Kiphart v. Saturn Corp.

74 F.Supp.2d 769

Ronald Jeffrey KIPHART v. SATURN CORPORATION, et al.

No. 1-97-0054.

United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division.

September 30, 1999.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Mary Ann Parker, Brenda Rhoton Little, Parker & Crofford, Nashville, TN, James E. Goodman, Goodman & Associates, P.C., Atlanta, GA, Michael E. Terry, Stephanie H. Gore, Nashville, TN, for Plaintiff.

Robert Earl Boston, Waverly David Crenshaw, Jr., Stephen W. Grace, Thomas H. Lee, Mark W. Peters, Waller, Lansden, Dortch & Davis, Nashville, TN, G. Geoffrey Weirich, Susan E. Himmer, Paul, Hastings Janofsky & Walker, Atlanta, GA, Alice M. Osburn, Saturn Corp., Detroit, MI, Connye Harper, Detroit, MI, Michael Hamilton, Lee D. Anderson, Provost, Umphrey Law Firm, LLP, Nashville, TN, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

HIGGINS, District Judge.

The plaintiff, Ronald Jeffrey Kiphart, is one of the original 77 plaintiffs who brought this action against Saturn Corporation; International Union, United Auto, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America; and Local 1853 International Union, United Auto, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and more than twenty other federal and state law claims. By voluntary dismissal and agreed order, 18 plaintiffs have been dismissed from this action and all claims, except the ADA claims, have been dismissed by the remaining 59 plaintiffs.¹ See orders (entered October 8, 1997 and March 2, 1998; Docket Entry Nos. 34 and 184).

At the pretrial conference on February 8, 1999, the Court determined to try the ADA claims of a single pilot plaintiff to expedite the disposition of the claims of the remaining plaintiffs.² Mr. Kiphart was chosen, and the only claim of Mr. Kiphart against the defendants remaining for trial was his ADA claim for failure to reasonably accommodate his alleged disabilities.

The trial of this pilot plaintiff commenced on March 8, 1999. At the close of the plaintiff's proof, the Court granted the Rule 50 motion of the UAW International Union on the grounds that the International Union was not a joint employer, and the International Union was dismissed from this action. At the close of all the evidence, Saturn and Local 1853 moved for judgment as a matter of law. Local 1853's motion was granted and it was dismissed from this action, while Saturn's³ motion was taken under advisement.

I.

Mr. Kiphart is 46 years old and has been an employee of General Motors for 28 years. In 1990, Mr. Kiphart moved to Tennessee where he began work as an operating technician at Saturn. Saturn is an automobile manufacturing plant located in Spring Hill, Tennessee, which employs over 7,000 employees.

Mr. Kiphart claims that from April 18, 1992, through November 22, 1996, he was disabled within the meaning of the ADA. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that he had tendinitis, bilateral chronic ulnar neuropathy, a fused cervical spine at the C6-C7 level, and chronic depression, and that these conditions substantially limited one or more of his major life activities. The plaintiff alleges that he was incapable of performing certain manual tasks, was restricted from lifting more than thirty pounds, and that his ability to think, concentrate, interact with others, and sleep were substantially impaired. The plaintiff further alleges that, even if he was not disabled within the meaning of the ADA because his physical and mental impairments did not substantially limit one of his major life activities, he was nevertheless disabled within the meaning of the ADA because he had a record of such an impairment or the defendant perceived him as so impaired.

Mr. Kiphart alleges that, despite the fact that his physical and mental impairments substantially limited his major life activities during the time in question, he was qualified to perform the essential functions of his job, with or without an accommodation. He also asserts that he sought an accommodation from Saturn by requesting that he be permanently placed on a team where he could be fully functional and fully rotational.⁴ Mr. Kiphart contends that instead of accommodating his disability by giving him a permanent placement on a team, Saturn gave him temporary positions and then, from April 18, 1996, through November 22, 1996,⁵ placed him on involuntary leave, both on the basis of his disability in violation of the ADA.⁶

Saturn concedes that during the relevant period Mr. Kiphart had a physical impairment but denies that he was disabled within the meaning of the ADA, either because of his impairment, because he had a record of an impairment, or because he was regarded as having an impairment. Saturn asserts that, even if Mr. Kiphart was disabled within the meaning of the ADA, he was not an otherwise qualified person with a disability within the meaning of the Act because he was unable to perform the essential functions of his job with or without a reasonable accommodation. Specifically, Saturn asserts that an essential function of Mr. Kiphart's position was that he be fully functional and fully rotational and that because he was not, he was not an otherwise qualified person with a disability within the meaning of the Act.

