Klaneski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

680 F.Supp.3d 170

Rosa Lee KLANESKI, as Assignee of Farmington Auto Park, LLC, as Assignee of Gora, Plaintiff, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CO.;Robert Fulginiti; and Kelly Tierney, Defendants.

No. 3:22-cv-1458 (VAB)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

Signed June 30, 2023

Rosa Lee Klaneski, Farmington, CT, Pro Se.

Michael R. McPherson, Halloran & Sage LLP, Hartford, CT, Rachel J. Fain, Usery & Associates, Hartford, CT, for Defendants.

RULING AND ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

VICTOR A. BOLDEN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Rosa Lee Klaneski ("Plaintiff") has sued State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm"), Robert Fulginiti, and Kelly Tierney (collectively, "Defendants"), alleging that Defendants unreasonably delayed their resolution of a claim involving an automobile accident and failed to pay the full amount owed under an automobile insurance policy. See Compl., ECF No. 1. The policy, which was held by David Gora, covered a 2013 Honda Civic owned by Halina Gora. See id. at 2. The Goras later assigned their rights under the policy to Farmington Auto Park, LLC, which in turn assigned these rights to Ms. Klaneski. See id. at 5. Ms. Klaneski now asserts claims under the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTCA"), the federal mail and wire fraud statutes, the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act ("CUIPA"), the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act ("CUTPA"), state insurance regulations, and state common law. See id. at 4-10.

Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 13 ("Mot.").

For the following reasons, Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

Ms. Klaneski's claims under federal law are DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim.

Because the federal claims are dismissed and the Court does not have diversity jurisdiction over this action, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Ms. Klaneski's state law claims. These claims are DISMISSED without prejudice to refiling in state court.

If Ms. Klaneski believes that the jurisdictional defects identified in this Ruling and Order can be cured, she must seek leave to file an Amended Complaint by August 4, 2023, or this action will be dismissed with prejudice.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Factual Allegations

On or about June 1, 2022, the Goras' vehicle was allegedly involved in a serious accident. Compl. at 2. As a result, the vehicle was allegedly towed to Farmington Auto Park to await an appraisal of whether the vehicle could be repaired or would be deemed a total loss. Id.

After the accident, Mr. Gora allegedly filed a claim under his State Farm policy. Id. at 2-3. State Farm allegedly instructed Mr. Gora to take photos of the vehicle on his cell phone and send them to the insurer for appraisal. Id. at 3. Although Mr. Gora allegedly requested that State Farm send an appraiser in person, State Farm allegedly did not do so. Id. Based on the photos submitted by Mr. Gora, State Farm appraiser Robert Fulginiti allegedly assessed that the vehicle could be repaired for $8,007.71 and submitted this estimate to Farmington Auto Park. Id.

Farmington Auto Park allegedly disputed this appraisal, based in part on Mr. Fulginiti's failure to include the cost of repairing the vehicle's front end. Id. Farmington Auto Park allegedly requested a supplemental appraisal and advised State Farm that the total cost to repair the vehicle would exceed Mr. Fulginiti's estimate by at least $5,000. Id. at 4. According to the Complaint, State Farm then sent Mr. Tierney to complete a supplemental appraisal in person. Id. Based on this new appraisal, State Farm concluded that the vehicle was a total loss. Id.

After State Farm deemed the vehicle a total loss, Farmington Auto Park allegedly presented State Farm with an invoice for $10,152.17. Id. State Farm allegedly issued a partial payment of $2,478.80, leaving an outstanding balance of $7,673.37. Id.

According to the Complaint, State Farm's inaccurate initial estimate and its initial failure to perform an in-person appraisal caused the Goras' vehicle to sit idle and damaged for a longer period than necessary. Id. During this period, the vehicle accrued daily storage charges and occupied space at Farmington Auto Park. Id.

Ms. Klaneski also alleges that Farmington Auto Park repeatedly contacted State Farm regarding the extent of damage to the vehicle, the accruing storage costs, and the unpaid claim, and that State Farm unreasonably took two months to complete the claim. Id.

B. Procedural History

On November 14, 2022, Ms. Klaneski filed her Complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. Compl.

On January 19, 2023, Defendants filed their motion to dismiss Ms. Klaneski's Complaint. Mot.; Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 13-1 ("Mem.").

On February 6, 2023, Ms. Klaneski filed her opposition to Defendants' motion to dismiss. Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 16 ("Opp'n").

On February 10, 2023, the parties filed their Rule 26(f) report. Rule 26(f) Report, ECF No. 17.

On February 13, 2023, the Court issued a scheduling order. Scheduling Order, ECF No. 18.

On February 21, 2023, Defendants filed a reply in support of their motion to dismiss. Defs.' Reply to Pl.'s Obj. to Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 19 ("Reply").

On April 21, 2023, the Court granted Defendants' motion to stay discovery pending the resolution of Defendants' motion to dismiss. Order, ECF No. 24.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

"A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(1) when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it." Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims. Id.

"When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the court must take all facts alleged in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff." Sweet v. Sheahan, 235 F.3d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Johnson, 461 F.3d 164, 171 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Sweet, 235 F.3d at 83). The Court may also, however, resolve disputed jurisdictional fact issues "by referring to evidence outside of the pleadings, such as affidavits, and if necessary, hold an evidentiary hearing." Karlen ex rel. J.K. v. Westport Bd. of Educ., 638 F. Supp. 2d 293, 298 (D. Conn. 2009) (citing Zappia Middle E. Constr. Co. v. Emirate of Abu Dhabi, 215 F.3d 247, 253 (2d Cir. 2000)).

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

A complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Any claim that fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted" will be dismissed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In reviewing a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), a court applies a "plausibility standard" guided by "[t]wo working principles." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

First, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id.; see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ("While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." (alteration in original) (citations omitted)). Second, "only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Thus, the complaint must contain "factual amplification . . . to render a claim plausible." Arista Records LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Turkmen v. Ashcroft, 589 F.3d 542, 546 (2d Cir. 2009)).

When reviewing a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court takes all factual allegations in the complaint as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. The court also views the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and draws all inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Cohen v. S.A.C. Trading Corp., 711 F.3d 353, 359 (2d Cir. 2013); see also York v. Ass'n of the Bar of N.Y.C., 286 F.3d 122, 125 (2d Cir. 2002) ("On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, we construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepting the complaint's allegations as true.").

A court considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) generally limits its review "to the facts as asserted within the four corners of the complaint, the documents attached to the complaint as exhibits, and any documents incorporated in the complaint by reference." McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2007). A court may also consider "matters of which judicial notice may be taken" and "documents either in plaintiffs' possession or of which plaintiffs had knowledge and relied on in bringing suit." Brass v. Am. Film Techs., Inc., 987 F.2d 142, 150 (2d Cir. 1993); Patrowicz v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 2d 140, 144 (D. Conn. 2005).

III. DISCUSSION

The federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Lussier, 211 F.3d 697, 700 (2d Cir. 2000) ("It is axiomatic that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may not decide cases over which they lack subject matter jurisdiction."). "It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction." Kokkonen v....