Knotts v. Grafton City Hosp.

237 W.Va. 169

786 S.E.2d 188

Martha KNOTTS, Petitioner

v.GRAFTON CITY HOSPITAL, Respondent.

No. 14–0752.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted on Rehearing April 5, 2016.

Decided April 14, 2016.

Allan N. Karlin, Esq., Allan N. Karlin & Associates, Morgantown, West Virginia, for Petitioner.

Mario R. Bordogna, Esq., Julie A. Moore, Esq., Steptoe & Johnson PLLC, Morgantown, West Virginia, for Respondent.

Kathryn R. Bayless, Esq., Bayless Law Firm PLLC, Princeton, West Virginia, Counsel for Amicus Curiae, American Association of Retired Persons (AARP).

Lonnie C. Simmons, Esq., DiTrapano, Barrett, DiPiero, McGinley & Simmons, PLLC. Charleston, West Virginia. Mark A. Atkinson, Esq., Paul L. Frampton, Esq., Atkinson & Polak, PLLC. Charleston, West Virginia. Counsel on Rehearing for Amici Curiae West Virginia Employment Lawyers Association and United Mine Workers of America.

Chief Justice KETCHUM :

Petitioner Martha Knotts (“Ms. Knotts”) appeals the July 8, 2014, order of the Circuit Court of Taylor County granting Respondent Grafton City Hospital's (“hospital”) motion for summary judgment. Ms. Knotts alleged that she was wrongfully discharged by the hospital on the basis of her age—she was 65 years-old when the hospital fired her. The circuit court ruled that Ms. Knotts failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under the West Virginia Human Rights Act, W.Va.Code § 5–11–1 et seq. [1967].¹

In the instant appeal, we address the following issue—whether, in an age discrimination case, this Court should adopt the “substantially younger” rule articulated by the United States Supreme Court in O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996). After review,² we answer that question in the affirmative. We therefore reverse the summary judgment order of the circuit court and remand this case to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

I.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2005, the hospital hired Ms. Knotts, a 58 year-old woman, to work as a housekeeper. She worked for the hospital for seven years until 2012 when she was fired. The hospital's stated reason for Ms. Knotts' termination was that she had committed multiple violations of the hospital's patient confidentiality policy.

The alleged violations occurred on April 2, 2012, when Ms. Knotts was working near the emergency department. Ms. Knotts recognized a patient, Rebecca Green (“Patient Green”), who was being brought into the emergency department. Patient Green had previously lived with Ms. Knotts for approximately one year, and testified that Ms. Knotts was “like a mother to me.”³ Upon seeing Patient Green in the emergency room, Ms. Knotts asked her, “[A]re you okay? ... What's the problem?” Nurse Brooke Davis was in the emergency department and overheard Ms. Knotts' inquiries to Patient Green. Nurse Davis admonished Ms. Knotts for making inquiries regarding the patient's condition. According to Nurse Davis, Ms. Knotts' inquiries to Patient Green constituted a violation of the hospital's patient confidentiality policy.

Following this interaction, Nurse Davis took Patient Green into the emergency department. Thereafter, Ms. Knotts walked into the hallway outside of the emergency department and saw Patient Green's teenage son, Cordale, who was crying. Ms. Knotts stated that she hugged Cordale and asked him, “Is everything okay?” According to Ms. Knotts, Cordale replied, “Mom's sick.” This second communication was also overheard by Nurse Davis.⁴ Nurse Davis memorialized her observations of these incidents in a formal incident report.

Upon receiving Nurse Davis' incident report, Tammy Barcus, the hospital's HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act) compliance officer/director of patient safety and quality, began an investigation. The investigation included (1) an interview with Nurse Davis, (2) an interview with a nurse's aide, Debbie Hickman (“Aide Hickman”), who was present during the incidents, (3) a review of the hospital's confidentiality policy, and (4) a review of the patient confidentiality training the hospital had provided to Ms. Knotts.⁵ Ms. Barcus did not interview Ms. Knotts during her investigation.

