Kitchen Planners, LLC v. Friedman

440 S.C. 456

892 S.E.2d 297

The KITCHEN PLANNERS, LLC, Petitioner, v. Samuel E. FRIEDMAN and Jane Breyer Friedman and Branch Banking and Trust, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2020-001669

Opinion No. 28173

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Submitted April 17, 2023

Filed August 23, 2023

Christopher P. Kenney, of Columbia, Petitioner. ¹

Charles A. Krawczyk, of Finkel Law Firm LLC, of Columbia for Respondents.

JUSTICE FEW :

The Kitchen Planners, LLC, filed a petition for a writ of certiorari asking this Court to review the court of appeals’ decision in Kitchen Planners, LLC v. Friedman , 432 S.C. 267, 851 S.E.2d 724 (2020). In that decision, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's order granting summary judgment to the Friedmans and dissolving Kitchen Planners’ mechanic's lien. We granted Kitchen Planners’ petition in part and now affirm as modified. As we will explain, the court of appeals incorrectly applied the wrong standard of decision for a motion for summary judgment when the motion is based on insufficiency of the evidence. Reviewing the circuit court's order using the correct standard of decision, however, we nevertheless find the court of appeals reached the correct result in affirming the summary judgment. ²

The court of appeals’ opinion contains an exhaustive recitation of the facts. 432 S.C. at 271-74, 851 S.E.2d at 726-28. Of importance, the Friedmans contracted with Kitchen Planners to procure cabinets manufactured by Crystal Cabinets and install the cabinets in the Friedmans’ home. When Kitchen Planners delivered the cabinets, the Friedmans refused to accept them and refused to pay the final one-third of the contract price. Kitchen Planners attempted to perfect its mechanic's lien ³ by serving on the Friedmans "a statement of a just and true account of the amount due" as required by section 29-5-90 of the South Carolina Code (2007). Kitchen Planners then filed this action to enforce the lien.

The Friedmans filed a motion for summary judgment contending Kitchen Planners failed to perfect its lien because it did not serve the section 29-5-90 "statement" within ninety days as required by the section. See id. ("Such a lien shall be dissolved unless the person desiring to avail himself thereof, within ninety days after he ceases to labor on or furnish labor or materials for such building or structure, serves upon the owner ... a statement of a just and true account of the amount due ...."). The circuit court agreed and granted the motion for summary judgment. ⁴

Rule 56(c) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment "if the [evidence before the court] show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." To survive the Friedmans’ motion, Kitchen Planners was required by Rule 56(c) to present evidence that it perfected its lien by serving the section 29-5-90 statement on the Friedmans "within ninety days after [Kitchen Planners] cease[d] to labor on or furnish labor or materials for such building or structure." § 29-5-90. Sufficient evidence that Kitchen Planners timely served the statement would have established a "genuine issue [of] material fact" as to whether it perfected the lien. Whether Kitchen Planners presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that it met the ninety-day deadline for serving the section 29-5-90 statement is the sole issue before the Court.

The following dates are important. The cabinets were delivered to the Friedmans’ home on May 20, 2015. Kitchen Planners’ sole member—Patricia Comose—accompanied an installer to the Friedmans’ home on May 21 for the purpose of installing the cabinets. The cabinets were not installed. On June 18, a Crystal Cabinets representative informed Comose the Friedmans did not want Comose involved any further. According to Comose, "In mid-June 2015 I was taken off the job." On August 18, the Crystal Cabinets representative emailed Comose telling her Crystal Cabinets had also been removed from the job. "We've been fired," the email stated, "Everything is done." On September 29, Comose wrote a check for $550.61 to pay for parts of the cabinets she ordered on an unknown previous date. Kitchen Planners served the section 29-5-90 statement on the Friedmans on November 17, 2015. Ninety days before November 17 is August 19.

In the section of its opinion entitled "Standard of Review," the court of appeals stated, "[I]n cases applying the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof, the non-moving party is only required to submit a mere scintilla of evidence in order to withstand a motion for summary judgment." 432 S.C. at 275, 851 S.E.2d at 729 (alteration in original) (quoting Hancock v. Mid-S. Mgmt. Co. , 381 S.C. 326, 330, 673 S.E.2d 801, 803 (2009) ). As we explain below, Comose's statement she wrote a check on September 29 to pay for parts of the Friedmans’ cabinets is a scintilla of evidence the November 17 service of the section 29-5-90 statement was "within ninety days after [Kitchen Planners] cease[d] to labor on or furnish labor or materials." Applying the so-called "mere scintilla" standard, therefore, the court of appeals should have reversed the order granting summary judgment. As we now clarify, however, the "mere scintilla" standard is not the correct standard for decision under Rule 56(c).

