Knox v. Dixon

1

MICHAEL KNOX, Petitioner, v. RICKY DIXON, Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections, Respondent.

No. 4:24cv166-AW-HTC

United States District Court, N.D. Florida, Tallahassee Division

August 20, 2024

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

HOPE THAI CANNON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Michael Knox, proceeding pro se, filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his conviction in Leon County Circuit Court Case No. 2018 CF 763. Doc. 1. After considering the petition, the record, the Secretary's response, Doc 9, and Knox's reply, Doc. 11, the undersigned finds the petition should be DENIED without an evidentiary hearing.

I. Background^[1]

On February 24, 2018, multiple guns were stolen from Ad-Tek, a gun store in Tallahassee, Florida. Doc. 9-3 at 5-7. Officer Michael Petroczky of the Tallahassee Police Department subsequently received an intelligence bulletin that included a photograph of a vehicle potentially connected to the burglary. Id. Based on the photograph, Officer Petroczky identified the vehicle as a white 90's model Toyota Corolla with tinted windows, aftermarket rims, damage near the passenger side mirror, and a black molding strip along the mid-line of the passenger side. Id. at 67.

On February 28, 2018, police dispatch received a call about a black male at the corner of Gamble and Disston Streets selling firearms from a white vehicle, possibly a Honda, that the caller thought were stolen. Id. at 7-9, 21, 25. The caller indicated the male: (1) was approximately 5'10” and 180 lbs; (2) was wearing a black tank top and jeans; (3) had a short fade haircut that was grown out; and (4) went by the name “Meat” and his first name was possibly “Mike.” Id. at 9-10. The caller contacted dispatch a second time and provided the license plate number of the white vehicle. Id. at 9-10. The caller wished to remain anonymous but gave their phone number to dispatch in case they needed to be contacted. Id. at 9. Police ran the license plate number provided by the caller and learned it was for a 1993 white Toyota Corolla registered to the petitioner, Michael Knox. Id. at 10. Officer Petroczky also learned Knox had a criminal history that involved either guns or violence. Id. at 30.

Less than 10 minutes after the second call, Officer Petroczky arrived at the location given by the caller and drove his unmarked car past the white vehicle several times over the course of about 30 minutes. Id. at 11, 14. Officer Petroczky recognized the vehicle as the same one he saw in the intelligence bulletin, as it had the same rims, molding, and tint. Id. at 11-12. Officer Petroczky also observed an individual, later identified as Knox, who matched the physical description provided by the caller. Id. at 13, 19-20. Officer Petroczky saw Knox holding something at chest level and showing it to another individual; Petroczky could not see what was in Knox's hand because the Corolla obstructed his view. Id. at 13. Based on his training and nearly 13 years of experience in law enforcement, Officer Petroczky believed “there was something illegal about their actions” because “the mannerisms that they were using or displaying suggested that what they were doing was secretive, guarded, hidden behind the car and hidden close to the chest.” Id. at 1214. And because the individual showed “significant excitement” over what Knox was showing him, Officer Petroczky did not think it was “a nonchalant, hand-to-hand transaction” like he had witnessed “with most street level narcotics deals”; instead, based on all the information he had, Officer Petroczky suspected Knox was showing the individual a firearm. Id. at 14.

Officer Petroczky, along with other officers in unmarked vehicles, subsequently entered the parking lot where the Corolla was located. Id. at 15. The officers exited their vehicles with their guns drawn and pointed at the suspects, who were ordered to get down. Id. at 15, 26. Knox and the other men put their hands up and laid on the ground. Id. at 15. Petroczky secured Knox's hands behind his back, patted him down, and found a pistol in a holster in the front of his waistband. Id. at 17-18, 26. Officers also searched a duffel bag located on the trunk of the Corolla and discovered multiple firearms, the majority of which were confirmed as being stolen from Ad-Tek. Id. at 18-19, 28, 31.

