Knight v. MTA-N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 19-CV-9960 (VSB)

CHRISTINE N. KNIGHT, Plaintiff, v. MTA-NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Defendant.

19-CV-9960 (VSB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

June 15, 2021

OPINION & ORDER

Appearances:

Laine Alida Armstrong

Arthur Z Schwartz

Advocates for Justice, Chartered Attorneys

New York, NY

Counsel for Plaintiff

Joshua Samson Fox

Steven D. Hurd

Proskauer Rose, LLP

New York, NY

Counsel for Defendant

VERNON S. BRODERICK, United States District Judge:

Before me is the motion of Defendant MTA-New York City Transit Authority ("NYCTA") ("Defendant") to dismiss the Amended Complaint and Collective and Class Action Complaint ("Amended Complaint") of Plaintiff Christine Knight ("Plaintiff") pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Because Plaintiff has failed to raise sufficient facts to state a violation of Section 7(a) of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and because I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims, Defendant's motion is GRANTED. Since I do not have jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims, I do not reach the question of whether Plaintiff's action is subject to the four-month limitations period set forth by New York Civil Practice Law and Rule ("CPLR") § 217.

I. Background and Procedural History¹

Plaintiff brings this putative class action for damages on behalf of herself and all employees holding the title of Associate Transit Management Analyst, and related titles, who worked for Defendant during the six years prior to the filing of this lawsuit, who worked in excess of 40 hours per week, who were not paid overtime at a rate of one and one-half times their regular hourly rate of pay, and who have not previously joined the action pending in the Eastern District of New York titled Brack v. MTA NYC Transit Authority (Brack), 19-cv-846-ILG-SJB. (Doc. 30, Am. Compl. ¶ 11.)²

Plaintiff has worked at MTA-New York City Transit Authority ("NYCT") as an Associate Transit Management Analyst (Material Forecaster/Project Coordinator) since around 1999. (Id. ¶ 6.) During the six-year period prior to commencing this action, Plaintiff and others similarly situated were required to work more than 40 hours a week assisting with special projects, completing regular job assignments, as test monitors, as ambassadors for select bus service or otherwise, but were not paid at a premium rate for hours worked overtime. (Id. ¶¶ 11-12, 17-23.) Plaintiff was required to "bank" 160 overtime hours as compensatory hours in lieu of payment for those hours before Defendant paid her for overtime hours worked. (Id. ¶ 24.)Defendant has not posted notices regarding employee rights under the FLSA in appropriate sites at Plaintiff's work location. Nor has Defendant sought to notify Plaintiff and others similarly situated of FLSA rights and requirements through any other means, such as through mandatory human resources trainings. (Id. ¶ 25.) Plaintiff was unaware of her statutory FLSA rights regarding overtime prior to around January 2019, when she received notice of a possible settlement in Brack, a proposed FLSA collective action alleging overtime violations. Plaintiff alleges violations of: Section 7(a) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (First Cause of Action); and Section 134 of the New York State Civil Service Law ("NYSCSL") and 9 NYCRR § 135.1 (Second Cause of Action).

On April 21, 2020, Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint. (Am. Compl.) On May 15, 2020, Defendant NYCTA filed the instant motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. (Docs. 31-32.) On June 12, 2020, Plaintiff filed her memorandum in opposition to Defendant's motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint, (Doc. 35), and on June 19, 2020, Defendant filed its reply, (Doc. 36).

II. Legal Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim will have "facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. This standard demands "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. "Plausibility . . . depends on a host of considerations: the full factual picture presented by the complaint, the particular cause of action and its elements,and the existence of alternative explanations so obvious that they render plaintiff's inferences unreasonable." L-7 Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy, LLC, 647 F.3d 419, 430 (2d Cir. 2011).

In considering a motion to dismiss, a court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint and must draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 237 (2d Cir. 2007). A complaint need not make "detailed factual allegations," but it must contain more than mere "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, although all allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is "inapplicable to legal conclusions." Id. A complaint is "deemed to include any written instrument attached to it as an exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference." Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Int'l Audiotext Network, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 62 F.3d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1995)).

III. Discussion

Regarding Plaintiff's FLSA claim (First Cause of Action), Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege a plausible FLSA overtime claim, (Doc. 32, Def.'s Mem. 6),³ and that Plaintiff's allegation that Defendant improperly compensated her with compensatory time in lieu of overtime pay fails to state a claim under 29 U.S.C. § 207(o)(2), (id. at 11). Defendant also argues that Plaintiff's NYSCSL claim (Second Cause of Action) should be dismissed as time-barred as it was not filed within the four-month limitations period set forth by CPLR § 217. (Id. at 14.)

A. FLSA Claim (First Cause of Action)

1. Applicable Law

Section 207(a)(1) of FLSA provides that, "for a workweek longer than forty hours," an employer must provide an employee "compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed." 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). "[I]n order to state a plausible FLSA overtime claim, a plaintiff must sufficiently allege 40 hours of work in a given workweek as well as some uncompensated time in excess of the 40 hours." Lundy v. Catholic Health Sys. of Long Island Inc., 711 F.3d 106, 114 (2d Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal of FLSA overtime claims where plaintiffs had "not alleged a single workweek in which they worked at least 40 hours and also worked uncompensated time in excess of 40 hours"). In order to do so, "[p]laintiffs must provide sufficient detail about the length and frequency of their unpaid work to support a reasonable inference that they worked more than forty hours in a given week." Nakahata v. New York-Presbyterian Healthcare Sys., 723 F.3d 192, 201 (2d Cir. 2013). While "an approximation of overtime hours" is not "a necessity in all cases," an approximation "may help draw a plaintiff's claim closer to plausibility." DeJesus v. HF Mgmt. Servs., LLC, 726 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Lundy, 711 F.3d at 114 n.7). However, a pleading must accomplish more than simply "track[ing] the statutory language of the FLSA, lifting its numbers and rehashing its formulation." Id. at 89.

Section 207(o) provides an exception from Section 207(a)'s general mandate, and allows that a public agency may provide "compensatory time off at a rate not less than one and one-half hours for each hour of employment for which overtime compensation is required by this section" pursuant to "applicable provisions of a collective bargaining agreement, memorandum ofunderstanding, or any other agreement between the public agency and representatives of such employees" or "an agreement or understanding arrived at between the employer and employee before the performance of the work." 29 U.S.C. § 207(o)(2). "Such an agreement or understanding need not be formally reached and memorialized in writing, but instead can be arrived at informally, such as when an employee works overtime knowing that the employer rewards overtime with compensatory time." Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 579 n.1 (2000). "An agreement or understanding may be evidenced by a notice to the employee that compensatory time off will be given in lieu of overtime pay." 29 C.F.R. § 553.23(c)(1). "In such a case, an agreement or understanding would be presumed to exist for purposes of section 7(o) with respect to any employee who fails to express to the employer an unwillingness to accept compensatory time off in lieu of overtime pay." Id. "Consequently, those employees who agree to work overtime knowing that they will receive compensatory time off for overtime hours worked under the State's rules are deemed to have reached an agreement with their employer consistent with §7(o)." U.S. Dep't of Labor, Wage & Hour Div. Opinion Letter, Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 1994 WL 1004765, at *1 (Apr. 1, 1994).

2. Application

Plaintiff raises a handful of allegations to support her FLSA overtime claim. She claims that "[d]uring numerous weeks within the last six years, Plaintiff, and all others similarly situated, have been required to work, during various weeks, in excess of 40 hours per week." (Am. Compl. ¶ 17.) During the relevant claims period, "Plaintiff and all others similarly situated [were] . . . regularly scheduled to work 35 hours per...