Knickerbocker v. United States

ISSAM ELIE KNICKERBOCKER, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR,DEATH VALLEY NATIONAL PARK, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE,NICOLE GRUVER and BRYAN DREW, PREVIOUSLY NAMED AS UNKNOWNPARK RANGER AGENTS 1 and 2, and DOES 3-25, Defendants.

No. 1:16-cv-01811-DAD-JLT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

February 12, 2018

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

(Doc. No. 37)

Plaintiff is proceeding on a first amended complaint ("FAC") pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In his FAC, plaintiff alleges that various constitutional and tort violations occurred during his arrest in Death Valley National Park by two park rangers, defendants Gruver and Drew. (Doc. No. 33.) This court previously dismissed plaintiff's original complaint with leave to amend on October 4, 2017. (Doc. No. 27.) Defendant United States now moves to dismiss the FAC, asserting that plaintiff fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. (Doc. No. 37.) The government also seeks to introduce body camera evidence of the arrest to justify dismissal of the case, despite its current procedural posture. (Id.) A hearing on the pending motion was held on January 9, 2018. Assistant U.S. Attorney Gregory Broderick appeared telephonically at the hearing on behalf of defendant United States. Attorney Richard Knickerbocker appeared telephonically on behalf of plaintiff. For the reasons set forth below, the court will deny the motion to dismiss brought on behalf of defendant United States of America.

BACKGROUND

The salient factual allegations of the FAC are as follows. On February 20, 2016, plaintiff and two friends travelled to Death Valley National Park to photograph the "super-bloom" of wildflowers. (Doc. No. 33 at ¶ 13.) Plaintiff drove his car, and the group parked legally along the side of the road near Badwater Basin. (Id. at ¶¶ 13-14.) When plaintiff returned to his car, two park rangers were nearby, and stopped the group to ask who owned the car and for identification. (Id. at ¶ 15.) After identifying himself as the owner, plaintiff refused a request from the rangers to search his car. (Id.) The rangers then asked for identification from the group, which was produced. (Id.) At that time, there was no indication any crime had been committed, as plaintiff's car was validly registered, plaintiff was not driving, and plaintiff was not engaged in any illegal activity. (Id. at ¶ 16.) Following the receipt of his identification, plaintiff was subsequently handcuffed with his hands behind his back. (Id. at ¶ 18.) At some point later, the rangers told plaintiff he had an outstanding warrant in Los Angeles for a traffic violation, though plaintiff alleges he has never been shown evidence that such a warrant existed. (Id. at ¶¶ 16-17, 19.)

In the process of being handcuffed by the rangers, plaintiff "felt his shoulder to be temporarily or partially dislocated and or sliding from its socket," and it was ultimately discovered he suffered a torn rotator cuff during this process. (Id. at ¶ 18.) Immediately upon being handcuffed and for the subsequent two hours, plaintiff complained to the rangers about the pain and discomfort he felt in his shoulder, and repeatedly asked the ranger to loosen the handcuffs, handcuff his arms in front of his body, connect two pairs of handcuffs together, or find some other method of detaining him that would relieve the pain in his shoulder. (Id. at ¶ 23.) The rangers refused, asserting that the handcuffs were required for their safety and that they were not authorized to restrain him in another manner. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges he remained in restraintsfor at least two hours until another ranger—apparently the supervisor of Rangers Gruver and Drew—arrived. (Id. at ¶ 24.) Upon the supervisor's arrival, plaintiff advised him of the pain he was experiencing, and the supervisor placed plaintiff in belly chain handcuffs and allowed him to use the police car to push his shoulder back into place, which relieved the pain in plaintiff's shoulder. (Id.) Because of the manner in which he was restrained, plaintiff ultimately underwent surgery for a subacromial decompression to repair tears in the labrum and the rotator cuff, a procedure which will need to be repeated approximately every ten years for the rest of his life. (Id. at ¶¶ 18, 29-30.) Plaintiff's range of motion with his shoulder is limited and he is partially disabled as a result of the restraints in which he was placed. (Id. at ¶ 31.)

During the period in which he was restrained, the arresting rangers took away plaintiff's phone, wallet, socks, and shoes and searched him multiple times. (Id. at ¶ 19.) The rangers threatened to have plaintiff's car impounded, despite the presence of plaintiff's friends who could have driven the car away. (Id. at ¶ 20.) Plaintiff alleges defendant Gruver appeared to be agitated throughout the encounter. (Id. at ¶ 21.) According to the FAC, the rangers arrested plaintiff and treated him in the manner they did because of his race and ethnicity and in retaliation for his refusing to consent to a search of his vehicle. (Id. at ¶¶ 15, 23.) Eventually, plaintiff was transported by defendant Gruver to a rendezvous with an officer from the Inyo County Sheriff's Department, who transported plaintiff to the Inyo County Jail. (Id. at ¶ 27.)

The FAC presents the following claims: (1) a Bivens claim against the individual rangers for excessive use of force in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (2) a Bivens claim against the individual rangers for unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (3) battery against all defendants; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress against all defendants; and (5) negligence against the United States. (Id. at ¶¶ 33-69.)

LEGAL STANDARD

The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. N. Star Int'l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). "Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A plaintiff is required to allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

In determining whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the court accepts as true the allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989). However, the court need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations. United States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, "it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading is insufficient if it offers mere "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. See also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 ("Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice."). Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume that the plaintiff "can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged." Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

In ruling on such a motion, the court is permitted to consider material which is properly submitted as part of the complaint, documents that are not physically attached to the complaint if their authenticity is not contested and the plaintiff's complaint necessarily relies on them, and matters of public record. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001).

ANALYSIS

A. Claims Against the Individual Defendants

As with the previously heard motion to dismiss, this motion is brought solely by defendant United States. Defendants Gruver and Drew, who were the Doe Defendants One and Two named in the original complaint and are now identified in the FAC, had not been served atthe time of the hearing on this motion. As discussed at the hearing, counsel for the government indicated that, if defendants Gruver and Drew agreed, he would represent them and at that point could accept service of the complaint on their behalf. On February 8, 2018, plaintiff's counsel filed a declaration indicating that defense counsel had since advised him that defense counsel had been authorized to accept service in this matter on behalf of defendants Gruver and Drew. (Doc. No. 52 at ¶ 4.) The declaration also indicates the parties have agreed that defendants will have twenty-one (21) days following the issuance of this order to file a responsive pleading. (Id. at ¶ 5.) Since issues related to service in this case have apparently been resolved, the court will direct that defendants file a responsive pleading within twenty-one days of the date of service of this order.

B. Battery

Turning to the substantive claims in this case, the United States argues plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to establish a battery occurred because he may not allege a claim that is based merely on the fact of his arrest or handcuffing. (Doc. No. 37-1 at 4-5.) Plaintiff's battery claim is not, however, based on the mere fact of his arrest or handcuffing. Rather, it is based on the manner in which these actions were allegedly carried out. As...