Konefe v. AutoZoners, LLC

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BRIAN KONEFE, Plaintiff, v. AUTOZONERS, LLC.,^[1] Defendant.

No. 22-11004

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division

February 9, 2023

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF NO. 9)

LINDA V. PARKER U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

This is a diversity action arising out of claims of employment discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. Brian Konefe (“Konefe”) initiated this lawsuit on May 10 2022. In an Amended Complaint filed on June 13, 2022, against AutoZoners, LLC (“AutoZone”), Konefe alleges the following: racial discrimination and harassment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C § 2000e, (“Title VII”) and the Michigan Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2201 et seq., (“ELCRA”) (Count 1); retaliation in violation of Title VII and the ELCRA (Count II); and discrimination and retaliation under the Michigan Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act, Mich. Comp Laws. § 37.1101 et seq., (“PWDCRA”) (Count III). (ECF No. 8.)

The matter is presently before the Court on “Defendant's Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint” (ECF No. 9). The motion is fully briefed. (ECF Nos. 11, 12.) Finding the facts and legal arguments sufficiently presented by the parties the Court is dispensing with oral argument with respect to the parties' motions pursuant to Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(f). For the reasons that follow, the Court is granting AutoZone's motion and dismissing Count III and the racial harassment claim in Count I of the Amended Complaint. Count II and the racial discrimination claim in Count I will proceed for further litigation.

I. Factual Background

Konefe is a Caucasian male. In or around April 2021, he was hired by AutoZone in its Saginaw, Michigan location. Konefe later worked as a Store Manager at AutoZone's Rochester Hills, Michigan location (“Rochester store”). In or around April 2021, an African-American employee allegedly committed a theft at the store Konefe managed. Konefe notified the district manager, who is African-American, that because of the theft, the store needed new locks, keys, and security codes. Konefe alleges that the district manager became “overly defensive” and did not acknowledge the risk of potential theft “because the original theft was committed by an African American employee of [AutoZone].” (ECF No. 8 at Pg ID 70, ¶ 15.)

At an undisclosed later date, Konefe and the district manager had a disagreement regarding whether the Rochester store needed to change the locks, keys, and security codes, as well as the district manager's alleged refusal to acknowledge the potential risk of theft “because the original theft was committed by an African American.” (Id. ¶ 15.) Konefe alleges that since the disagreement occurred, he has experienced harassment and adverse employment actions because of his race, including being demoted from his title of “Store Manager” to “Manager.” Konefe also maintains that discrimination occurred when the district manager changed the locks, keys, and security codes without notifying him, causing Konefe to be locked out of the Rochester store. From or around July 2020 through December 2020, Konefe participated in a store manager training program. Upon completion of the program, Konefe alleges that the district manager refused to consider him for a store manager position “due to [Konefe's'] race and hired an African-American friend instead.” (Id. at Pg ID 71, ¶ 22.)

Konefe filed a report with AutoZone's Human Resources Department but alleges that HR “refused/failed” to investigate his complaint regarding his treatment by the district manager. Konefe also alleges that during the time he was supervised by the district manager, Konefe was treated differently than his African-American coworkers, which caused him “extreme stress.” (Id. ¶ 22.) Konefe subsequently took medical leave for severe hypertension due to stress.

On or about May 7, 2021, the district manager terminated Konefe. On December 6, 2021, Konefe filed an EEOC complaint and received a “Right to Sue” letter on February 14, 2021.

II. Standard of Review

AutoZone seeks dismissal of this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. RMI Titanium Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 78 F.3d 1125, 1134 (6th Cir. 1996). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” but it must contain more than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action ....” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A complaint does not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertions' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

As the Supreme Court provided in Iqbal and Twombly, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Majestic Bldg. Maint., Inc. v. Huntington Bancshares Inc., 864 F.3d 455, 458 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.) Moreover, the plausibility standard “does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal [conduct].” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

In deciding whether the plaintiff has set forth a “plausible” claim, the court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). This presumption is not applicable to legal conclusions, however. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 668.

Ordinarily, the court may not consider matters outside the pleadings when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Weiner v. Klais & Co., Inc., 108 F.3d 86, 88 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing Hammond v. Baldwin, 866 F.2d 172, 175 (6th Cir. 1989)). A court that considers such matters must first convert the motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P 12(d). However, “[w]hen a court is presented with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it may consider the [c]omplaint and any exhibits attached thereto, public records, items appearing in the record of the case and exhibits attached to [the] defendant's motion to dismiss, so long as they are referred to in the [c]omplaint and are central to the claims contained therein.” Bassett v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008).

III. Applicable Law & Analysis

In the motion, AutoZone seeks to dismiss a portion of Count I and Count III pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, AutoZone maintains that Konefe's racial harassment claim (Count I) should be dismissed for the following reasons: (1) “[Konefe] failed to state a claim because he did not allege that he was subjected to racial comments or conduct” and (2) “[Konefe] failed to state objectively severe or pervasive conduct that could support a cognizable hostile work environment claim.” (ECF No. 9 at Pg ID 90.) Next, AutoZone maintains that Konefe's PWDCRA claim should be dismissed for the following reasons: (1) “[Konefe] failed to state a ‘regarded as' or ‘perceived' as disability claim” and (2) “[Konefe] failed to identify any substantial impairment on major life activity to support a disability discrimination claim.” (Id.)

Racial Discrimination and Harassment (Count I)

As an initial matter, Count I of the Amended Complaint contains two separate claims racial discrimination and harassment due to a hostile work environment based on race despite being labeled as a single count. Notably, AutoZone states in its reply brief that it is not seeking to dismiss Konefe's racial discrimination claim, only the racial harassment claim. (ECF No. 12 at Pg ID 150.) As such, the Court will separate the claims and only address the racial harassment claim in this opinion.

Generally, the Sixth Circuit analyzes discrimination claims brought under the ELRCA under the same standards as discrimination under Title VII. Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 658 (6th Cir. 1999). “A plaintiff may advance a claim of discrimination by way of a racially hostile work environment under Title VII.” Id. Title VII makes it unlawful to “discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[.]” 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1). To allege a claim for a hostile work environment based on race, a plaintiff must establish five elements: 1) he is a member of a protected class; 2) he was subjected to unwelcome racial harassment; 3) the harassment was based on race; 4) the harassment created a hostile work environment; and 5) the existence of employer liability. See Hafford v. Seidner, 183 F.3d 506, 512 (6th Cir. 1999); Bowie v. Oakland Cmty. Coll., No. 21-10098, 2022 WL 4541627, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 28, 2022).

“[W]hen the workplace is permeated with ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,' that is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment,' Title VII is violated.” Nat'l R.R....