Koback v. Mun. Employees' Ret. Sys. of R.I.

252 A.3d 1247

Timothy KOBACK

v.MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF RHODE ISLAND.

No. 2019-423-M.P.

16-7082

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 24, 2021

John M. Harnett, Esq., for Petitioner.

Michael P. Robinson, Esq., for Respondent.

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

Justice Lynch Prata, for the Court.

The respondent, Municipal Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode Island (MERS),¹ seeks review of a decree of the Appellate Division of the Workers’ Compensation Court (WCC), awarding attorneys’ fees and costs to the petitioner, Timothy Koback. The respondent claims the WCC and its Appellate Division lack the statutory authority to award attorneys’ fees and costs. The respondent also maintains that even if attorneys’ fees are proper, the petitioner did not submit legally sufficient evidence to support such fees under our precedent. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we quash the decree of the Appellate Division of the WCC.

Facts and Travel

The underlying facts of this case are not in dispute. The petitioner was employed as a firefighter by the City of Woonsocket. On March 24, 2012, during the performance of his duties as a firefighter, he sustained a herniated disc injury to his lower back while assisting in a patient transfer. The petitioner filed his application for accidental disability retirement (ADR) benefits with the respondent retirement board on September 19, 2013. As mandated by G.L. 1956 § 45-21.2-9(a), he was examined by three physicians engaged by the retirement board to assist the board in rendering a decision on petitioner's ADR application.

On November 10, 2015, the retirement board denied petitioner's ADR application, finding that petitioner had failed to prove that his injury arose out of and in the course of his duties as a firefighter. The retirement board instead approved petitioner's application for ordinary disability retirement. The petitioner requested reconsideration of the decision; and in a letter dated November 18, 2016, the retirement board affirmed its decision to deny petitioner's ADR application.

The petitioner then appealed the retirement board's adverse ruling to the WCC. In accordance with the WCC's rules, practices, and procedures, the matter was assigned to a trial judge. On May 23, 2017, the trial judge issued a pretrial order denying the petition, from which petitioner filed a timely claim for a trial de novo .

After a full trial, the trial judge issued a written decision granting petitioner's petition seeking ADR benefits and awarding a counsel fee to petitioner's counsel. In support of his application for attorneys’ fees, petitioner's counsel submitted a fee affidavit, detailing the work his office performed and the hours spent on the case, along with a list of fees and costs incurred, for a total bill of $10,442.02. The respondent objected, arguing that the WCC lacked statutory authority to award attorneys’ fees. The petitioner's counsel later submitted a supplemental affidavit, attesting to his credentials and the difficulty of the case, and filed an affidavit billing an additional $2,790 for work performed after the WCC rendered its decision. A hearing was held before the WCC. The trial judge determined that the WCC had statutory authority to award attorneys’ fees and concluded that a fee in the amount of $12,000 was fair and reasonable in this case. A decree was entered ordering that petitioner was to be paid ADR benefits and that his attorney be paid a fee of $12,000, plus costs of $418.27.

The respondent then filed an appeal to the Appellate Division, challenging only the award of attorneys’ fees and costs to petitioner's counsel, and contesting the WCC's authority to award attorneys’ fees and costs in ADR claims.

In its decision, the Appellate Division rejected respondent's arguments, finding that the WCC had statutory authority to award fees and costs in ADR cases. The Appellate Division reasoned that appeals in such cases may be considered "proceedings" and the notice of appeal to the WCC may be considered a petition, within the meaning of G.L. 1956 § 28-35-32.² According to the decision, a contrary ruling would "elevate form over substance." The Appellate Division determined that petitioner, as a firefighter who filed a claim for ADR benefits, was an "employee" as that term is defined in G.L. 1956 § 28-29-2(4). The court also determined that ADR benefits are a form of compensation within the meaning of § 28-35-32.

The Appellate Division then considered respondent's argument that the affidavits submitted by petitioner's attorney were insufficient to support an award of attorneys’ fees. The decision observed that the affidavits were never "formally introduced as exhibits for the court to review." Thus, the Appellate Division reasoned, there was no need for a disinterested attorney to vouch for the reasonableness and necessity of fees contained in a fee affidavit. Despite the absence of a formally introduced affidavit, the Appellate Division upheld the fee awarded by the trial judge and imposed an additional fee of $2,500 for counsel's work before the Appellate Division. A final decree was entered on October 22, 2019, and respondent filed a timely petition for writ of certiorari with this Court. We granted the petition on November 18, 2019, and the writ of certiorari issued on that same day.

