Koelker v. Mayor and City Council of Cumberland

Page 624

599 F.Supp.2d 624

Chuck KOELKER, et al. v. The MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF CUMBERLAND (MARYLAND).

Civil No. JFM-07-2706.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

February 24, 2009.

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Francis J. Collins, Kahn Smith and Collins PA, Baltimore, MD, for Plaintiffs.

Jefferson L. Blomquist, Funk and Bolton PA, Baltimore, MD, Michael Scott Cohen, Law Office of Michael Scott Cohen LLC, Cumberland, MD, for Defendant.

OPINION

J. FREDERICK MOTZ, District Judge.

On October 5, 2007, current and former members of the Cumberland Fire Department ("plaintiffs") filed this action against the Mayor and City Council of Cumberland ("defendant") for alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), the Maryland Wage and Hour Law, and the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Act. Plaintiffs request declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief for defendant's alleged failure to pay wages for all hours worked and time-and-a-half for overtime wages.¹

Plaintiffs and defendant have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. After defendant filed its response to plaintiffs' summary judgment motion and a cross-motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to amend their complaint.

I.

The facts in this case are largely undisputed. (See Pls.' S.J. Reply 2.) Plaintiffs are firefighters currently or formerly employed by the Fire Department of the City of Cumberland, Maryland. Defendant, the Mayor and City Council of Cumberland, operates the Fire Department.

The employment terms for the firefighters are established in a collective bargaining agreement. The International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, Local # 1715 ("the Union"), is the exclusive bargaining agent for the plaintiff firefighters. (Def.'s Ex. 11, at 1, 3.) On July 15, 2003, defendant and the Union executed a collective bargaining agreement effective from July 1, 2002, through June 30, 2006. (Id. at 31.) A largely identical successor agreement was executed on August 8, 2006, for the employment period of July 1, 2006, through June 30, 2007. (Def.'s Ex. 12, at 32.) The current agreement was executed on April 15, 2008, to cover the period July 1, 2007, through June 30, 2010. (Def.'s Ex. 18, at 1.)

Under the Agreements, firefighters work one twenty-four hour "shift" followed by forty-eight hours off. After a certain number of shifts—eight under the 2003 Agreement and six under the 2006 and 2008 Agreements—the employee has one shift off, known as a "Kelly" day. For other members of the Fire Department, the work week is established by the Chief but "shall not exceed an average of 48 hours per week." (Def.'s Ex. 11, at 21; Def.'s Ex. 12, at 22; Def.'s Ex. 18, at 28.) For purposes of this summary judgment motion, the parties by agreement only present evidence regarding hours worked as to two firefighter plaintiffs, Chuck Koelker and Steven Grogg.

Each firefighter is paid a non-fluctuating amount biweekly equal to 1/26th of their annual base salary. The "Salary and Wage Rates" Article in the 2003 and 2006 Agreements lists yearly salaries for pay grades 1 through 18. (Def.'s Ex. 11, at 28; Def.'s Ex. 12, at 29.) The 2008 Agreement provides yearly rates and hourly rates.² (Def.'s Ex. 18, at 36, 41-43.) Plaintiffs "receive consistent bi-weekly checks that equal 2,080 times the hourly rate stated in the Union Contract." (Pls.' Mem. of Law in Supp. of Pls.' Mot. for Summ. J. ["Pls.' S.J. Mem."] 8.)

The Article governing overtime in the Agreements reads: "Whenever any employee entitled to overtime pay works in excess of his regularly assigned workweek or work schedule, he shall be paid for such overtime at a rate of time and one-half for such overtime, in addition to any other benefit to which he may be entitled."³ (Def.'s Ex. 11, at 21; Def.'s Ex. 12, at 23; Def.'s Ex. 18, at 28.) For court appearances, "Union members will be compensated at the rate of time and one-half for time spent in court appearances related to his Fire Department duties when employee is off duty." (Def.'s Ex. 11, at 22; Def.'s Ex. 12, at 24; Def.'s Ex. 18, at 30.) To determine the overtime rate, the City divides a firefighter's annual salary by 2,080 and multiplies the result by 1.5. (Repp Dep. 28:11-18, Jan. 28, 2008.)

