Knight v. United States

RONNIE J. KNIGHT, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

14-CV-1037S

10-CR-144S

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

January 9, 2017

DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Presently before this Court is the Motion of pro se Petitioner Ronnie J. Knight to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct his Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. For the reasons discussed below, Petitioner's § 2255 motion is denied.

II. BACKGROUND

On September 20, 2010, Petitioner appeared before this Court and pled guilty to a one count Superseding Information, charging a violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 846 (conspiracy to manufacture, to possess with intent to distribute, and to distribute, a mixture and substance containing methamphetamine). (See Docket No. 29.)¹ The plea agreement signed by Petitioner reflects his understanding that the maximum penalty that could be imposed at sentencing included a thirty-year term of imprisonment and a fine of $2,000,000. (Plea Agreement ¶ 1, Docket No. 28.)

Prior to accepting Petitioner's guilty plea, this Court inquired as to his mental health and competency. Both Petitioner and his counsel, John Molloy, stated that there were no competency issues:

The Court: Do you take any medications, prescription or nonprescription?

Petitioner: I take a bipolar medication and blood pressure.

The Court: That's a prescription drug that's been prescribed for you by a psychiatrist?

Petitioner: Yes, your Honor.

The Court: All right. So you've undergone treatment and evaluation for a bipolar condition and other mental health conditions?

Petitioner: Yes, your Honor.

The Court: Okay. Any difficulty, any red flags here, Mr. Molloy, in terms of Mr. Knight's soundness of mind to proceed forward on this plea today?

Mr. Molloy: No, your Honor.

The Court: Any competency issues?

Mr. Molloy: Not at all.

The Court: Any plea that you feel would be entered today would be knowing and intelligently entered?

Mr. Molloy: Yes, your Honor.

The Court: Okay. Are you comfortable with your understanding of this whole proceeding that's involved here today based on your medication and health and mental health history—

Petitioner: Yes, your Honor.

(Plea Tr. at 8-9, Docket No. 55.) Based on these representations, as well as observation of Petitioner's behavior and aspect, this Court found Petitioner competent to enter a plea of guilty.

By entering into the plea agreement Petitioner "knowingly waive[d] the right to appeal and collaterally attack any component of a sentence imposed by the Court whichfalls within or is less than the sentencing range for imprisonment, a fine and supervised release set forth in Section III, ¶ 12, . . . notwithstanding the manner in which the Court determines the sentence." (Id. ¶ 21.) Petitioner further understood "that by agreeing to not collaterally attack the sentence, [Petitioner] is waiving the right to challenge the sentence in the event that in the future [Petitioner] becomes aware of previously unknown facts or a change in the law which the [Petitioner] believes would justify a decrease in [his] sentence." (Id. ¶ 22.)

Petitioner was sentenced on January 10, 2011 to a term of incarceration of 188 months, supervised release of six years, and no fines. (Docket No. 41.) The incarceration sentence was within the guideline sentencing range set forth in the plea agreement of 188 to 235 months; the term of supervised release was also within the range set forth in the plea agreement. (Plea Agreement ¶ 11.) During his sentencing, Petitioner made a statement acknowledging that he knew his actions were wrong:

First, your Honor, I'd like to apologize to you and to society for what I've done. You know, I know what I've done is wrong. I'm an old man now, and I should have known better than to do it. But I grew up with the drug, and being addicted to it and addicted to chemistry itself, I kept manufacturing. And for that I'm truly sorry. I am. I can't—I couldn't break the chain. There's just—it was in me where I couldn't do it. And I'm just truly sorry that I couldn't break the chain.

(Sentencing Tr. at 6, Docket No. 54.) Neither Petitioner nor his counsel brought up his mental health at Sentencing, although his self-reported history of mental illness is discussed in the Presentence Investigation Report. (Docket No. 42 ¶ 71.)

