Kinney v. Cnty. of Berks

1

JACOB S. KINNEY v. COUNTY OF BERKS, WARDEN JANINE QUIGLEY, DEPUTY WARDEN STEPHANIE SMITH, SERGEANT MOREY, SERGEANT HUGGINS, LIEUTENANT SCHERE, CORRECTIONAL OFFICER MICHAEL EVANS, CORRECTIONAL OFFICER DARRAH HARLEY, CORRECTIONAL OFFICER BRENNA DELP, CORRECTIONAL OFFICER STONES, CORRECTIONAL OFFICER MERCADO, CORRECTIONAL OFFICER MICHAEL FERYO, CORRECTIONAL OFFICER CHRISTOPHER VOLLMER, CORRECTIONAL OFFICER REICHERT, CORRECTIONAL OFFICER WEIDNER, CORRECTIONAL OFFICER RUFFNER, PRIMECARE MEDICAL, INC., KENNETH R. WLOCZEWSKI, WILLIAM CATTELL, JESSE T. KIRSCH, CORINNE E. BERGER

Civil Action No. 22-2566

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

June 6, 2023

MEMORANDUM

MURPHY, J.

I. Introduction

In this case, when a twenty-one-year-old entered prison as a pre-trial detainee, there were red flags suggesting he could attempt suicide. Neither the correctional officers nor the prison's medical providers addressed the detainee's condition until three days after he arrived. The detainee attempted suicide on his fourth day in prison. And at the exact time he attempted suicide, on-duty correctional officers responsible for checking on him noted that he was in good health.

The detainee sued prison officials, the prison's medical provider, its physicians, and the local municipality for causing the injuries he suffered. Chiefly, he argues the parties inflicted cruel and unusual punishment on him by failing to provide adequate medical care and failing to stop him from attempting suicide.

His allegations plausibly show the correctional officers and treating physicians violated his constitutional rights. We deny defendants' motions to dismiss where the detainee sufficiently pled the personal involvement of the state actors at issue. Also, the allegations plausibly demonstrate that the prison's medical provider has a policy or custom that inflicted cruel and unusual punishment on the detainee. We deny the medical providers' motion on that front as well.

But we grant defendants' motions to dismiss the detainee's conspiracy claim. The detainee has not alleged a plausible agreement and concerted action among correctional officers and medical providers to deprive him of his constitutional rights.

Lastly the detainee brings state law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence. Although the detainee cannot sue a local government or its correctional officers in their official capacities, he sues the prison's correctional officers for emotional distress in their individual capacities. So, his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim survives in that respect. And his emotional distress claim against the prison's medical provider sets forth just enough to survive the pleadings stage. His negligence claim against the local municipality, however, fails under Pennsylvania law.

II. Alleged Facts

On July 3, 2020, twenty-one-year-old Jacob Kinney checked himself into Reading Hospital. DI 11 ¶ 5, 44. He had abused opioids and heroin, and requested detoxification. Id. Mr. Kinney's emergency room physicians diagnosed him with a panoply of drug-related illnesses. Id. The ER workers documented his condition and placed him on 1:1 observation to avoid the risk of suicide. Id.

Prior to discharge from the ER, a doctor and social worker recommended Mr. Kinney enter inpatient detoxification. Id. Instead, Mr. Kinney was moved from the ER to Berks County Jail. Id. He arrived in jail later on July 3. Id. Correctional Defendants^[1]and PrimeCare Defendants^[2]received his ER paperwork. Id.

Correctional Defendants and PrimeCare Defendants did not evaluate Mr. Kinney's physical or mental condition once he arrived. Id. ¶¶ 45-46. It was not until three days passed that Jesse Kirsch, a physician's assistant for PrimeCare Medical, responded to a “medical sick call” and assessed Mr. Kinney. Id. ¶ 84. PA Kirsch had access to Mr. Kinney's ER records. Id. ¶ 85. PA Kirsch noted that Mr. Kinney last used drugs on July 2. Id. ¶ 84.^[3]And according to PA Kirsch, Mr. Kinney suffered from “severe withdrawal symptoms.” Id.^[4] PA Kirsch planned to check on Mr. Kinney “as needed.” Id.

On the same day, July 6, Mr. Kinney requested a mental health evaluation. Id. ¶ 92. Social worker Corrine Berger completed the evaluation. Id. Ms. Berger had interacted with Mr. Kinney in some capacity prior to July 6. Id. She had access to Mr. Kinney's ER paperwork. Id. Ms. Berger did not put Mr. Kinney on suicide watch after her assessment. Id. ¶ 96.

The next day, Brenna Delp - a jail treatment counselor - evaluated Mr. Kinney. Id. ¶ 97. Ms. Delp observed that Mr. Kinney suffered from substance abuse and mental health issues. Id. She recommended a mental health program for Mr. Kinney but did not place him on suicide watch. Id. ¶¶ 97, 102.

