Konan v. U.S. Postal Serv.

652 F.Supp.3d 721

Lebene KONAN v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, United States of America, Raymond "Ray" Rojas, and Jason Drake

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:22-CV-0139-S

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division

Signed January 19, 2023

Robert Clary, Robert Clary PLLC, Murphy, TX, for Lebene Konan.

Brian Walters Stoltz, U.S. Attorney's Office, Dallas, TX, for United States Postal Service, Raymond "RAY" Rojas, Jason Drake, United States of America.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

KAREN GREN SCHOLER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court are the Motion to Dismiss of Defendant United States of America [ECF No. 15], the Motion to Dismiss of Defendant United States Postal Service [ECF No. 17], and the Motion to Dismiss of Defendants Raymond "Ray" Rojas and Jason Drake [ECF No. 22] (collectively, "Motions"). The Court has considered Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint [ECF No. 7], the Motions, Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendant United States of America's Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 19], Appendix to Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to the United States of America's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) [ECF No. 20], Plaintiff's Response to the Motion to Dismiss Filed by the United States Postal Service [ECF No. 21], Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss of Defendant United States of America [ECF No. 24], Plaintiff's Surreply Brief in Opposition to Defendant United States of America's Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 27], Reply in Support of Defendant United States Postal Service's Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 28], Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss Filed by Defendants Rojas and Drake [ECF No. 29], Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss of Defendants Raymond "Ray" Rojas and Jason Drake [ECF No. 30], and the applicable law. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the Motions.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Lebene Konan brings this tort and discrimination action against Defendants United States of America ("United States"); United States Postal Service ("USPS"); Raymond "Ray" Rojas ("Rojas"), a mail carrier for USPS; and Jason Drake ("Drake"), a Postmaster for USPS. See Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint ("Compl.") [ECF No. 7] ¶¶ 2-5. Plaintiff alleges that Rojas and Drake (collectively, "Individual Defendants"), "acting in their capacities as employees of the USPS[,]" intentionally withheld and refused to deliver Plaintiff's mail to two residences she owned and leased to tenants in Euless, Texas ("Residences"). Id. ¶ 49; see id. ¶¶ 13, 20, 23-25, 37-38, 49. According to Plaintiff, Rojas and Drake failed to deliver her mail because "[t]hey do not like the idea that a black person owns the Residences, and leases rooms in the Residences to white people." Id. ¶ 28.

Plaintiff alleges that the discrimination against her began when Rojas unilaterally changed the lock on a mailbox belonging to one of her Residences, located at 1207 Saratoga Drive ("Saratoga Residence"), without her permission. Id. ¶ 13. Plaintiff claims that on information and belief, Rojas did not change the lock on mailboxes belonging to any other residence owner on his route or refuse to deliver mail to similar multi-family residences owned by "white people." Id. ¶ 16. Plaintiff states that on May 15, 2020, she went to the Post Office to inquire why the lock to her mailbox was changed without notice or consent. Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiff alleges the personnel at the Post Office advised her that USPS would not deliver any mail to the Saratoga Residence until its ownership was "investigated by USPS's Inspector General and conclusively established." Id. ¶ 19.

While the Inspector General conducted the investigation over the next two to three months, Plaintiff contends that no mail was delivered to the Saratoga Residence. Id. ¶ 20. Plaintiff claims she lost expected rental income when several of her tenants moved out as a result. Id. According to Plaintiff, while the investigation ultimately concluded that Plaintiff owned the Saratoga Residence and mail delivery temporarily resumed, Drake instructed Rojas and other employees working under him "not to deliver any mail properly addressed to the Saratoga Residence unless the individuals to whom mail was addressed at the Saratoga Residence first provided proof that they were actually living there." Id. ¶¶ 21-23.

Plaintiff alleges that Rojas, with Drake's encouragement, refused to deliver Plaintiff's mail and some of her tenants' mail, returning the mail to the Post Office where he had it marked as "undeliverable." Id. ¶¶ 24-25. Plaintiff claims that she and some of her tenants did not receive important mail addressed to them including "doctor's bills, medications, credit card statements, car titles and property tax statements." Id. ¶ 24.

Plaintiff alleges that in April 2021, Rojas discovered Plaintiff owned another residence located at 1116 Trenton Lane in Euless, Texas, and, with Drake's support, started to withhold mail addressed to this location as well. Id. ¶¶ 37-38. Plaintiff alleges Rojas and Drake have engaged in this behavior because she is African American. Id. ¶ 39. Plaintiff alleges she repeatedly advised USPS of Rojas and Drake's intentional misbehavior, but nothing has been done to correct the situation. Id. ¶ 42. "To this day," Plaintiff claims, "Rojas and Drake continue to refuse to deliver properly-addressed mail to" both Residences. Id. ¶ 48.

Plaintiff asserts common law tort claims against USPS pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671, et seq. ("FTCA"), including nuisance, tortious interference with prospective business relations, conversion, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. ¶¶ 68-96. Plaintiff also asserts these claims against the United States because she contends the United States "is liable to Plaintiff for the payment of" damages under these claims.¹ Id. ¶¶ 71, 76, 83, 96. Against Rojas and Drake, Plaintiff asserts claims for denial of equal protection of the law pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Id. ¶¶ 97-104.

USPS and the United States now move to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). The Individual Defendants move to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and based on qualified immunity.²

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and absent jurisdiction conferred by statute, lack the power to adjudicate claims." La. Real Est. Appraisers Bd. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 917 F.3d 389, 391 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Texas v. Travis Cnty., 910 F.3d 809, 811 (5th Cir. 2018)). Courts "must presume that a suit lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests on the party seeking the federal forum." Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001).

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) is the vehicle through which a party can challenge a federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). The district court may dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on the complaint alone. Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Barrera-Montenegro v. United States, 74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1996)). The court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true. See Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 424 (5th Cir. 2001). If the court determines that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the action. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3).

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

To defeat a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 742 (5th Cir. 2008). To meet this "facial plausibility" standard, a plaintiff must "plead[ ] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). The court must accept well-pleaded facts as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Sonnier v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 509 F.3d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 2007). However, the court does not accept as true "conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions." Ferrer v. Chevron Corp., 484 F.3d 776, 780 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). A plaintiff must provide "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citation omitted). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Id. (citations omitted).

In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court limits its review to the face of the pleadings. See Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999). The pleadings include the complaint and any documents attached to it. Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000). The ultimate question is whether the complaint states a valid claim when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Great Plains Tr. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2002). At the motion to dismiss stage, the court does not evaluate the plaintiff's likelihood of success. It only determines whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. Mann v. Adams Realty Co., 556 F.2d 288, 293 (5th Cir. 1977).

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff alleges four state-law claims: nuisance, tortious interference with prospective business relations, conversion, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Compl. ¶¶ 68-96. She...