When a firefighter works beyond his regularly scheduled hours due to an emergency, he is paid time-and-one-half for all "overtime" hours worked. (Repp Dep. 27:13-21.) However, firefighters are not always paid overtime for each hour worked; when a firefighter is called in to work due to understaffing, she is paid overtime for only eight hours of a twelve hour shift and sixteen hours of a twenty-four hour shift. (Repp Dep. 27:4-12; 28:1-5; Howser Dep. 21:7-22:7.)

The Agreements provide a binding "Grievances and Arbitration Procedure." (Def.'s Ex. 11, at 4; Def.'s Ex. 12, at 4; Def.'s Ex. 18, at 10.) This procedure is the exclusive remedy for the resolution of disputes over a breach, misinterpretation, or improper application of the Agreement. (Id.) Plaintiffs have not filed a grievance or sought arbitration.

II.

Plaintiffs move to amend their complaint to add an additional count against defendant. This motion is granted in part and denied in part.

While the "general rule is that leave to amend a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) should be freely given," Steinburg v. Chesterfield County Planning Comm'n, 527 F.3d 377, 390 (4th Cir.2008), a "district court may deny leave to amend for reasons `such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of the allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.'" Glaser v. Enzo Biochem, Inc., 464 F.3d 474, 480 (4th Cir.2006) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962)).

The Fourth Circuit has held that "after the deadlines provided by a scheduling order have passed, the good cause standard must be satisfied to justify leave to amend the pleadings." Nourison Rug Corp. v. Parvizian, 535 F.3d 295, 298 (4th Cir.2008). On December 11, 2007, I entered a scheduling order setting a deadline of January 25, 2008, for joinder of additional parties and amendment of the pleadings. Plaintiffs filed their motion for leave to amend long past that deadline. Accordingly, in order to justify their proposed amendment, plaintiffs must show "good cause." Id.

Plaintiffs' new claim alleging noncompliance with the minimum wage provisions of the FLSA seems to be inextricably interrelated to plaintiffs' other claims for allegedly unpaid regular and overtime wages. Accordingly, plaintiffs' motion to amend is granted as to the minimum wage claim.⁴

However, plaintiffs' new claim for sleep and meal time wages is factually distinct from plaintiffs' other claims, and sleep and meal time wages "were not involved in the case during the discovery and were not the subject of ... discovery." Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Alpha of Virginia, Inc., 43 F.3d 922, 940 (4th Cir.1995). Plaintiffs have not shown "good cause" for amending their claim well after the deadline set by this court for amending pleadings. Accordingly, plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend their complaint to add this claim is denied.

III.

A motion for summary judgment will be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). The substantive law of the cause of action determines which facts are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. "When cross-motions for summary judgment are submitted to a district court, each motion must be considered individually, and the facts relevant to each must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant." Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 363 (4th Cir.2003).

"`The two central themes of the FLSA are its minimum wage and overtime requirements,'" and the FLSA is "clearly structured to provide workers with specific minimum protections against excessive work hours and substandard wages." Monahan v. County of Chesterfield, Va., 95 F.3d 1263, 1266-67 (4th Cir.1996) (quoting Arnold v. Arkansas, 910 F.Supp. 1385, 1392 (E.D.Ark.1995)). Section 206 of the FLSA establishes the minimum wage requirements, and Section 207 governs maximum work hour limitations and overtime. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-207.

The FLSA generally requires employers to pay one and one-half times the employee's regular rate for each hour worked beyond forty hours in a workweek. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). Congress created a partial exemption for individuals employed by a "public agency engaged in fire protection or law enforcement activities." 29 U.S.C. § 207(k). This partial exemption

raises the average number of hours the employer can require law enforcement and fire protection personnel to work without triggering the overtime requirement, and it accommodates the inherently unpredictable nature of firefighting and police work by permitting public employers to adopt work periods longer than one week.

O'Brien, 350 F.3d at 290. The 207(k) exemption provides:

No public agency shall be deemed to have violated subsection (a) of this section with respect to the employment of any employee in fire protection activities ... if—

... (2) in the case of such an employee to whom a work period of at least 7 but less than 28 days applies, in his work period the employee receives for tours of duty which in the aggregate exceed a number of hours which bears the same ratio to the number of consecutive days in his work period as 216⁵ hours ...

compensation at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.

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