Following her investigation, Ms. Barcus recommended that Ms. Knotts be fired because her actions violated the hospital's patient confidentiality policy. A meeting was then held to consider Ms. Knotts' employment with the hospital. This meeting included the hospital's administrator, Pat Shaw (“Administrator Shaw”), its human resources manager, Missy Kimbrew, and the hospital's housekeeping supervisor, Angela Rinck. Administrator Shaw and the human resources manager agreed with Ms. Barcus' recommendation to fire Ms. Knotts. The housekeeping supervisor disagreed with the recommendation and stated that she believed Ms. Knotts should have been given a written warning and received additional patient confidentiality training. Ms. Knotts was fired by the hospital on April 3, 2012, one day after the alleged violations occurred.

Ms. Knotts filed a grievance challenging her termination. As part of the grievance procedure, Administrator Shaw reviewed Ms. Knotts' termination. In conducting his review, Administrator Shaw interviewed Ms. Knotts, Nurse Davis, Aide Hickman, and the patient Ms. Knotts spoke with in the emergency department, Rebecca Green. After conducting his review, Administrator Shaw upheld Ms. Knotts' termination.

On August 31, 2012, Ms. Knotts filed a lawsuit against the hospital, asserting a single claim for wrongful termination on the basis of her age in violation of the West Virginia Human Rights Act (“WVHRA”), W.Va.Code § 5–11–1 et seq. After the close of discovery, the hospital filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that Ms. Knotts had failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. Additionally, the hospital argued that even if Ms. Knotts could establish such a claim, the hospital set forth a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Ms. Knotts' termination (her violation of the hospital's patient confidentiality policy), and Ms. Knotts did not establish that the hospital's reason for her discharge was pretextual. By contrast, Ms. Knotts argued that she had raised an inference of age discrimination by showing 1) that she was fired for conduct that did not violate HIPAA or the hospital's patient confidentiality policy; 2) that the hospital did not fire “substantially younger” employees who “were guilty of real and substantive violations” of HIPAA and the patient confidentially policy; and 3) that the hospital replaced her with an employee who was “substantially younger” than she was.⁶

The circuit court agreed with the hospital that Ms. Knotts failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination and granted its motion for summary judgment. In so ruling, the circuit court gave no weight to the “substantially younger” replacement and comparison employees Ms. Knotts offered as evidence in order to raise an inference of discrimination. The circuit court ruled that:

[The hospital's] alleged lenient treatment [of the comparison employees] fails to provide an inference of age discrimination because each of these individuals is within the protected class, i.e., age forty or older. Therefore, they are not appropriate “comparators” for purpose of proving age discrimination under this Court's well-established per curiam opinion in Young v. Bellofram Corp., 227 W.Va. 53, 705 S.E.2d 560 (2010). In Young, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that a co-employee who was over the age of 40, and, therefore, also a member of the same protected class as a plaintiff, was not a proper comparator to provide an inference of age discrimination under the WVHRA.

Other than relying upon comparator evidence to try and prove her prima facie case, the Plaintiff also argued that an inference of age discrimination existed because she was replaced in her job after she was discharged by one of two individuals—one of whom was 12 years younger and the other who was 24 years younger. However, even if true, because both [sic] these individuals are also in the protected class, i.e., age forty or older, their replacement of the Plaintiff also fails to offer any sufficient inference of age discrimination for the same reasons.

Ms. Knotts appealed the circuit court's summary judgment order to this Court. She contends the circuit court erred by failing to consider the “substantially younger” replacement and comparison employees simply because these employees were in the same protected class as Ms. Knotts, i.e., over the age of forty. Ms. Knotts asserts that under the Supreme Court's holding in O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., supra, such evidence was relevant and should have been considered by the circuit court.

II.STANDARD OF REVIEW

This is an appeal from a summary judgment order. We have held that “[a] circuit court's entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. ” Syllabus Point 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994). See Martin v. Randolph County Bd. of Educ., 195 W.Va. 297, 304, 465 S.E.2d 399, 406 (1995) ( “assessing a prima facie case in a ... discrimination claim is a question of law over which we have plenary review.”). We have also stated that “[s]ummary judgment is appropriate if, from the totality of the evidence presented, the record could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, such as where the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case that it has the burden to prove.” Syllabus Point 2, Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc., 194 W.Va. 52, 459 S.E.2d 329 (1995). Further, “[e]ven in cases where elusive concepts such as motive or intent are at issue, summary judgment may be appropriate if the nonmoving party rests merely upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation.” Johnson v. Killmer, 219 W.Va....