Kohrs v. Swift Transp. Co. of Ariz.

1

Christopher Kohrs v. Swift Transportation Co. of Arizona, LLC et al

No. 2:24-cv-03570-SVW-MAA

United States District Court, C.D. California

July 18, 2024

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Present: The Honorable STEPHEN V. WILSON, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

Proceedings IN CHAMBERS ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR REMAND [12]

I. Introduction

Before the Court is a motion to remand the action back to state court. Dkt. 12. For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff Christopher Kohrs (“Plaintiff') filed this lawsuit against defendant Swift Transportation Co. of Arizona, LLC (“Defendant” or “Swift”) and doe defendants who work at Swift (collectively, “Defendants”), in Los Angeles Superior Comt on November 27, 2023. Dkt. 1, ¶ 5. Plaintiff alleged a class action with eight causes of action against Defendants, namely: failure to provide rest breaks, failure to provide meal breaks, failure to pay minimum wages, failure to pay all wages upon separation, failure to furnish timely and accruate wage statements, failure to reimburse business expenses, violation of California's Unfair- Competition Act, and Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) penalties. Dkt. 11, at 1. Defendants removed the case on April 30, 2024. Dkt. 1. Plaintiff filed this motion to remand on May 30, 2024. Dkt. 12.

Plaintiff is a citizen of California. Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 22-23. Swift is a citizen of Delaware and Arizona. Id. ¶¶ 24-32. Plaintiff worked as a truck driver for Defendant from August 2022 through August 2023. Dkt. 1-1, ¶ 8. The putative class includes all drivers employed by Defendant in California from 2019 to the present, which the complaint alleges as exceeding several hundred persons. Id. ¶¶ 17-19. The complaint alleges that Defendant induced Plaintiff and other Class Members to enroll in its training progr am, charged them a $9,000 fee that would be forgiven after a year of work, and then fired Plaintiff and other class members before the year was up to avoid forgiving the $9,000 debt. Id. ¶¶ 9-10. The complaint includes reimbursement for this fee in the prayer for relief. Id. ¶ H. All other allegations and causes of action come without specific dollar numbers.

Defendants argue that removal is proper under the Class Action Fairness Act pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Dkt. 1, ¶ 2. Defendant's investigation of its own records shows over 4,000 class members and an aggregate of over 200,000 workweeks. Id. ¶¶ 41-43. Defendant calculated nearly $50 million for the arnormt in controversy based only on minimum wages, meal and rest breaks, waiting time penalties, and attorneys' fees. Id. ¶ 66. Defendant does not address the amount in controversy for the reimbursement of the $9,000 training fee.

On December 13, 2023, Judge Berle, of the Los Angeles Superior Court, ordered a Joint Initial Stahrs Conference Statement to be submitted by February 16, 2024. Dkt. 1-10. The order required an estimate of the class's estimated size. Dkt. 12-1 at 33. Defendants submitted a statement on February 23, 2024, indicating that investigation and discovery regarding the estimated class size were ongoing without providing an estimate. Id. at 44.

On March 22, 2024, Defendant responded to Plaintiff s initial discovery requests, which included questions regarding estimated class size. Id. at 59, 62-63. In its response. Defendant claimed it performed a diligent search of records that it believed would contain the information sought, but also that its investigation, discovery, and evaluation of the matter were ongoing. Id. at 60. Defendant objected to every single question in the initial discovery requests, including requests for the total number of currently and formerly employed drivers who reside in California. Id. at 60-62.

Defendant filed the notice of removal on April 30, 2024. Dkt. 1.

III. Legal Standard

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and have subject matter jurisdiction only where authorized by the Constitution and Congress. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.,511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Unless otherwise limited, “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district comt of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Federal courts have original jurisdiction where an action arises under federal law or where each plaintiffs citizenship is diverse from each defendant's citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(a).

