Kohlbeck v. Wyndham Vacation Resorts, Inc.

7 F.4th 729

Thomas KOHLBECK; Gay Hartfiel; Roger Leake; Rita Leake, Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.WYNDHAM VACATION RESORTS, INC.; Wyndham Vacation Ownership, Inc., Defendants - Appellees

No. 20-1815

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: February 17, 2021

Filed: August 3, 2021

Michael Gross, Saint Louis, MO, M. Scott Montgomery, Montgomery & Newcomb, Springfield, MO, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

David Alois Jermann, Darren Keith Sharp, Armstrong & Teasdale, Kansas City, MO, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before SMITH, Chief Judge, ARNOLD and STRAS, Circuit Judges.

SMITH, Chief Judge.

Thomas Kohlbeck and Gay Hartfiel, a married couple, and Rita and Roger Leake, another married couple, entered into multiple timeshare contracts with Wyndham Vacation Resorts, Inc. ("Wyndham"). The couples sued Wyndham, alleging various improper trade practices under Missouri law. Wyndham asserted counterclaims against the couples for breach of contract. The couples’ claims were dismissed, and Wyndham's counterclaims continued. Wyndham moved for summary judgment on its counterclaims. In defense, the couples asserted duress and fraudulent misrepresentation. The district court¹ granted summary judgment in Wyndham's favor. The couples appeal. We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment.

I. Background

Kohlbeck, Hartfiel, and the Leakes have had a long history with Wyndham. Kohlbeck and Hartfiel first contracted with Wyndham in 2007. The Leakes first contracted with Wyndham in 2001. As relevant, the contracts allowed the couples to stay at the properties they had ownership in, rent out the properties they had ownership in, and rent properties from other people who had Wyndham-related timeshares. Whenever the couples traveled through Wyndham, Wyndham representatives would insist that the couples attend short owner update meetings. But according to the couples, the meetings were actually grueling, hours-long sales presentations. Despite their frustrations, over the years, both couples entered into multiple new contracts with Wyndham. Each new contract would replace the previous contract, so that each couple had only one active contract with Wyndham at a time. Kohlbeck and Hartfiel's active contract at the time of the suit began in July 2017. The Leakes’ active contract was formed in May 2015.

Both couples stopped making payments under their active contracts and, in August 2018, sued Wyndham in state court. They alleged that Wyndham engaged in various unfair trade practices under the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act. Wyndham removed the case to federal court. The couples’ claims against Wyndham were eventually dismissed for failure to meet federal pleading standards. Wyndham responded to the couples’ suit by asserting breach-of-contract claims against them.

Wyndham moved for summary judgment on its breach-of-contract claims. The couples asserted the defenses of duress and fraudulent misrepresentation.

In their depositions, both couples identified several instances that they argue constituted duress or fraudulent misrepresentation. First, both couples claimed that Wyndham falsely represented the length of the update meetings. Second, both couples asserted that Wyndham falsely represented that they would be able to offset certain monthly fees under the contracts by renting their properties to third parties. The Leakes additionally stated that Wyndham falsely informed them (1) about the quality of their accommodations, (2) that the monthly fees under the contracts would increase only minimally, and (3) that they could travel anywhere at any time.

On undisputed facts, the district court determined as a matter of law that Kohlbeck, Hartfiel, and the Leakes breached their contracts with Wyndham and that the couples failed to establish the defenses of duress and fraudulent misrepresentation. Wyndham moved for monetary damages. The couples’ response to that motion included a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).² In its order, the district court granted Wyndham's motion for monetary damages and denied the couples’ Rule 60(b) motion. The couples’ notice of appeal indicated they were appealing from the "order granting monetary damages entered in this action on the 1st day of April, 2020." Notice of Appeal at 1, Kohlbeck v. Wyndham Vacation Resorts , No. 6:18-cv-03319-MDH (W.D. Mo. 2020), ECF No. 96.

II. Discussion

Kohlbeck, Hartfiel, and the Leakes argue that the district court erred when granting Wyndham summary judgment by finding that the couples failed to establish the defenses of duress and fraudulent misrepresentation.

