Klein v. Madison, CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-4507

374 F.Supp.3d 389

Charlene KLEIN, Plaintiff,

v.Officer Stephen MADISON, Officer Christopher Hendricks, Officer Michael Good, Officer Jacoby Glenny, John/Jane Does 1-X, Mayor Edwin Pawlowski, Former Chief Keith Morris, and City of Allentown, Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-4507

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed April 10, 2019

Robert E. Goldman, Robert E. Goldman LLC, Allentown, PA, Joshua E. Karoly, Karoly Law Firm LLC, Allentown, PA, for Plaintiff.

David J. Macmain, The Macmain Law Group LLC, West Chester, PA, Tricia M. Ambrose, Macmain Law Group, Malvern, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Smith, District Judge.

In the middle of the night on May 2, 2016, the plaintiff heard a knock at her door. Answering the door in her pajamas, she found several City of Allentown police officers seeking information about her son's whereabouts and requesting permission to search her home without a warrant. The plaintiff flatly refused and attempted to close her door and end the encounter. What happened next is disputed by the parties. The plaintiff argues that two officers proceeded to violently pull her from her doorway, throw her over a railing, handcuff her, and drag her to a police car. The defendants allege that the plaintiff violently slammed the door shut on an officer's hand, then punched him in the face, and was restrained using a reasonable amount of force. Regardless of what occurred, it is undisputed that the encounter ended with a warrantless entry into her home and in her arrest.

The plaintiff brought the instant civil action against the officers who entered her home and arrested her, the former chief of police, the former mayor of the City of Allentown, and the City of Allentown. Concerning the asserted causes of action, she brings several 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims and state law claims (i.e. , assault and battery, trespass, civil conspiracy) against the individual officers. Against the former police chief, she brings a claim for supervisory liability-policymaker liability under section 1983. Against the City of Allentown, she brings a section 1983 claim for municipal liability pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York , 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).

Currently before the court is the defendants' motion for summary judgment on all causes of action. The defendants request summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiff has (1) failed to establish her claims as a matter of law and (2) the officers, for certain of her claims, qualify for immunity under federal and state law. As to all her claims but one, which the court dismisses without prejudice pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey , 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), and partial summary judgment for another, the court finds disputed issues of material fact preclude summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Therefore, for the reasons stated below, summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The plaintiff, Charlene Klein, filed her complaint against the defendants, Officer Stephen Madison ("Officer Madison"), Officer Christopher Hendricks ("Officer Hendricks"), Officer Michael Good ("Officer Good"), Officer Jacoby Glenny ("Officer Glenny"), John/Jane Does 1-X ("Does"), (former) Mayor Edwin Pawlowski ("Mayor Pawlowski"), the (former) Chief of Police Keith Morris ("Chief Morris"), and the City of Allentown (the "City") on October 10, 2017. Doc. No. 1. The complaint asserted twelve causes of action:¹ (1) excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment under section 1983 against Officers Madison, Hendricks, and Glenny, in their individual capacities; (2) unlawful search in violation of the Fourth Amendment under section 1983 against Officers Madison, Hendricks, Good, and Glenny (collectively, the "Officers") in their individual capacities; (3) failure to intervene in violation of the Fourth Amendment under section 1983 against the Officers in their individual capacities; (4) civil conspiracy under section 1983 against the Officers in their individual capacities; (5) denial of medical care in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment under section 1983 against the Officers in their individual capacities; (6) violation of her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights under section 1983 against the Officers in their individual capacities; (7) supervisory liability/policymaker liability under section 1983 against Mayor Pawlowski and Chief Morris in their individual capacities; (8) municipal liability pursuant to Monell against the City; (9) assault and battery under Pennsylvania law against Officers Madison, Hendricks, and Glenny in their individual capacities; (10) violations of the Pennsylvania Constitution against the Officers; (11) trespass under Pennsylvania law against the Officers in their individual capacities; and (12) civil conspiracy under Pennsylvania law against the Officers. Compl. at 26–66, Doc. No. 1.

The defendants filed an answer and affirmative defenses to the complaint on December 27, 2017. Doc. No. 13. After discovery concluded, the defendants moved for summary judgment as to all claims brought by the plaintiff on December 14, 2018. Doc. No. 55. On January 4, 2019, the plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Doc. No. 58. The court heard oral argument on the motion on January 9, 2019. See Doc. No. 60. The defendants then filed a reply brief and a separate response to plaintiff's additional facts on January 14, 2019. Doc. Nos. 62, 63. Lastly, the plaintiff filed a sur-reply brief as to certain issues raised during oral argument on January 24, 2019. Doc. No. 68. On March 27, 2019, the parties dismissed the claims against the Does and Mayor Pawlowski by stipulation. Doc. No. 95.

The motion for summary judgment is ripe for disposition.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review – Motions for Summary Judgment

A district court "shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Additionally, "[s]ummary judgment is appropriate when ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ " Wright v. Corning , 679 F.3d 101, 103 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Orsatti v. N.J. State Police , 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995) ). An issue of fact is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id.

The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden "of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). Once the moving party has met this burden, the non-moving party must counter with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (stating that "[a] party asserting that a fact...is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by...citing to particular parts of materials in the record...; or...[by] showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence...of a genuine dispute"). The non-movant must show more than the "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" for elements on which the non-movant bears the burden of production. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Bare assertions, conclusory allegations, or suspicions are insufficient to defeat summary judgment. See Fireman's Ins. Co. v. DuFresne , 676 F.2d 965, 969 (3d Cir. 1982) (indicating that party opposing a motion for summary judgment may not "rely merely upon bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions"); Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. for M.E. , 172 F.3d 238, 252 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining that "speculation and conclusory allegations" do not satisfy non-moving party's duty to "set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists and that a reasonable factfinder could rule in its favor"). Additionally, the non-moving party "cannot rely on unsupported allegations, but must go beyond pleadings and provide some evidence that would show that there exists a genuine issue for trial." Jones v. United Parcel Serv. , 214 F.3d 402, 407 (3d Cir. 2000). Thus, it is not enough to "merely [ ] restat[e] the allegations" in the complaint; instead, the non-moving party must "point to concrete evidence in the record that supports each and every essential element of his case." Jones v. Beard , 145 F. App'x 743, 745– 46 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Celotex , 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ). Moreover, arguments made in briefs "are not evidence and cannot by themselves create a factual dispute sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion." Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Twp. of Lacey , 772 F.2d 1103, 1109–10 (3d Cir. 1985).

"When considering whether there exist genuine issues of material fact, the court is required to examine the evidence of record in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, and resolve all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Wishkin v. Potter , 476 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2007). The court must decide "not whether...the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but...