Rule 56(c) became effective in 1985. Rule 86(a), SCRCP. ⁵ In most cases applying Rule 56(c), this Court and our court of appeals have applied the "genuine issue of material fact" standard set forth in the Rule, requiring the party opposing the motion show a "reasonable inference" to be drawn from the evidence, and we have rejected the "mere scintilla" standard. See, e.g. , Vaughan v. Town of Lyman , 370 S.C. 436, 448, 635 S.E.2d 631, 638 (2006) (reversing an award of summary judgment and stating "the evidence is susceptible to more than one reasonable inference, and therefore should be submitted to the jury"); Russell v. Wachovia Bank, N.A. , 353 S.C. 208, 219 n.4, 578 S.E.2d 329, 334 n.4 (2003) ("The standard for summary judgment ‘mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under Rule 50(a)’ [SCRCP]." ⁶ (quoting Baughman v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. , 306 S.C. 101, 115, 410 S.E.2d 537, 545 (1991) )); Baughman , 306 S.C. at 115, 410 S.E.2d at 545 (holding a party opposing summary judgment "must ... ‘do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts’ but ‘must come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. ’ " (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538, 552 (1986) ); ⁷ Shelton v. LS & K, Inc. , 374 S.C. 294, 297, 648 S.E.2d 307, 308 (2007) ("The existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party's position is not sufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment." (citing Bravis v. Dunbar , 316 S.C. 263, 265, 449 S.E.2d 495, 496 (1994) )); Dickert v. Metro. Life Ins. Co. , 306 S.C. 311, 313, 411 S.E.2d 672, 673 (1991), rev'd in part on other grounds , 311 S.C. 218, 428 S.E.2d 700 (1993) (stating "the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party's position is not sufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment") (citing Anderson , 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S. Ct. at 2512, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 214 )). ⁸ But see Anders v. S.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. , 307 S.C. 371, 375, 415 S.E.2d 406, 408 (1992) ("At the summary judgment stage of the proceeding, it was only necessary for the Defendant to submit a scintilla of evidence warranting a determination by the jury." (citing nothing)).

In 2009 in Hancock , however, this Court made the statement quoted by the court of appeals in this case, "that in cases applying the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof, the non-moving party is only required to submit a mere scintilla of evidence in order to withstand a motion for summary judgment." 381 S.C. at 330, 673 S.E.2d at 803. In other cases even after Hancock , we continued to impose the "genuine issue of material fact" and "reasonable inference" standard that appears inconsistent with the "mere scintilla" standard Hancock purported to set. See Town of Hollywood v. Floyd , 403 S.C. 466, 477, 744 S.E.2d 161, 166 (2013) (stating as to the summary judgment standard "it is not sufficient for a party to create an inference that is not reasonable or an issue of fact that is not genuine"); see also Callawassie Island Members Club, Inc. v. Martin , 437 S.C. 148, 157, 877 S.E.2d 341, 345 (2022) (stating as to a motion for summary judgment, "When determining if any triable issues of fact exist, the evidence and all reasonable inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." (quoting Fleming v. Rose , 350 S.C. 488, 493-94, 567 S.E.2d 857, 860 (2002) )); Bluestein v. Town of Sullivan's Island , 429 S.C. 458, 462, 839 S.E.2d 879, 881 (2020) (same); Bell v. Progressive Direct Ins. Co. , 407 S.C. 565, 576, 757 S.E.2d 399, 404 (2014) (reciting the "mere scintilla" standard from Hancock , but stating, "Nevertheless, ‘when the evidence is susceptible of only one reasonable interpretation, summary judgment may be granted.’ " (quoting Brooks v. Northwood Little League, Inc. , 327 S.C. 400, 403, 489 S.E.2d 647, 648 (1997) )).

We acknowledge there may be disagreement as to whether the "mere scintilla" standard is inconsistent with the Rule 56(c) "genuine issue [of] material fact" standard. See Taylor v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co. , 78 S.C. 552, 556, 59 S.E. 641, 643 (1907) ("A scintilla of evidence is any material evidence that if true would tend to establish the issue in the mind of a reasonable juror."). The position that the two standards are the same would explain this Court's recitation of both at various times since 1985. In the minds of many, however, the...