A. Appellate Jurisdiction

Before addressing the merits, we must first determine whether the couples’ notice of appeal confers appellate jurisdiction on us over the district court's grant of summary judgment. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c) sets certain requirements for a notice of appeal. We have explained that Rule 3 "is a jurisdictional requirement." Johnson v. Leonard , 929 F.3d 569, 575 (8th Cir. 2019). The Supreme Court has too. Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co. , 487 U.S. 312, 317–18, 108 S.Ct. 2405, 101 L.Ed.2d 285 (1988) ; see also Gonzalez v. Thaler , 565 U.S. 134, 147, 132 S.Ct. 641, 181 L.Ed.2d 619 (2012) ("We have held that ‘Rule 3's dictates are jurisdictional in nature.’ " (quoting Smith v. Barry , 502 U.S. 244, 248, 112 S.Ct. 678, 116 L.Ed.2d 678 (1992) ).

Nevertheless, in response to Wyndham's jurisdiction arguments, the couples ask us to view Rule 3 as a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule. It is true that the Supreme Court has increasingly "stressed the distinction between jurisdictional prescriptions and nonjurisdictional claim-processing rules." Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1849, 204 L.Ed.2d 116 (2019). But even if the Supreme Court's more recent decisions "call[ ] the precedents treating the requirements of Rule 3(c) as jurisdictional into doubt," "we are bound to follow Torres and later precedents on this issue until the Supreme Court overrules them." Auto. Alignment & Body Serv., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 953 F.3d 707, 723 (11th Cir. 2020).

Thus, we apply the test we always have: "When determining whether an appeal from a particular district court action is properly taken, we construe the notice of appeal liberally and permit review where the intent of the appeal is obvious and the adverse party incurs no prejudice."

Vogt v. State Farm Life Ins. Co. , 963 F.3d 753, 765–66 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Parkhill v. Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. , 286 F.3d 1051, 1058 (8th Cir. 2002) ). In other words, the notice of appeal must be "the functional equivalent of what the rule requires." Lincoln Composites, Inc. v. Firetrace USA, LLC , 825 F.3d 453, 458 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Smith v. Barry , 502 U.S. 244, 248, 112 S.Ct. 678, 116 L.Ed.2d 678 (1992) ).

Rule 3(c) requires a notice of appeal to "(A) specify the party or parties taking the appeal by naming each one in the caption or body of the notice ...; (B) designate the judgment, order, or part thereof being appealed; and (C) name the court to which the appeal is taken."

1. Failure to Name this Court

First, the couples’ notice of appeal inexplicably appealed to and from two nonexistent courts. Notice of Appeal at 1 (appealing from the "United States District Court for the Southern District of Missouri" and "to the United States Court of Appeals for the Southern District of Missouri"). We note the similarities between this notice of appeal and the notices of appeal in Newcomb v. Wyndham Vacation Ownership, Inc. , 999 F.3d 1134 (8th Cir. 2021). In Newcomb , we dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction, finding the notices of appeal "entirely deficient" under Rule 3(c) because the appellants "appeal[ed] an order entered on a day when no order issued, from a district court that does not exist, [and] to a court of appeals that does not exist." Id. at 1137.

Here, the couples appealed from a real and specific order. Their notice of appeal also properly named the parties in the caption. The only Rule 3(c) requirement missing was the naming of this court. Although the notice of appeal failed to properly name the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the couples’ intent to appeal to this court was obvious, and Wyndham was not prejudiced. See Vogt , 963 F.3d at 765–66. This is because (1) the couples filed the notice of appeal with the proper district court, (2) there was only one appellate court they could be appealing to, (3) the notice of appeal was transferred to the only relevant appellate court, and (4) the improper naming of courts did not delay the case or otherwise prejudice Wyndham.

This conclusion aligns with our sister circuits that have addressed the issue. See Jackson v. Lightsey , 775 F.3d 170, 175–76 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding that a failure to properly name the court being appealed to did not deny the court appellate jurisdiction because "there [wa]s only one possible appellate forum"); Isert v. Ford Motor Co. , 461 F.3d 756, 760 (6th Cir. 2006) (explaining that "[w]hen there is only one possible appellate forum, ... and no information or action contrary to the proper forum appears on the face of the papers, the filing of a notice of appeal has the practical effect of ‘naming’ that forum" (quoting Dillon v. United States , 184 F.3d 556, 558 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc))); United States v. Treto-Haro , 287 F.3d 1000, 1002 n.1 (10th Cir. 2002) (stating that "[t]he Government's failure to identify this [c]ourt in its notice of appeal" was "careless" but "did not prejudice or mislead [the] [d]efendant" because "the Tenth Circuit [wa]s the only [c]ourt to which the Government [could] take th[e] appeal").

2. Designation of the Appealed-from Order

The couples’ notice of appeal stated that they were appealing from the "order granting monetary damages entered in this action on the 1st day of April, 2020." Notice of Appeal at 1. The April 1 order considered Wyndham's motion...