moot following City’s disclosure of the name to Austin, and Kinney, therefore, is not the prevailing party on her CPRA petition against City to disclose the name.

City also claims, and principally argues, that the trial court erroneously refused to enforce City’s Code of Civil Procedure section 998 ² offer to Kinney, served on February 14, 2020, offering to disclose the vehicle owner’s name and to pay Kinney $2,500 in costs and attorney fees. City claims the court erroneously concluded that the offer was invalid because it was ambiguous on the question of to whom City was offering to disclose the crime victim’s name—to Kinney or a third party such as Austin. City claims the offer was unambiguous, and therefore valid, because no extrinsic evidence shows that, at the time the offer was made, Kinney had any reason to believe the offer was to disclose the name to a third party, such as Austin, rather than to Kinney.

We conclude substantial evidence supports the court’s implied finding that Kinney was the prevailing party on her CPRA petition. (Gov. Code, former § 6259, subd. (d).) As the prevailing party, Kinney is entitled to recover her costs and reasonable attorney fees from City. (Ibid.) But City’s February 14, 2020 section 998 offer to Kinney was unambiguous, valid and enforceable. No extrinsic shows that, when the offer was made, Kinney had any reason to believe the offer was to disclose the name to a third party, such as Austin, rather than to Kinney. Further, Kinney did not obtain a more favorable result on her CPRA petition. Thus, the offer cut off Kinney’s right to recover her postoffer costs and attorney fees. (§ 998, subd. (c)(1).) In Kinney’s motion for attorney fees, which resulted in the judgment awarding Kinney $43,300 in attorney fees, Kinney sought $2,475 in attorney fees through February 14, 2020, the date City made its section 998 offer. Thus, we reverse the judgment and remand the matter to the trial court with directions to enter a judgment awarding Kinney $2,475 in attorney fees.

II. ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND

A. Applicable CPRA Provisions

[1] The CPRA establishes a right of public access to government records. (National Lawyers Guild v. City of Hayward (2020) 9 Cal.5th 488, 492, 263 Cal.Rptr.3d 124, 464 P.3d 594.) "Modeled after the federal Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq.), the [CPRA] was enacted for the purpose of increasing freedom of information by giving members of the public access to records in the possession of state and local agencies." (Los Angeles County Bd. of Supervisors v. Superior Court (2016) 2 Cal.5th 282, 290, 212 Cal.Rptr.3d 107, 386 P.3d 773.) In enacting the CPRA in 1968, the Legislature declared this right of access to be "a fundamental and necessary right of every person in this state." (Gov. Code, former § 6250 [now Gov. Code, § 7921.000]; National Lawyers Guild, at p. 492, 263 Cal. Rptr.3d 124, 464 P.3d 594.) In 2004, the voters ratified this declaration by amending the California Constitution to secure a "right of access to information concerning the conduct of the people’s business." (Cal. Const., art. I, § 3, added by Prop. 59, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 2, 2004); National Lawyers Guild, at p. 492, 263 Cal.Rptr.3d 124, 464 P.3d 594.)

The CPRA requires the superior court to order the disclosure of public records, or show cause why the records should not be disclosed, if "it is made to appear" by a verified petition that the records "are being improperly withheld from a member of the public." (Gov. Code, former §§ 6258, 6259, subd. (a).) The court "shall order the public official to make the record public" if the court finds the official’s refusal to disclose the record is not justified under Government Code former sections 6254 or 6255. (Gov. Code, former § 6259, subd. (b).) The petitioner may also seek declaratory relief under the CPRA. (Gov. Code, former § 6258.)

[2, 3] If the petitioner prevails in litigation under the CPRA, the petitioner is entitled to recover its costs and reasonable attorney fees from the public agency. (Gov. Code, former § 6259, subd. (d); Motorola Communication & Electronics, Inc. v. Department of General Services (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1340, 1344, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 477 (Motorola).) The petitioner prevails in litigation under the CPRA if the litigation motivated the defendant to release the requested documents or was the "catalyst" for the release. (Motorola, at p. 1344, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 477; Belth v. Garamendi (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 896, 901-902, 283 Cal.Rptr. 829 (Belth).)

[4–7] "‘The right of access to public records under the CPRA is not absolute.’ " (County of Santa Clam v. Superior Court (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1320, 1322, 89 Cal.Rptr.3d 374 (County of Santa Clara).) Government Code former section 6254 provided for " ‘a diverse collection of exemptions from disclosure ….’" (County of Santa Clara, at p. 1820, 89 Cal.Rptr.3d 374.) As relevant here, the statute required a public agency to disclose the name and age of a crime victim (subject to exceptions not applicable here), unless the disclosure would endanger the safety of an individual involved in the investigation. (See Fredericks v. Superior Court (2015) 233 Cal.app.4th 209, 226, 182 Cal.Rptr.3d 526.)³ Disclosure is strongly favored; thus, all exemptions are narrowly construed, and the agency opposing disclosure bears the burden of proving that an exemption applies. (County of Santa. Clara, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 1321, 89 Cal.Rptr.3d 374.) "‘[U]nless exempted, all public records may be examined by any member of the public, … conceivably any person with no greater interest than idle curiosity.’ " (San Lorenzo Valley, supra, 139 Cal. App.4th at p. 1408, 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 128.)

[8–10] The CPRA "does not allow limitations on access to a public record based upon the purpose for which the record is being requested, if the record is otherwise subject to disclosure." (Gov. Code, former § 6257.5.) Thus, a public agency may not demand to know a requestor’s purpose in requesting a public record; the requestor’s purpose in seeking the record is irrelevant to whether the record is subject to disclosure. (See Riskin v. Hollywood Media Dist. Proper Owner Ass’n. (Super. Ct. Los Angeles County, 2018, No. BS166075 ["[T]he requestor’s purpose in seeking the records is irrelevant."].)) Additionally, if a public record is exempt from disclosure, the agency waives the exemption if it voluntarily and knowingly discloses the record to one member of the public but not other members. (Gov. Code, former § 6254.5; Ardon v. City of Los Angeles (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1176, 1189, 199 Cal. Rptr.3d 743, 366 P.3d 996.) Disclosure to one member of the public waives the exemption, " ‘requiring disclosure to any other person who requests a copy.’ " (County of Santa Clam, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1321-1322, 89 Cal.Rptr.3d 374.)

B. Facts and Procedural Background

1. Kinney’s CPRA Request and Petition

On December 23, 2019, Kinney e-mailed a public records request to City, asking City to disclose the name of a crime victim, specifically, the owner of a vehicle reported stolen on May 23. Kinney’s request indicated that Kinney...