Klein v. Metro. Transit Auth.

1

CHRISTIAN PAUL ENZO KLEIN, Plaintiff, v. METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants.

No. 21-CV-7118 (JPC) (JLC)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

March 6, 2023

Honorable John P. Cronan, United States District Judge

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

JAMES L. COTT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Christian Paul Enzo Klein (“Klein”), proceeding pro se, has brought this Section 1983 action alleging that the Metropolitan Transit Authority (“MTA”), the MTA Police Department, Police Officer Brian Denicola Lieutenant Matthew Sauer, Police Officer Danielle Hughes Captain Jennifer Kelly, Kirk Thomas, and Gina Mital (“Mital”) violated his constitutional rights as a result of an incident on a Metro-North train in 2018. Klein also alleges a claim of slander against Mital. Pending before the Court is Mital's motion to dismiss the claims against her and Klein's cross-motion for leave to further amend his complaint. For the reasons set forth below, I recommend that Mital's motion be granted and Klein's cross-motion be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Klein alleges as follows in his amended complaint: on August 22, 2018, he intended to board a Metro-North train traveling from Harlem to Port Chester, New York, but accidentally boarded a train bound for New Haven, Connecticut. Amended Complaint (“Am. Compl.”), Dkt. No. 24, at 5. On the train, Klein encountered conductor Kirk Thomas and explained to him that he had boarded the wrong train. Id. Thomas told Klein that he would have to pay an additional $20 for a ticket, which Klein said “couldn't be right.” Additional Facts, Dkt. No. 24-1 ¶ 3.^[1]Once the train reached Stamford, Connecticut, Thomas called the other individual defendants and together, they wrestled Klein to the ground, stomped on him, and arrested him. Id. ¶¶ 6-7. Klein was arrested and charged with theft of service, breach of the peace, and resisting arrest; the case against him was dismissed on October 31, 2019. Am. Compl. at 6.

One of the individuals who Klein alleges was present during the incident was Mital. Id. at 5. Although Klein does not allege that Mital was involved in any physical assault, he alleges that she made a false statement to the police, thereby resulting in his arrest. Id. at 6.

B. Procedural History

On August 23, 2021, Klein filed a complaint against the MTA, the MTA Police Department, John Does 1 through 4, and Jane Does 1 and 2 alleging violations of his Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. Complaint, Dkt. No. 2, at 2. By order dated September 10, 2021, the MTA was directed to identify the John and Jane Doe defendants and provide Klein with their names. Dkt. No. 6. Following that order, Klein amended his complaint to add the following individuals as defendants: Kirk Thomas, Police Officer Danielle Hughes, Captain Jennifer Kelly, Lieutenant Matthew Sauer, Police Officer Brian Denicola, and Gina Mital. Am. Compl. at 1.

On August 26, 2022, Mital was served with the amended complaint. See Dkt. No. 52. On November 30, 2022, she moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendant Mital's Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 62; Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (“Def. Mem.”), Dkt. No. 62-1. In opposition to Mital's motion, Klein filed a number of letters: one filed December 1, 2022 (“December 1 Letter”), Dkt. No. 63; one filed December 2, 2022 (“December 2 Letter”), Dkt. No. 64; one filed January 30, 2023 (“January 30 Letter”), Dkt. No. 77; and one filed February 4, 2023 (“February 4 Letter”), Dkt. No. 83.^[2] In addition, on February 3, 2023, Klein cross-moved for leave to further amend the complaint. Notice of Motion (“Mtn. Am.”), Dkt. No. 81. Mital did not file a reply in support of her motion nor did she file opposition papers in response to Klein's cross-motion.