At some point on July 7, Mr. Kinney vocalized his intent to commit suicide to on-duty correctional officers. Id. ¶ 51. The correctional officers who heard Mr. Kinney relayed his statement to someone from PrimeCare Medical's staff. Id.¶ 54. The correctional officers did not enact suicide precautions after Mr. Kinney told them of his plan. Id. ¶ 53.

Still on July 7, the correctional officers responsible for monitoring Mr. Kinney documented their routine, fifteen-minute passes by his cell. Id. ¶ 58. The officers annotated their wellness check-ins beginning at 7:17 PM. Id. ¶ 59. During the 7:17 to 9:38 PM time frame, Mr. Kinney “wrote a lengthy suicide note.” Id.

At or around 9:30 PM, Mr. Kinney attempted suicide by using bed linens to hang himself. Id. ¶¶ 56, 122. In the 9:38 PM recordation of Mr. Kinney's wellness check, Correctional Officer Zared Reichart noted that Mr. Kinney was fine. Id. ¶ 65. Correctional Officer Adam Ruffner used an artificial airway to keep Mr. Kinney alive at the same time - 9:38 PM. Id. Mr. Kinney survived. On July 8, the day after he attempted suicide, he was screened for suicide risk. Id. ¶ 74.

Mr. Kinney's suicide attempt caused a legion of physical ailments, including “multi organ failure, seizures, paralysis, and brain injury.” Id. ¶ 123. He is now permanently disabled. Id. Almost two years after the events in question, he sued.

III. Defendants' Motions to Dismiss^[5]

Mr. Kinney brings six causes of action.^[6]They revolve around 42 U.S.C. § 1983, with two state law claims included.^[7]

Congress imposes two baseline requirements to sue under § 1983: “(1) the conduct complained of must be committed by a person acting under color of state law and, (2) it must have deprived the plaintiff of a right or privilege secured by the Constitution or the law of the United States.” Riley v. Jeffes, 777 F.2d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 1985). Correctional Defendants and PrimeCare Defendants challenge Mr. Kinney's ability to plead part two of his § 1983 claims. They separately moved to dismiss some - but not all - of his claims. See DI 16, 23. Specifically, Berks County did not move to dismiss Mr. Kinney's Monell^[8]claim, and PrimeCare Defendants did not move to dismiss Mr. Kinney's state law negligence claim.

We heard oral arguments on the motions. DI 37. They are ripe for disposition.

IV. Analysis

A. Failure to Provide Adequate Medical Care

Mr. Kinney alleges that Correctional Defendants and PrimeCare Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment^[9] right to adequate medical treatment. DI 11 ¶ 145. He claims that defendants' reckless and deliberate indifference toward his unstable health condition caused his injuries. Id. ¶ 148.

1. Summary of Correctional Defendants' Motion

Correctional Defendants focus less on Mr. Kinney's allegations and more on the standard for reviewing a pre-trial detainee's “vulnerability-to-suicide” claim. See DI 24 at 5-7. They argue Mr. Kinney's claim as drafted, which alleges a reckless or deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, does not apply the correct legal framework. Id. The right framework, according to Correctional Defendants, comes from the Third Circuit's decision in Colburn v. Upper Darby Township (“Colburn II”), 946 F.2d 1017 (3d Cir. 1991). Id. at 5-6. The Third Circuit in Colburn II listed three elements a prisoner must prove to demonstrate a constitutional violation involving suicide:

(1) that the individual had a particular vulnerability to suicide, meaning that there was a “strong likelihood, rather than a mere possibility,” that a suicide would be attempted;

(2) that the prison official knew or should have known of the individual's particular vulnerability; and

(3) that the official acted with reckless or deliberate indifference, meaning something beyond mere negligence, to the individual's particular vulnerability.

Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 223-24 (3d Cir. 2017) (summarizing Colburn II).

Mr. Kinney disagrees with Correctional Defendants' argument that a “general deliberate indifference to serious medical needs standard simply does not apply here.” DI 24 at 6; see DI 25 at 10. In response, Mr. Kinney explains how the Third Circuit's analysis in Colburn II comes from the Supreme Court's decision in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), which in turn requires a prisoner allege facts that support two factors: “(1) a serious medical need, and (2) sufficiently harmful acts or omissions . . . that demonstrate a deliberate indifference to that medical need.” DI 25 at 10. But at the same time, Mr. Kinney argues “[t]he facts stated in the [a]mended [c]omplaint clearly meet the pleading standard of the elements of a prison suicide case as set forth in Colburn.” Id. at 11.

At bottom, Mr. Kinney argues he has met his burden at the pleadings stage no matter what standard is used. Id. at 13. He says “there can be no question” that the facts exhibit his particular vulnerability to suicide. Id. at 11. In support, he references the “history...