Federal courts also have original jurisdiction pm suant to the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”). 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). CAFA gives federal courts jurisdiction over certain class actions, defined in § 1332(d)(1), if the class has more than 100 members, any class member is a citizen of a state different from any defendant, and the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), (5)(B).

“Through CAFA, Congr ess broadened federal diversity jurisdiction over class actions . . .” Mondragon v. Capital One Auto Fin., 736 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2013). “[N]o antiremoval presumption attends cases invoking CAFA, which Congress enacted to facilitate adjudication of certain class actions in federal court,” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014). Thus. “CAFA's “provisions should be read broadly, with a strong preference that interstate class actions should be heard in a federal court if properly removed by any defendant.” Id. (cleaned up). However, “under CAFA the burden of establishing removal jurisdiction remains, as before, on the proponent of federal jurisdiction.” Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chemical Co., 443 F.3d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (noting that Congress passed CAFA in the context of a “longstanding, near-canonical rule that the burden on removal rests with the removing defendant”).

The mechanics and requirements for removal are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1446. Kuxhausen v. BMW Fin. Servs. NA LLC, 707 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2013). Section 1446(b) “identifies two thirtyday periods for removing a case.” Carvalho v. Ecpdfax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 885 (9th Cir. 2010). “The first thirty-day removal period is triggered if the case stated by the initial pleading is removable on its face.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “The second thirty-day removal period is triggered if the initial pleading does not indicate that the case is removable, and the defendant receives ‘a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper' from which removability may first be ascertained.” Id. (quoting § 1446(b)). 28 U.S.C. § 1446 also governs the removal of class actions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b) (“A class action may be removed to a district court of the United States in accordance with section 1446.”).

IV. Discussion

A. There is Original Jurisdiction Under CAFA

None of Plaintiff s claims arise under federal law. Thus, there is no federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Defendant removed the case based on 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), the Class Action Fairness Act. Defendant has shown minimal diversity. Based on Defendant's employment records, Plaintiff resides in California and is therefore likely a citizen of California. Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 22-23. The putative class of current and California drivers also likely includes California citizens. Id. Defendant is a limited liability company with citizenship in Delaware and Arizona. Id. ¶¶ 24-30. Thus, a “member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from [a] defendant” under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A).

Defendant also showed the aggregate amount in controversy for all class members exceeded $5,000,000. Defendant determined, based on its records, that the putative class of California dr ivers from November 27, 2019, to the present is comprised of at least 4,000 dr ivers who worked an aggr egate 200,000 workweeks. Id. ¶¶ 42-43. Plaintiff s claim for the $9,000 training fee reimbursement multiplied by 4,000 class members results in an amount in controversy of $36,000,000, satisfying the amount in controversy requirement without accounting for Plaintiff s other claims. Curiously, in Defendant's notice of removal, much effort is spent calculating the potential amount in controversy for unspecified claims for minimum wage, meal and rest breaks, waiting time penalties, and attorneys' fees, without taking note of the only affirmative dollar- number mentioned in the complaint. Id. ¶¶ 44-69.

B. However, Defendant Removed the Case Too Late

Although the case could be removed because this court possesses original jurisdiction under CAFA, we find that Defendant's notice of removal was untimely.

Specifically, Defendant ran afoul of the first thirty-day removal period under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), which is trigger ed if the case stated by the initial pleading is removable on its face. The statute does not define “removable.” See Durham v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 445 F.3d 1247, 1252 (9th Cir. 2006).

Although every complaint is either capable of being removed or not, for the purpose of assessing timeliness, some pleadings are “indeterminate” in the sense that the face of the complaint does not make clear whether the required jurisdictional elements are present. Harris v Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 693 (9th Cir. 2005). To avoid saddling defendants with the burden of investigating jurisdictional facts, the Ninth Circuit has held that “the gr ound for removal must be revealed affirmatively in the initial pleading in order for the first thirty-day clock under § 1446(b) to begin.” Id. at 695. “Removals invoking CAFA jurisdiction are...