This case was referred to me on February 28, 2022 for general pretrial supervision, and an amended order of reference was entered on December 5, 2022 referring Mital's motion and Klein's cross-motion to me for a report and recommendation. Dkt. Nos. 32, 65.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards

1. Failure to State a Claim Under Rule 12(b)(6)

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the plaintiff must plead sufficient facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Although the Court “construes the pleadings and affidavits in the light most favorable to plaintiffs . . . the Court will not draw argumentative inferences in the plaintiff's favor and need not accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Gilbert v. Indeed, Inc. 513 F.Supp.3d 374, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (cleaned up).

2. Standards Applicable to Pro Se Litigants

Submissions made by pro se plaintiffs are held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (internal quotations omitted); see also Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (courts are “obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally”). As a result, the Court may consider allegations that appear in a pro se plaintiff's opposition papers or other submissions to the Court. See, e.g., Freud v. New York City Department of Education, No. 21-CV-2281 (MKV), 2022 WL 889213, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2022) (courts “may also consider factual statements made in the pro se Plaintiff's opposition to the motion to dismiss”) (citing Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 122 n.1 (2d Cir. 2013)); see also Henning v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Corr., No. 14-CV-9798 (JPO), 2016 WL 297725, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2016) (“Although this allegation appears in his opposition papers, the Court-consistent with its duty to liberally construe pro se pleadings-will credit Plaintiff's assertion in evaluating the sufficiency of his complaint.”). Nevertheless, pro se plaintiffs are not excused from the normal rules of pleading; “dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper if the complaint lacks an allegation regarding an element necessary to obtain relief[.]” Geldzahler v. N.Y.Med. Coll., 663 F.Supp.2d 379, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (cleaned up).

3. § 1983 Claims

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the challenged conduct (1) was “committed by a person acting under color of state law,” and (2) “deprived [the plaintiff] of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1994)). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States Constitution and federal statutes that it describes.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979). “The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.” Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992).

B. Analysis

1. Klein's §1983 Claims Against Mital Should Be Dismissed

Mital contends that Klein has failed to state a claim pursuant to § 1983 because although she is a Connecticut Probation Officer, she was not a state actor during this incident. Def. Mem. 7-8.^[3] The Court agrees. To state a plausible claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a state actor violated a right protected by the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); see also Snider v. Dylag, 188 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1999). Klein has not done so.

First, taking Klein's allegations as true, he has not demonstrated that Mital participated in the alleged incident as a state actor. Klein states that four MTA police officers walked toward him “along with Kirk Thomas, and a woman [he] later found out to be Gina Mital, a Stamford Probation officer.” Am. Compl. at 5. Beyond stating that he “later” learned that Mital was a probation officer, Klein puts forward no allegations that Mital was acting in her capacity as a government employee. Accordingly, the first prong required by § 1983 has not been met.

Next, Klein has not sufficiently alleged that Mital was personally involved in the deprivation of his constitutional rights. To state a claim under § 1983, “a plaintiff must assert direct and personal involvement of the defendant in the alleged constitutional deprivations.” Ella v. Jackson, No. 95-CV-2314 (AGS), 1996 WL 673819, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 1996) (citing McKinnon v. Patterson, 568 F.2d 930, 934 (2d Cir. 1977)).

In his letters to the Court, Klein claims summarily that “Mital was directly involved in the violation of [his] constitutional rights,” December 1 Letter; that Mital caused his arrest and prosecution “by making false statements to police and abusing her authority as a member of law enforcement,” and that “Mital also committed another 42 U.S.C. 1983 violation by violating [his] right to fair trial,” February 4 Letter. In support of these claims against Mital, Klein alleges that: she made a false statement, “while representing herself as a member of law enforcement, result[ing] in [his] wrongful arrest and assault;” she “assisted in [his] arrest by accompanying the MTA officers mentioned in this suit to arrest [him];” and she stated that Klein “made ‘racial' remarks, paint[ing] . . . [him] a racist.” January 30 Letter.

While Klein alleges that Mital was present at the time he was arrested and made certain remarks, his allegations do not contain the requisite specificity. Moreover, even if Mital did make a false statement resulting in his...