Klaus v. Vill. of Tijeras

1

DIANE KLAUS, Plaintiff, v. VILLAGE OF TIJERAS, JAKE BRUTON, DON JOHNSON, FELIX GARCIA and MAXINE WILSON, in their individual and official capacities, Defendants.

Civ. No. 20-1105 JFR/KK

United States District Court, D. New Mexico

September 16, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ^[1]

JOHN F. ROBBENHAAR United States Magistrate Judge.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Claim for Violations of the New Mexico Whistleblower Protection Act (“Motion”), filed November 12, 2021.^[2] Doc. 132. On January 20, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Response. Doc. 160. On January 31, 2022, Defendants filed a Reply. Doc. 164. The Court, having considered counsel's arguments, the record, and the relevant law FINDS that Defendants' Motion is well taken and is GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Village of Tijeras (“Village”) hired Plaintiff as a Deputy Clerk in October of 2011. Doc. 1-1 at 2, ¶ 10. Plaintiff successfully completed her probationary period in May of 2012. Id. Plaintiff was classified as a regular, full time hourly employee. Id. at ¶ 11. From the date Plaintiff was hired until January 3, 2020 Gloria Chavez was the Mayor of the Village and was Plaintiff's direct supervisor. Id. at ¶ 12. After January 3, 2020, Defendant Jake Bruton, a former Village Council member, became the Mayor of the Village. Id. at ¶ 13.

Plaintiff alleges that beginning in 2017, Defendants Bruton, Johnson, Garcia and Wilson were vocal critics and opponents of Mayor Chavez and Plaintiff and initiated a concerted effort to terminate Plaintiff's employment in retaliation for, inter alia, her association and affiliation with Mayor Chavez, and for Plaintiff's attempts to enforce Village ordinances and her reporting to third parties in good faith what she believed were violations of state law by Village Councilors, malfeasance by Council members, and gross mismanagement, waste of funds and abuse of authority by Village Councilors. Id. at 4, ¶¶ 24-25. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants continued their efforts until she was terminated on the recommendation of newly elected Mayor Bruton. Id. at ¶ 26.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

A motion for summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986); Jones v. Kodak Med. Assistance Plan, 169 F.3d 1287, 1291 (10^th Cir. 1999); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of [the record] ... which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Catrett, 106 S.Ct. at 2552 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670-71 (10^thCir. 1998). Once the movant meets this burden, the non-moving party is required to put in the record facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). “A fact is ‘material' if, under the governing law, it could have an effect on the outcome of the lawsuit. A dispute over a material fact is ‘genuine' if a rational jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party on the evidence presented.” Adamson v. Multi Cmty. Diversified Servs., Inc., 514 F.3d 1136, 1145 (10^th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted); Bird v. W.Valley City, 832 F.3d 1188, 1199 (10^th Cir. 2016). Only material factual disputes preclude the entry of summary judgment. Atl. Richfield Co. v. Farm Credit Bank of Wichita, 226 F.3d 1138, 1148 (10^th Cir. 2000).

The trial judge is not to weigh the evidence to determine the truth of the matter, but instead must ask “whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented.” Anderson, 106 S.Ct. at 2512. “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 2510. To carry its initial burden, the moving party need not negate the nonmoving party's claim. See Allen v. Muskogee, Okla., 119 F.3d 837, 840 (10^th Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom. Smith v. Allen, 522 U.S. 1148 (1998). “‘Instead, the movant only bears the initial burden of ‘showing'-that is, pointing out to the district court-that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.'” Id. (quoting Catrett). Once the moving party meets its burden, the nonmoving party must “go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'” Catrett, 106 S.Ct. at 2552 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). A plaintiff cannot rely upon conclusory allegations or contentions of counsel to defeat summary judgment but rather must produce some specific factual support of its claim. See Pueblo Neighborhood Health Centers, Inc. v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 642, 649 (10^th Cir. 1988); Fritzcshe v. Albuquerque Mun. Sch. Dist., 194 F.Supp.2d 1194, 1206 (D.N.M. 2002). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.'” Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986) (citation omitted). Upon a motion for summary judgment, a court “must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and allow the nonmovant the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.” Kaus v. Standard Ins. Co., 985 F.Supp. 1277, 1281 (D. Kan. 1997). If there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute, then a court must next determine whether the movant is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Wood, 81 F.3d 988, 990 (10^th Cir. 1996).