On March 9, 2018, Knox was charged with four offenses: (1) burglary of a structure while armed with a firearm (Count 1); (2) possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 2); (3) grand theft of a firearm (Count 3); and (4) possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 4). Doc. 9-1 at 2-3. Counts 1 through 3 related to the burglary of Ad-Tek on February 24, while Count 4 related to the firearms found on February 28.

On April 12, 2018, Knox moved to suppress the firearms discovered during the February 28 encounter. Doc. 9-2. The circuit court held a hearing on the motion on June 7, 2018, Doc. 9-3, and denied it, Doc. 9-4. On August 22, 2018, the court severed Counts 1 through 3 from Count 4 at Knox's request. Doc. 9-5; Doc. 9-6. On January 29, 2019, Knox proceeded to trial on Count 4, where he represented himself, and a jury found him guilty of possessing the firearm found in his waistband. Doc. 9-7. On February 5, 2019, the court sentenced Knox to 12 years of imprisonment with a 3-year mandatory minimum. Doc. 9-8. The State later declined to prosecute Knox on Counts 1 through 3.

Knox filed a direct appeal of his conviction and sentence to the First District Court of Appeal (“First DCA”), arguing the circuit court erred by denying his motion to suppress. Doc. 9-9; see also Knox v. State, 296 So.3d 989 (First DCA 2020). The First DCA affirmed with a written opinion, holding the circuit court properly denied the motion to suppress. Knox, 296 So.3d at 996.

Knox sought discretionary review from the Supreme Court of Florida, which declined to accept jurisdiction on October 21, 2020. Doc. 9-13; see also Knox v. State, 2020 WL 6158132 (Fla. 2020). Because Knox did not seek review in the U.S. Supreme Court, his conviction became final 90 days later, on January 19, 2021. See Bond v. Moore, 309 F.3d 770, 773-74 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding a state prisoner's conviction becomes final when the U.S. Supreme Court denies certiorari, issues a decision on the merits, or when the 90-day period to file a petition for certiorari expires). However, Knox's time to file the instant petition under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”)^[2] did not start on that date because he had already filed a Rule 3.800 motion to correct illegal sentence on December 14, 2020. Doc. 9-14.

Knox's Rule 3.800 motion, along with several other postconviction motions he filed, tolled the statute of limitations period, so less than 60 days ran off the one-year AEDPA clock before Knox filed his § 2254 petition on April 4, 2024. Doc. 1. Thus, the undersigned agrees with the Secretary that the petition is timely.

In the petition, Knox presents five grounds for habeas relief: (1) the circuit court erred by denying his motion to suppress; (2) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to sever Counts 1 through 3 from Count 4 before the hearing on the motion to suppress; (3) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to present legal authority (statutes, caselaw, procedural rules) during the motion to suppress hearing; (4) appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to move for a rehearing after the First DCA affirmed his conviction on direct appeal; and (5) appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge “the nature of the initial encounter” between Knox and police. Doc. 1.

II. Legal Standards

Under the AEDPA, which governs a state prisoner's petition for habeas corpus relief, relief may only be granted on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court if the adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This standard is both mandatory and difficult to meet. White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 419 (2014). “Clearly established federal law” consists of the governing legal principles set forth in the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court when the state court issued its decision. Id. A decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if the state court either: (1) applied a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth by Supreme Court case law; or (2) reached a different result from the Supreme Court when faced with materially indistinguishable facts. Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1155 (11th Cir. 2010); Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 (2003).

A state court decision involves an “unreasonable application” of Supreme Court precedent if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle, but applies it to the facts of the petitioner's case in an objectively unreasonable manner, Brown v. Payton 544 U.S. 133, 134 (2005); Bottoson v. Moore, 234 F.3d 526, 531 (11th Cir. 2000), or “if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply.” Bottoson, 234 F.3d at 531 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406 (2000)). “A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as fair-minded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court's...