Konepachit v. Sakavye, 2:20-CV-0910-TLN-DMC-P

DAVID KONEPACHIT, Plaintiff, v. CANTIL SAKAVYE, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:20-CV-0910-TLN-DMC-P

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

June 18, 2020

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff's complaint. See ECF No. 1.

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a ". . . short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff's claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague and conclusory.

I. PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff, David Konepachit, is a prisoner incarcerated at Centinela State prison. Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) Cantil Sakavye¹, Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court, and (2) Xavier Becerra, the Attorney General of California. Plaintiff alleges that defendants deprived him of his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection and Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by denying his writ for habeas corpus. Plaintiff also alleges that the five-year prior felony enhancement on his sentence deprives him of his Fifth Amendment right to due process, Sixth Amendment right to a criminal trial, and Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment stating that the Fair and Just Sentencing Reform Act violates his constitutional rights. Plaintiff also seeks a declaratory judgment stating that California Penal Code sections §667(e)(1), § 677 (a), and § 667.5(b) violate his constitutional rights.

Plaintiff claims that the recently enacted Fair and Just Sentencing Reform Act discriminates against individuals whose convictions were finalized by the time the bill was passed. The Fair and Just Sentencing Reform Act removed Penal Code § 667(a)'s mandatory five-year sentence enhancement for an offender's prior felony conviction. Although the Act is not retroactive, it lays out a detailed set of requirements for offenders to qualify for a resentencing referral. Plaintiff alleges that the requirement that administrative officials find evidence of rehabilitation is arbitrary and capricious. Plaintiff further alleges that the five-year felony enhancement to his original sentence caused his time in prison to triple, which wasdisproportionate to the crime he committed and thus violated his constitutional rights.

II. DISCUSSION

The Court finds that plaintiff's complaint suffers five defects. First, plaintiff cannot recover from defendant Cantil-Sakauye because she has absolute judicial immunity from such actions. Second, plaintiff has failed to allege any facts to support his Sixth Amendment claim. Third, § 1983 is not the appropriate vehicle for relief for plaintiff's Fifth Amendment double jeopardy claim and plaintiff's Eighth Amendment disproportionate sentence claim. Fourth, plaintiff's claims cannot establish the intentional discrimination necessary for a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim. Fifth, plaintiff cannot establish a necessary cognizable liberty interest for his Fifth Amendment due process claim.

A. Plaintiff's Claims Against Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye

Judges are absolutely immune from damage actions for judicial acts taken within the jurisdiction of their courts. See Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). This immunity is lost only when the judge acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction or performs an act that is not judicial in nature. See id. Judges retain their immunity even when they are accused of acting maliciously or corruptly, see Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (per curiam); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978), and when they are accused of acting in error, see Meek v. County of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1999). This immunity extends to the actions of court personnel when they act as "an integral part of the judicial process." See Mullis v. U.S. Bankruptcy Court, 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987).

Here, plaintiff alleges that Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye violated his constitutional rights by denying his writ for habeas corpus. A writ of habeas corpus falls squarely in the category of a judicial act within the jurisdiction of the California Supreme Court. Thus, plaintiff cannot make a § 1983 claim against Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye as she has absolute judicial immunity from such actions.

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B. Plaintiff's Sixth Amendment Claim

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a ". . . short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff's claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague and conclusory.

The Sixth Amendment states "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI.

The Court recognizes that plaintiff attempts to bring a Sixth Amendment claim, however, plaintiff does not allege any Sixth Amendment violations. Plaintiff at no point raises issues with his previous trial or requests a new trial. Plaintiff is not entitled to a resentencing hearing under the Sixth Amendment. See Dillon v. U.S., 560 U.S. 817, 828 (2010) (holding that statutes that authorize modification of modification of imprisonment based on retroactive amendment do not implicate the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial). Plaintiff is also not entitled to a speedy trial for his § 1983 claim as § 1983 is a civil suit and therefore not subject to the protections the Sixth Amendment provides for criminal suits.

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C. Plaintiff's Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Claim and Eighth Amendment Disproportionate Sentence Claim

When a state prisoner challenges the legality of his custody - either the fact of confinement or the duration of confinement - and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to an earlier or immediate release, such a challenge is cognizable in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); see also Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 824 (9th Cir. 1997); Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). Where a prisoner challenges the conditions of confinement, as opposed to the fact or duration of confinement, his remedy lies in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 531-32 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S.Ct. 1289, 1298-99 n.13 (2011) (stating that ". . .when a prisoner's claim would not 'necessarily spell speedier release,' that claim does not lie at 'the core of habeas corpus' and may be brought, if at all, under § 1983"). Any claim that does not necessarily shorten an inmate's incarceration, if successful, falls outside the scope of habeas jurisdiction. See Blair v. Martel, 645 F.3d 1151, 1157-58 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Wilkerson v. Wheeler, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 6435496 (9th Cir. 2014) (discussing loss of good-time credits); Nettles v. Grounds, 788 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2015) (discussing loss of good-time credits). Thus, 28 U.S.C. §2254 cannot be used to challenge the conditions of confinement, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot be used to challenge the fact or duration of confinement.

Here, 42 USC § 1983 cannot provide relief for plaintiff's disproportionate sentence claim or his double jeopardy claim. Despite plaintiff's express statements to the contrary, plaintiff's disproportionate sentence and double jeopardy arguments necessarily challenge the duration of his sentence by arguing that his initial sentence was unfair. The only plausible relief that could be provided is a speedier release for prison, thus, plaintiff's disproportionate sentence and double jeopardy claims can only be brought...