Knox v. Mayor

RHONDA KNOX, Plaintiff v. MAYOR & CITY COUNCIL BALTIMORE CITY et al., Defendants

CIVIL NO. JKB-17-1384

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

November 29, 2017

MEMORANDUM

I. Background

Plaintiff Rhonda Knox filed this suit claiming employment discrimination in the form of sexual harassment, retaliation for engaging in protected activity, federal civil rights violations, violations of state law, and acts of tortious conduct. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) The named Defendants are the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City ("City"), Fabian Lewis, and Yolanda Cason. Following the filing of a motion to dismiss,¹ Knox filed an amended complaint (Am. Compl., ECF No. 14), to which the City and Cason filed a motion to dismiss (City Defs.' Mot., ECF No. 16) and to which Lewis filed a counterclaim (Countercl., ECF No. 17) and a motion to dismiss (Lewis's Mot., ECF No. 20). In turn, Knox filed a motion to dismiss Lewis's counterclaim (Knox's Mot., ECF No. 24.) The motions have been briefed (ECF Nos. 21, 25, 26, 27) and are ready for decision. No hearing is necessary. Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2016). The motions will be granted in part and denied in part.

II. Standard of Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim

A complaint must contain "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Facial plausibility exists "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. An inference of a mere possibility of misconduct is not sufficient to support a plausible claim. Id. at 679. As the Twombly opinion stated, "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." 550 U.S. at 555. "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.' . . . Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). Although when considering a motion to dismiss a court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint, this principle does not apply to legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

III. Allegations of the Complaint

Knox is a female who has been working with the City's Department of Transportation ("DOT") in the Safety Division since 2004. (Am. Compl. ¶ 13.) Her initial position was that of a Parking Control Agent. (Id.) On September 26, 2013, she was promoted to Transportation Enforcement Supervisor and began reporting to Lewis, who was Deputy Chief of the DOT Safety Division. (Id. ¶ 14.) At that time, Lewis began making lewd comments to her and engaging in unwanted physical touching. (Id.) In October 2013, Lewis began making "inappropriate sexual comments towards her while at work." (Id. ¶ 15.) In November 2013, Lewis entered Knox's office, "grabbed her and kissed her on the mouth, then stated that shewouldn't be a supervisor if it wasn't for him." (Id. ¶ 16.) By January 2014, Lewis "had begun regularly groping Ms. Knox when others were not present." (Id. ¶ 17.)

In early 2014, Knox informed Lt. Caroline Brooks, a higher-ranking supervisor² within the Safety Division, of Lewis's behavior. (Id. ¶ 18.) Brooks's initial comment to Knox was that Lewis "was just a dirty old man." (Id.) Brooks then attended a meeting with Knox and Lewis "and specifically told Mr. Lewis the harassment would need to stop or Lt. Brooks would report him." (Id. ¶ 19.) Brooks told Knox that she, Brooks, had told Cason, Chief of the Safety Division, about the alleged harassment. (Id. ¶ 20.) After the meeting of Brooks, Lewis, and Knox, Lewis changed Knox's schedule (id. ¶ 21), but Knox provides no particulars as to that schedule change. Knox alleges Lewis made "threats of other retaliation" (id.), but provides no factual content as to what those threats were. While still in the six-month probationary period for her new position of Traffic Enforcement Supervisor, Knox "became nervous that she would face further retaliation, or even be fired, if she did not respond to Mr. Lewis's retaliatory behavior and continued sexual solicitations." (Id.)

Knox alleges another officer in the same division complained of harassment and was relocated as a result (id. ¶ 22), but Knox does not specify who that harasser was, when the harassment occurred, whether it was sexual harassment, and whether the relocation was welcomed as a protective measure or regarded as a punitive action.

Lewis began sending text messages to Knox, asking her to take and send nude pictures of herself while she was at work. (Id. ¶ 23.) Knox alleges the text messages "conveyed that if the nude photographs or videos were not sent to him, he would not approve [her] request for overtime hours, scheduling requests, or requests for additional staffing." (Id. ¶ 24.) Knoxalleges Lewis's text messages "contained lascivious comments, including [his] saying 'I want to have you for lunch' and 'I'm sitting outside of your house.'" (Id. ¶ 25.) She alleges her "nonconsensual responses of sending nude photographs [were] in exchange for receiving proper staffing, approval of overtime, and appropriate scheduling." (Id. ¶ 3.) One time, Lewis told Knox "he had a pink dildo in his briefcase and wanted to stick it in her butt." (Id. ¶ 26.)