Petitioner did not file an appeal, and the instant § 2255 motion was filed on December 8, 2014. (Docket No. 52.) Together with the § 2255 motion, Petitioner submits certain records related to his mental health treatment between 2003 and 2009.Petitioner asserts that these reports summarize his mental illness as "Major Depressive Disorder Recurrent Severe with Psychotic Features." (Id. at 2.) Petitioner does not argue that he was not mentally competent to enter a plea, but he does argue that he is actually innocent of the crime to which he pled guilty because he was insane at the time of its commission. He further argues that his counsel, Mr. Molloy, was ineffective because he failed to investigate and pursue an insanity defense.

III. DISCUSSION

Twenty-eight U.S.C. § 2255 allows federal prisoners to challenge the constitutionality of their sentences. That section provides, in pertinent part, that:

A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.

28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). The Second Circuit has held that a "collateral attack on a final judgment in a criminal case is generally available under § 2255 only for a constitutional error, a lack of jurisdiction in the sentencing court, or an error of law or fact that constitutes a fundamental defect which inherently results in complete miscarriage of justice." Graziano v. United States, 83 F.3d 587, 589-90 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Bokun, 73 F.3d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Petitioner bears the burden of proving such a fundamental defect by preponderance of the evidence. See Galviz Zapata v. United States, 431 F.3d 395, 399 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Williams v. United States, 481 F.2d 339, 346 (2d Cir. 1973)).

A court must construe a pro se litigant's submissions liberally and interpret suchsubmissions "to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." Fulton v. Goord, 591 F.3d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). This principle applies to pro se litigants moving pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See Green v. United States, 260 F.3d 78, 83 (2d Cir. 2001). Still, a pro se litigant is not exempt "from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law." Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks omitted).

1. Timeliness

Motions made pursuant to § 2255 are subject to "[a] 1-year period of limitation" that runs from the latest of, inter alia, "the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1). "[F]or purposes of § 2255 motions, an unappealed federal criminal judgment becomes final when the time for filing a direct appeal expires." Moshier v. United States, 402 F.3d 116, 118 (2d Cir. 2005). Under Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, "[i]n a criminal case, a defendant's notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within 14 days after the later of: (i) the entry of either the judgment or the order being appealed; or (ii) the filing of the government's notice of appeal." Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A). A judgment or order is entered under this rule when it is entered on the docket. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(6).

Here, Petitioner's judgment of conviction was entered on January 18, 2011. (See Docket No. 44.) Accounting for the fourteen-day period to appeal and the one-year statute of limitations, Petitioner's deadline for filing his § 2255 motion was February 1, 2012. He filed the instant motion on December 8, 2014, nearly three years after that deadline. Because the Motion was not brought within one year of the date the judgment of conviction became final, it is not timely under § 2255(f)(1).

With respect to Petitioner's argument that he is "actually innocent" of the crimes to which he pled guilty and that the statute of limitations is therefore inapplicable, his argument is unpersuasive for the reasons set forth below. With respect to Petitioner's argument that his counsel was ineffective, the Second Circuit has instructed that a court should not ordinarily dismiss a § 2255 motion without notice and an opportunity for the movant to be heard. See Acosta v. Artuz, 221 F.3d 117, 124-26 (2d Cir. 2000). Accordingly, although the motion is untimely by nearly three years, this Court also considers and dismisses Petitioner's claims on the merits.

2. Actual Innocence

Habeas petitioners asserting a claim of actual innocence will not be automatically time-barred if they file after the one-year limitations period has run. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 185 L. Ed. 2d 1019 (2013). Under this exception "a credible showing of actual innocence may allow a prisoner to pursue his constitutional claims . . . on the merits notwithstanding the existence of a procedural bar to relief." Id. at 1931. This is a "demanding" standard which requires that the petitioner present "evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial." Id. at 1936 (citation omitted). This exception "applies to a severely confined category: cases in which new evidence shows it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted [the petitioner]." Id. at 1933 (internal quotation and citation omitted). Furthermore, a...