Saturn also asserts that, even if Mr. Kiphart was an otherwise qualified disabled person within the meaning of the ADA, it provided him with a reasonable accommodation by placing him in Saturn's Member Placement Program. Through this program, Saturn provided Mr. Kiphart with temporary assignments and extended leave with disability benefits.

For the reasons stated below, Saturn's motion for judgment as a matter of law will be granted.

II.

In determining whether to grant Saturn's motion for judgment as a matter of law, the Court determines whether the record contains evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find in favor of Mr. Kiphart. Monday v. Oullette, 118 F.3d 1099, 1101-02 (6th Cir.1997). The Court views the evidence in a light most favorable to Mr. Kiphart and gives him the benefit of all reasonable inferences. Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1081 (6th Cir.1994); Smith Corona Corp. v. Pelikan, Inc., 784 F.Supp. 452, 460-61 (M.D.Tenn.1992).

The issue to be determined is "whether there is sufficient evidence to raise a question of fact for the jury. The trial court may neither weigh the evidence, pass on the credibility of the witnesses nor substitute its judgment for that of the jury." Smith Corona, 784 F.Supp. at 461. A Rule 50 motion is to be granted if "the evidence is uncontradicted and a reasonable mind could only draw one conclusion from the evidence." Id. The Court applies this standard in reaching its conclusions herein.

III.

Under the ADA, employers may not discriminate "against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The ADA definition of the term "`discriminate' includes `not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or an employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of the covered entity.'" Smith v. Ameritech, 129 F.3d 857, 866 (6th Cir.1997) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)).

Mr. Kiphart's ADA claim is based on his assertion that Saturn failed to reasonably accommodate his disability. In order to demonstrate a prima facie case of disability discrimination under this claim, a plaintiff must establish that during the relevant time period: (1) he was disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) he was qualified to perform the essential functions of his job with or without reasonable accommodations; and (3) Saturn either refused to make a reasonable accommodation for his disability or took an adverse employment action against him based solely upon his disability. Ameritech, 129 F.3d at 866 (citing Roush v. Weastec, Inc., 96 F.3d 840, 843 (6th Cir.1996)); see also, McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg., U.S.A., Inc., 110 F.3d 369, 371 (6th Cir.1997).

A. Disability

The ADA provides three definitions of disability: (1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (2) a record of such impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). A plaintiff's subjective belief that he is "disabled" is insufficient as a matter of law to entitle him to protection under the ADA. Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 585 (6th Cir.1992) (holding that rumors, conclusory allegations, and subjective beliefs are insufficient to support a discrimination claim). Similarly, injuries or workplace restrictions are not, without more, "disabilities" under the ADA. Snow v. Ridgeview Med. Ctr., 128 F.3d 1201, 1207 (8th Cir.1997); Robinson v. Global Marine Drilling Co., 101 F.3d 35, 37 n. 2 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1228, 117 S.Ct. 1820, 137 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1997).

In Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, ___, 118 S.Ct. 2196, 2202, 141 L.Ed.2d 540, 553 (1998), the Supreme Court of the United States set forth a three-prong test for determining whether a plaintiff has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities. The first consideration is whether each of the plaintiff's asserted ailments constitutes a physical or mental impairment. Id. The second consideration is whether the life activities upon which the plaintiff relies constitute major life activities under the ADA. Id. The third consideration is whether the impairments substantially limited the asserted major life activities during the relevant...