Kissinger v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch.

293 F.Supp.3d 796

Donald KISSINGER, Jr., Plaintiff,

v.FORT WAYNE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, City of Fort Wayne, Gradlin Pruitt, Barry Pruser, and Darrell Armstead, Defendants.

Case No. 1:16–CV–126 JD

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.

Signed February 26, 2018

Christopher C. Myers, Lori W. Jansen, David W. Frank, Christopher C. Myers & Associates, Fort Wayne, IN, for Plaintiff.

Matthew J. Elliott Beckman Lawson LLP, Calvert S. Miller, Rebecca Kleber, Carson LLP, Fort Wayne, IN, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JON E. DEGUILIO, Judge, United States District Court

At the start of his senior year at L.C. Ward Education Center ("Ward"), Plaintiff Donald Kissinger, Jr. ("Kissinger"), applied for special permission to drive to school. He did not complete the necessary application process prior to the start of the academic year, but nonetheless began driving himself and other students to and from school, in violation of Ward's rules. School authorities confronted Kissinger about his noncompliance on August 26, 2015. Based on his responses to their questions, they suspected he had drugs in his car, which on that day was parked off school grounds, about one block away. A school official and a Fort Wayne police officer accompanied Kissinger to his car, where a search of the vehicle produced a marijuana pipe and burnt marijuana residue. The police officer handcuffed Kissinger and placed him under arrest. Kissinger subsequently agreed to attend another school for the semester in lieu of expulsion.

Kissinger filed this action against Fort Wayne Community Schools ("FWCS") under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for maintaining an unconstitutional policy in violation of the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. He also brings individual claims against Gradlin Pruitt (Ward's principal), Darrel Armstead (Ward's administrative assistant), and Officer Barry Pruser of the Fort Wayne Police Department (Ward's school resource officer), for subjecting him to an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Kissinger also asserted claims against those individuals under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3) and 1986, but he has since voluntarily dismissed those claims along with a separate Fourteenth Amendment claim against FWCS and Pruitt. [DE 49 at 1] Lastly, Kissinger brings state law claims against all Defendants for false arrest and false imprisonment.

Defendants have moved for summary judgment and the motions are ripe for review. For the reasons stated herein, the Court will grant Defendants' motions for summary judgment [DE 45; DE 47] with regard to Kissinger's federal claims, and will dismiss Kissinger's state law claims without prejudice. The Court will further deny Defendants' motions to strike [DE 51; DE 54] as moot.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

On summary judgment, the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that there "is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A "material" fact is one identified by the substantive law as affecting the outcome of the suit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A "genuine issue" exists with respect to any material fact when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. Where a factual record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial, and summary judgment should be granted. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (citing Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Servs. Co. , 391 U.S. 253, 289, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968) ). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, this Court must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable and justifiable inferences in that party's favor. Jackson v. Kotter , 541 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2008) ; King v. Preferred Tech. Grp. , 166 F.3d 887, 890 (7th Cir. 1999).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Ward and Its Policies

Ward (a public school) differs from other schools within the FWCS system because it is an "alternative placement school." As such, Ward provides an alternative learning environment for "middle and high school students who have been removed from their regular schools for significant rule violations involving drugs, weapons, fighting, and the like." [Pruitt Decl. ¶ 2] Drug possession and/or use counts as one of the most common rule violations. Id.

Due to its nature as an alternative school and its students' histories of "significant disciplinary issues," Ward has stricter rules than other FWCS schools. Id. ¶ 3. For example, Ward's students may not drive themselves to and from school (as opposed to taking a school bus) except under special circumstances, after submitting an application to and receiving approval from the administrative staff. In the administration's experience with students at Ward, "cars and illicit activity—particularly drug activity—go together," and this rule seeks to combat that issue. [Pruitt Decl. ¶ 11] If granted permission to drive, students must park in the school parking lot. In addition, students may never transport one another to and from school, and may not congregate in or around each other's vehicles at any time. According to the administration, riding together in cars increases the likelihood that students will engage in illegal conduct and drug use. [Pruitt Decl. ¶ 11]

Ward's official policies allow for student searches based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. If the staff approves a student's request to drive, the school's handbook warns students:

Any vehicle parked on school grounds or driven without the administration's approval and parked elsewhere is still subject to search in accordance with the FWCS search and seizure policy providing that the administration has reasonable suspicion to believe an unethical or illegal act may have taken place in or by using said vehicle.

[Ward Handbook at 12–13] (emphasis added). As a part of the FWCS system, Ward's students must also comply with the FWCS-wide rules, id. at 6, which further state that "[a]uthorized school personnel may conduct a search of a student ... automobile, if they have reasonable suspicion for a search." [FWCS Handbook at 32] According to FWCS, a search conducted under "reasonable suspicion" includes a search of a particular item that will lead to the discovery of "[a]nything that represents a danger of physical harm or illness to students, teachers, assistants or others, whether on school property, at a school-sponsored or school-supervised event or otherwise ." Id. (emphasis added).

Plaintiff's Path to Ward

Kissinger and his parents agreed for him to attend Ward rather than face expulsion from his traditional FWCS school, Snider High, for possessing drugs. [Pruitt Decl. ¶¶ 5–6, Exh. 3] In May 2015, while at Snider, Kissinger told a fellow student that he had smoked marijuana. Id. This led to a search of Kissinger's vehicle, where a school administrator and a police officer found cigarette butts, prescription medication, acetaminophen pills, two knives, and marijuana. Id.

Kissinger had previously faced drug-related disciplinary action at Snider, including a 2013 suspension for possession of marijuana. [Pruitt Decl. ¶ 7, Exh. 4] According to the corresponding report, Kissinger smelled of marijuana at school. Id. He admitted to smoking marijuana two weeks prior, and a subsequent search of his locker produced "shake."¹ Id.

Plaintiff's Time at Ward in August 2015

Kissinger enrolled for the 2015–2016 academic year at Ward, which began on or around August 15, 2015. Before the school year started, Kissinger and his mother requested that he be allowed to attend Ward for half days so that he could work the other half. They also requested that Kissinger be allowed to drive to and from school, so that he could leave straight for work after class. Ward's principal of nearly ten years, Mr. Pruitt, approved this request, conditioned on Kissinger turning in the required application and documentation of his work schedule, and that he follow all of Ward's driving-related rules as discussed above.

Kissinger and his mother agreed to these terms, but he did not live up to his end of the agreement. During the first two weeks of class, Kissinger: drove to and from school on several occasions without turning in his application, despite several reminders; did not park in the school parking lot despite multiple, explicit instructions from Ward's administration; and repeatedly drove other students to and from Ward, including during the times he represented to the administration that he would be at work. The administration finally informed Kissinger that, if he did not submit the necessary application by August 26, 2015, then he would not be allowed to drive to school and would be placed back on full class days.

The Search

Kissinger drove himself and another student to Ward on August 26, 2015. He parked on Weibke Street, about one block away from Ward's campus. The administration questioned Kissinger as to why he had not turned in his application and whether he had driven another student to school that day. He provided untruthful responses. For example, Kissinger denied knowing where he was supposed to park, despite having previously been explicitly shown by Mr. Armstead. He also denied driving another student to school that morning, which was false. Based on Kissinger's evasiveness and several other factors, Mr. Pruitt suspected that Kissinger had contraband (specifically, drugs) in his car and ordered a search. Kissinger led a school administrator, Mr. Armstead, and the school resource officer, Officer Pruser, to his off campus vehicle. While Kissinger and Officer Pruser stood by, Mr. Armstead searched the vehicle and found a marijuana pipe...