Konyen v. Lowes Home Ctrs.

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CATHIE KONYEN, Plaintiff, v. LOWES HOME CENTERS, LLC, Defendant.

No. 3:22-CV-00538-MMD-CLB

United States District Court, D. Nevada

May 3, 2024

ORDER RE: MOTION REGARDING DISCOVERY DISPUTE, MOTION TO QUASH, AND MOTION/OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S THIRD AMENDED SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM [ECF NOS. 30, 31, 36]

Before the Court are several motions relating to disputes that have arisen during rebuttal discovery in this action. First, is Plaintiff Cathie Konyen's (“Konyen”) motion regarding discovery dispute. (ECF No. 30.) Defendant Lowes Home Centers, LLC (“Lowes”), responded to the motion. (ECF No. 34.) Second is Interested Party Reno Orthopedic Center's (“ROC”) motion to quash. (ECF No. 31.) Konyen responded, (ECF No. 32), and ROC replied, (ECF No. 35). Finally, is ROC's motion/objection to Konyen's third amended subpoena duces tecum. (ECF No. 36.) Konyen responded, (ECF No. 39), and ROC replied, (ECF No. 42.) The Court will address each motion in turn.^[1]

I. BACKGROUND

The instant case arises out of allegations of discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Nevada Revised Statutes §§ 613.330, 613.340, as well as a claim of breach of an employment contract or legally enforceable promise, in relation to Konyen's employment by Lowes. (ECF No. 1.)

Konyen's asserts disability discrimination and retaliation claims against Lowes, in connection with Lowes' withdrawal of disability accommodations to her. (Id.) Konyen alleges the adverse employer actions taken against her consisted of Lowes' failure to accommodate her disabilities, failure to engage in the mandated interactive process to keep her in the same position for which she was the leading salesperson, retaliating against her, and firing her (whether constructive discharge or direct firing), on the pretext of asking her to put in her “notice of resignation,” in order for her to obtain interim pay while she waited to receive short-term disability benefits, which Lowes forced her to take. (Id.)

Discovery in this case has been extended numerous times, (See ECF Nos. 13, 21, 23, 26), with the most recent extension occurring on March 6, 2024, (ECF No. 28). On February 16 2024, during the deposition of Konyen's treating ROC provider, Dr. Bruce Witmer, the validity of two ADA Accommodations Substantiation Forms (collectively referred to as “ADA Forms”)-which form the basis of Konyen's ADA claims-was raised for the first time. (ECF No. 27.) Thus, the most recent extension of discovery was for the limited purpose of conducting rebuttal discovery regarding the validity of ROC medical records, the validity, including the possible forgery, of two ADA Forms completed in April 2019 and purported to be signed by Dr. Witmer, and for handwriting samples and retained expert analysis to determine authorship of the two suspected fraudulent ADA forms. (See id.)

On April 5, 2024, in accordance with this Court's discovery dispute process, Konyen filed a motion regarding discovery dispute regarding Lowes' notice of intent to issue a records subpoena on ROC's former employee, Courtney Scrottish (“Scrottish”). (ECF No. 30.) Scrottish is a witness identified by Konyen as having certain information concerning how ROC conducted its business operations from October 2019 through June 2021. (Id.)

On April 8, 2024, Interested Party ROC filed an objection to and motion to quash and/or modify amended subpoena-civil deposition duces tecum served by Konyen on ROC. (ECF No. 31.) Specifically, the subpoena commands an in-person deposition of a representative of ROC pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(b)(6) on a variety of topics pertaining to the procedure for receiving, completing, signing, and returning a variety of forms under the ADA, as well as a request for documents. (Id.) The objection and motion are made on the grounds that the subpoena imposes undue burden and expense on ROC. (Id.) On April 22, 2024, Interested Party ROC filed an objection to Konyen's third amended subpoena-civil deposition duces tecum served by Konyen on ROC. (ECF No. 36.) This objection is based on the same grounds as the first motion and was filed in response to Konyen issuing another subpoena seeking the same information, documents, and deposition of a ROC employee on a variety of subjects. (Id.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“[B]road discretion is vested in the trial court to permit or deny discovery.” Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998). Parties are entitled to discover non-privileged information that is relevant to a party's claim or defense and is proportional to the needs of the case, including consideration of the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1); see also ATS Prods., Inc. v. Champion Fiberglass, Inc., 309 F.R.D. 527, 530 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (the scope of third-party discovery is subject to the same limitations). The discovery process should be cooperative and largely unsupervised by the court. Sali v. Corona Reg. Med. Ctr., 884 F.3d 1218, 1219 (9th Cir. 2018).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Konyen's Motion Regarding Discovery Dispute

On April 5, 2024, in accordance with this Court's discovery dispute process, Konyen filed a motion regarding discovery dispute regarding Lowes' notice of intent to issue a records subpoena on ROC's former employee, Courtney Scrottish (“Scrottish”). (ECF No. 30.) Lowes' subpoena asks for “any and all records in [ROC's] control pertaining to [] Scrottish.” (ECF No. 30-2.) Scrottish is a witness identified by Konyen as having certain information concerning how ROC conducted its business operations from October 2019 through June 2021. (ECF No. 30.)

Generally, a party does not have standing to bring a motion to quash a subpoena that is directed to a nonparty, unless the party is asserting a privilege or some other ground that establishes standing. See United States v. Tomison, 969 F.Supp. 587, 596 (E.D. Cal. 1997) (“A party only has standing to move to quash the subpoena issued to another when the subpoena infringes upon the movant's legitimate interests ... Accordingly the government lacks standing to raise the exclusive grounds for quashing the subpoena, since it lacks the sine qua non of standing, an injury in fact relative to those grounds.”); California Sportfishing Prot. All. v. Chico Scrap Metal, Inc., 299 F.R.D. 638, 643 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (“The Ninth Circuit has yet to address the question of whether a party has standing to bring a motion to quash since usually only the subpoenaed nonparty may move to quash. The general rule, however, is that a party has no standing to quash a subpoena served upon a third party, except as to claims of privilege relating to the documents being sought.”).

As recently explained:

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(a)(1)(C), a party may subpoena a nonparty to produce documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things. The court “must” quash or modify a subpoena if it “requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter, if no exception or waiver applies.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(d)(3)(A)(iii). The Ninth Circuit has “yet to address the question of whether a party has standing to bring a motion to quash since usually only the subpoenaed non-party may move to quash. The general rule, however, is that a party has no standing to quash a subpoena served upon a third party, except as to claims of privilege relating to the documents being sought.” California Sportfishing Prot. All. v. Chico Scrap Metal, Inc., 299 F.R.D. 638, 643 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (citing Windsor v. Martindale, 175 F.R.D. 665, 668 (D. Colo. 1997)); see also Peccia v. Dept of Corr. & Rehab., No. 2:18-cv-3049 JAM AC, 2020 WL 2556751, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 20, 2020) (citing California Sportfishing, 175 F.R.D. at 643); Robertson v. Catholic Cmty. Servs. of W. Washington, No. C19-1618 RSM, 2020 WL 1819842, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 10, 2020) (same). Under this general rule, plaintiff lacks standing to object to the subpoena on grounds of relevance or undue burden. Wells Fargo & Co. v. ABD Ins., No. C 1203856 PJH DMR, 2012 WL 6115612, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2012). A party cannot seek to quash a Rule 45 subpoena except to the extent that it has “a personal right or privilege in the information sought to be disclosed.” