Knowles v. Hart, Civil Action No. 1:18-cv-01394-SDG

KENNETH R. KNOWLES, Individually and as Administratorof the Estate of Lori Renee Knowles, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER JASON MICHAEL HART, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 1:18-cv-01394-SDG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION

April 3, 2020

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF 25]. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

a. Facts

The undisputed material facts, construed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, are as follows. On July 24, 2014, Lori Knowles¹ called Henry County 911 multiple times.² The 911 operator had difficulty understandingKnowles as she was yelling and screaming and somewhat incoherent.³ Knowles did not identify herself, but she indicated that she had taken too much medicine.⁴ Defendant Officer Jason Hart and Officer Goetz were dispatched to Knowles's address.⁵ The dispatcher informed the officers that the caller was an unknown female who was incoherently yelling and screaming and had reportedly taken too much medication.⁶

Officer Hart and Officer Goetz were in uniform when they arrived.⁷ The officers knocked on the front door of the house numerous times and loudly announced "police," but no one answered.⁸ Officer Hart told Officer Goetz that he heard someone screaming inside.⁹ Officer Hart believed the female screaming seemed distraught and in danger.¹⁰ Unable to see anything through the windows in the front of the house, the officers went to the back of the house.¹¹ Officer Hartknocked on the back door.¹² The officers heard a female voice from inside, yelling and screaming "f--- you" among other things, but the officers could not comprehend all that was being said or to whom it was directed.¹³ The officers attempted to open the back door and found it to be locked.¹⁴

The officers considered the situation to be an emergency.¹⁵ Accordingly, they informed their supervisor, Sergeant Lyle, and he agreed with the officers' assessment that they should make a forced entry.¹⁶ Sergeant Lyle advised them to wait until the paramedics arrived on the scene.¹⁷ When the paramedics arrived, they gave the officers a tool to open the back door.¹⁸ The officers and paramedics went to open the back door, where they could still hear the female yelling and screaming inside.¹⁹

Upon entering the house, Officer Hart saw a large, closed gun safe in the living room.²⁰ The officers could hear the woman yelling "f--- you" from down the hallway.²¹ They proceeded down the hallway, towards the sound of the woman's voice.²² As they reached the end of the hallway, Officer Hart stepped toward a bedroom to his right and looked inside.²³ At this point, Officer Hart was in the threshold of the bedroom door and Officer Goetz was behind him.²⁴ Officer Goetz was able to see into the bedroom via a mirror hanging on the wall.²⁵

Inside the bedroom, Officer Hart saw a female, later identified as Knowles, lying face down on her bed with a black handgun inside a holster strapped to her right hip.²⁶ Officer Hart advised Officer Goetz about the gun and yelled for Knowles to show her hands.²⁷ As he did so, Officer Hart drew his service weapon and positioned it at a low ready position.²⁸ In this position, the gun was pointingtowards the floor, not at Knowles.²⁹ After Officer Hart told Knowles to show her hands, she got up from the bed.³⁰ Knowles had blood on her face, was yelling and screaming, and, according to both officers, had an "evil" look on her face.³¹

The parties dispute some of what happened next. However, the evidence shows that Knowles reached for her gun.³² From there, it is undisputed that Officer Hart fired his service weapon once within approximately 15 seconds after his firstcommand for Knowles to show her hands.³³ After Officer Hart fired his weapon, Knowles fell to the floor and Officer Hart rushed to her in an attempt to secure the handgun.³⁴ Knowles began kicking, fighting, refusing to cooperate, and screaming.³⁵ Officer Goetz came into the room to help Officer Hart get Knowles under control, but she continued to fight with and scream at the officers.³⁶ Eventually, the officers handcuffed Knowles and removed the handgun from the holster on her side.³⁷

Officer Hart asked Knowles if she had been hit and she said yes.³⁸ A paramedic found a gunshot wound on her right breast.³⁹ Knowles continued to fight while the paramedics strapped her onto a stretcher to be transported to a hospital.⁴⁰ Knowles was taken by ambulance to a local hospital.⁴¹ While en route, the paramedics gave Knowles anti-psychosis medication, after which she beganhaving seizure-like activity and became unresponsive.⁴² Knowles had no vital signs by the time she arrived at the hospital and she was pronounced dead within the hour.⁴³

Knowles's autopsy revealed that the gunshot entered her right breast near the center of the chest and exited in the armpit area.⁴⁴ The bullet did not enter the chest cavity or travel through the ribs.⁴⁵ The medical examiner found that "to a reasonable degree of medical certainty," the gunshot wound was not an independently lethal injury.⁴⁶ Thus, with appropriate care, the gunshot wound would not have been life-threatening.⁴⁷ The medical examiner determined that many factors contributed to Knowles's cardiac dysrhythmia and death, including: mixed drug intoxication, physical restraint based on her being handcuffed and strapped to the medical stretcher, and a history of bipolar and panic disorders.⁴⁸ The medical examiner concluded that the gunshot wound was a possiblecomplicating factor because it would have increased the stress Knowles was already experiencing as a result of her drug-induced psychosis or psychotic episode, but, "it is impossible to determine the degree or level of any increased stress or what effect, if any, it would have had on [her] physiological condition."⁴⁹

b. Procedural History

Plaintiff, Knowles's surviving husband,⁵⁰ filed this action on April 2, 2018.⁵¹ The Complaint asserts the following claims under Georgia law: battery (Count I), negligence (Count II), wrongful death (Count III), pain and suffering (Count IV), and bad faith (Count V). It also asserts a federal excessive force claim against Officer Hart in his individual capacity, in violation of the Fourth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count VI). On March 11, 2019, Officer Hart moved for summary judgment on all counts.⁵² Officer Hart's motion argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiff's § 1983 claim and official immunity from Plaintiff's state law claims.

Plaintiff's Complaint failed to assert a basis for this Court's jurisdiction. However, since the Complaint asserts a § 1983 cause of action, this Court has jurisdiction over that claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Since the state law claims arise from the same case and controversy as the § 1983 claim, the Court has jurisdiction over those claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" only if it can affect the outcome of the lawsuit under the governing legal principles. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A factual dispute is "genuine . . . if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.

A party seeking summary judgment has the burden of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If a movant meets its burden, the party opposing summary judgment must present evidence showing either (1) a genuine issue of material fact or (2) that the movant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 324.

In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, "and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn" in favor of that party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; see also Herzog v. Castle Rock Entm't, 193 F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th Cir. 1999). "Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions," and cannot be made by the court in evaluating summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. See also Graham v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 1274, 1282 (11th Cir. 1999). Summary judgment for the moving party is proper "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

III. DISCUSSION

a. Qualified Immunity for § 1983 Claim

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

Section 1983 itself creates no substantive rights. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140, 144 n.3 (1979). Rather, it provides a "method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States Constitution and federal statutes that it describes." Id. To succeed on a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff "must prove that she was deprived of a constitutionally guaranteed right under color of state law." Tillman v. Coley, 886 F.2d 317, 319 (11th Cir. 1989).⁵³

Plaintiff alleges that Officer Hart violated Knowles's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure.⁵⁴ Tennesee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) (holding that apprehension by use of force constitutes "seizure"...