Standard of Review

This Court's "review of a case on certiorari is limited to an examination of the record to determine if an error of law has been committed." Lang v. Municipal Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode Island , 222 A.3d 912, 914-15 (R.I. 2019) (quoting Plante v. Stack , 109 A.3d 846, 853 (R.I. 2015) ). The Court will "examin[e] the record for judicial error * * * [and] inspect the record to discern if there is any legally competent evidence to support the findings of the hearing justice below." Id. at 915 (quoting Plante , 109 A.3d at 853 ).

Additionally, § 28-35-30 sets forth the grounds upon which this Court may review a decision of the Appellate Division. The statute states in part that

"[u]pon petition for certiorari, the [S]upreme [C]ourt may affirm, set aside, or modify any decree of the appellate commission of the workers’ compensation court only upon the following grounds:

"(1) That the workers’ compensation court acted without or in excess of its authority;

"(2) That the order, decree, or award was procured by fraud; or

"(3) That the appellate division erred on questions of law or equity, the petitioner first having had his objections noted to any adverse rulings made during the progress of the hearing at the time the rulings were made, if made in open hearing and not otherwise of record." Section 28-35-30(a).

Furthermore, we review questions of statutory interpretation de novo . Lang , 222 A.3d at 915. "In so doing, [the Court's] ultimate goal is to give effect to the purpose of the act as intended by the Legislature." Id. (quoting Bluedog Capital Partners, LLC v. Murphy , 206 A.3d 694, 699 (R.I. 2019) ). If the statute is clear and unambiguous, the Court will "interpret the statute literally and * * * give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings." Id. (quoting In re B.H. , 194 A.3d 260, 264 (R.I. 2018) ). "The Legislature is presumed to have intended each word or provision of a statute to express a significant meaning, and the Court will give effect to every word, clause, or sentence, whenever possible." Id. (quoting In re B.H. , 194 A.3d at 264 ). However, "this Court will not construe a statute to reach an absurd result." Id. (quoting In re B.H. , 194 A.3d at 264 ).

Finally, we note that this Court has "staunchly adhered to the ‘American rule’ that requires each litigant to pay its own attorney's fees absent statutory authority or contractual liability." Tri-Town Construction Company, Inc. v. Commerce Park Associates 12, LLC , 139 A.3d 467, 478 (R.I. 2016) (brackets omitted) (quoting Shine v. Moreau , 119 A.3d 1, 8 (R.I. 2015) ). We have also concluded that "when a rule is silent regarding attorneys’ fees, there is ‘no room for implication by judicial construction’ and attorneys’ fees are not available under the statute." Shine , 119 A.3d at 10 (quoting Eleazer v. Ted Reed Thermal, Inc. , 576 A.2d 1217, 1221 (R.I. 1990) ).

Discussion

On certiorari, respondent raises three arguments. The respondent first claims that the WCC and its Appellate Division lack the authority to award attorneys’ fees and costs following an appeal from a decision of the retirement board pursuant to § 45-21.2-9(f). Second, respondent contends that § 28-35-32, the attorneys’ fees provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act, chapters 29 through 37 of title 28 of the general laws (WCA), does not provide for an award of attorneys’ fees in this case because petitioner's claim does not fall into one of the statutorily authorized categories allowing for an award of fees or costs. Third, respondent maintains that, assuming arguendo that attorneys’ fees are proper, petitioner did not submit legally sufficient evidence to support such fees under this Court's precedent.

Statutory Authority to Award Attorneys’ Fees

Because this Court is tasked with determining the interplay between several statutory provisions to resolve this case, we think it is necessary to provide a brief review of those statutes and the legislative history regarding the WCC's jurisdiction to hear ADR claims.

Prior to July 1, 2011, a party wishing to challenge an adverse ADR decision made by the retirement board was required to file an administrative appeal to the Superior Court pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15 of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). However, in 2011, the General Assembly changed the forum for litigants and granted jurisdiction to the WCC to hear ADR claims filed by certain parties aggrieved by a determination made by the retirement board for injuries occurring after July 1, 2011.³ See P.L. 2011, ch. 151, art. 12, § 8 (effective June 29, 2011); see also...