Knox took a leave from work of unspecified length in August 2015 "due to her anxiety." (Id. ¶ 27.) In November 2015, Lewis called Knox into a storeroom in the office, and, when she entered the storeroom, Lewis ejaculated on her arm and her sweater. (Id. ¶ 28.) Knox alleges she never welcomed or consented to Lewis's sexual harassment or advances; instead, she responded out of fear of losing her job or because she wanted "to attain work related compensation as was afforded to other employees without such demands." (Id. ¶ 29.) She alleges that male employees of DOT were never subjected to Lewis's "harassing behavior and retaliatory actions." (Id. ¶ 60.)

Although she was initially reluctant to make a complaint against her supervisor based on her fear of retaliation, in December 2015, Knox filed a formal complaint with Cason and the Department's Inspector General. (Id. ¶¶ 31, 32.) After the complaint was filed, and allegedly pursuant to Cason's directives, Knox's duty shift changed five times, which Knox alleges was "a particularly cruel hardship" for her because she is a mother of school-aged children and she had to make arrangements to get her children off of the bus and to make other accommodations to care for her family. (Id. ¶ 33.) Knox alleges the schedule changes negatively affected both her productivity in her work and her quality of life outside of work. (Id.)

Knox also alleges she was assigned individual directives and assignments not given to others with her same rank and title, adding to her workload and resulting in unnecessary stressand anxiety (id. ¶ 34), but she does not provide any details as to these additional directives and assignments, other than to say that Cason assigned her individual directives (id. ¶ 5). She alleges the schedule changes and additional directives and assignments were a direct result of her complaint against Lewis. (Id. ¶ 35.) Knox additionally says she was informed she needed to purchase a new cell phone because she had lost her cell phone's stylus, but she persuaded "her employers" to make her responsible only for purchasing a new stylus, not a new cell phone (id.); Knox does not say who informed her of this requirement, but says others in her department have not been held to this requirement (id.).

Knox alleges that, after she filed her formal complaint against Lewis, an investigation commenced and at least fifteen other women came forward and complained of similar misconduct by Lewis. (Id. ¶ 36.) Lewis was provided a "pretermination" letter, which notified him he was being recommended for termination. (Id. ¶ 37.) Before termination occurred, Lewis "quietly resigned." (Id.) The date of his resignation is not alleged.

In March 2016, Knox filed a complaint against Cason with DOT's Department of Human Resources. (Id. ¶ 38.) Knox does not indicate the outcome of that complaint.

Knox's amended complaint filed in this Court sets out twelve counts:

• Count I against City: Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment - Knox concedes this count is brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. (Pl.'s Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. Dismiss 6, ECF No. 15.)

• Count II against City: Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment - Knox also concedes this count is brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. (Id.)

• Count III against City, Cason, and Lewis: Civil Rights Act Due Process Claim - the Court infers this is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

• Count IV against City, Cason, and Lewis: Civil Rights Act Equal Protection Claim - the Court infers this is also brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

• Count V against City: Sexual Harassment under Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act, [State Government] Code § 20-606: Hostile Work Environment and Quid Pro Quo

• Count VI against City, Cason, and Lewis: Maryland Constitution Articles 24 & 26 Due Process Claim

• Count VII against City, Cason, and Lewis: Maryland Constitution Articles 24 & 26 Equal Protection Claim

• Count VIII against City, Cason, and Lewis: Maryland Constitution Article 46 Gender Discrimination

• Count IX against City, Cason, and Lewis: Maryland Constitution Longtin-type Pattern or Practice Claim

• Count X against City, Cason, and Lewis: Negligent Hiring, Training, Retention & Supervision

• Count XI against City, Cason, and Lewis: Negligent Entrustment

• Count XII against Lewis: Assault and Battery

IV. Allegations of the Counterclaim

Lewis's counterclaim presents a different set of allegations...