III. ALLEGATIONS AND MATERIAL FACTS

Plaintiff alleges in her Complaint that Defendants were critical of and/or displeased with her and retaliated against her for (1) reporting that a conflict of interest existed when Defendant Bruton attempted to file a zoning application and pay the fee on behalf of a resident; (2) reporting a violation of the Anti-Donation Clause when Defendant Garcia took discarded scrap metal belonging to the Village and used it for his own benefit; (3) advising the Village Fire Marshall to enforce a zoning violation he found during his inspection of Defendant Bruton's auto repair business of “too many vehicles”; (4) participating in the award of a service contract, previously awarded to Defendant Bruton, to an automobile repair shop based on that shop's lower estimate consistent with best practices and the provisions of the Procurement Code; (5) requiring an applicant to pay a zoning application fee pursuant to the Village zoning ordinance that Defendants wanted waived; (6) requiring a resident who was a political ally of Defendant Wilson to stop digging a trench on property in violation of Village ordinances; and (7) requiring water users to pay late fees pursuant to the Village water ordinance that Defendants wanted waived. Doc. 132 at 2, ¶ 1; Doc. 160 at 2-3, ¶ 1; Doc. 1-1 at 4-7, ¶¶ 24-42 and at 15-16, ¶¶ 100-104.

Plaintiff argues that each of the foregoing allegations constitute protected communications pursuant to the New Mexico Whistleblower Protection Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 10-16C-1 et seq. (“NMWPA”).

The record, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor, shows the following.

Exhibits B1 and B2 attached to Defendants' Motion are true and correct copies of the job descriptions for Village Clerk/Treasurer and Deputy Clerk.^[3] Doc. 132 at 3, ¶ 4, Doc. 160 at 3, ¶ 4.

Plaintiff's duties as Deputy Clerk or Acting Clerk included the following: (a) managing village staff; (b) overseeing the day-to-day operations of the Village; (c) making sure Village ordinances were enforced; (d) overseeing the billing for the Village's water utility; and (e) interacting with the public on behalf of the Village. Doc. 132 at 2, ¶ 3.^[4] Plaintiff's attempts to enforce Village ordinances and deal with water utility issues “were part of her job.” Doc. 132 at 4, ¶ 9; Doc. 160 at 4, ¶ 10.

During Mayor Chavez's tenure, Plaintiff's job included reporting to the Mayor, who exclusively supervised Plaintiff, and working under the Mayor's “direction.” Doc. 132 at 3, ¶ 5, Doc. 160 at 3, ¶ 4. During Plaintiff's employment, Mayor Chavez had “absolute authority” to decide what would be on an agenda for a Village Council meeting, and, in Plaintiff's experience, no one else could put items on the agenda. Doc. 132 at 4, ¶ 7; Doc. 160 at 4, ¶ 8.

After Plaintiff was hired as a Deputy Clerk in 2010, Plaintiff attended multiple trainings regarding government administration, some of which included training on the Anti-Donation Clause to the New Mexico Constitution and conflict of interest laws governing the conduct of public officials. Doc. 160 at 5, ¶ 3. In the course of those trainings, Plaintiff learned that the Anti-Donation Clause prohibits municipalities from directly or indirectly making any donation or aid to any person. Id.

Sometime prior to September 2017, Plaintiff reported to Mayor Chavez and a Municipal League attorney what she believed to be a conflict of interest on the part of Defendant Bruton after he submitted a zoning application and paid the fee on behalf of applicant Peggy Pohl.^[5] Doc. 160 at 5, ¶ 4. Plaintiff confirmed the existence of a conflict of interest on Defendant Bruton's part and was told that Defendant...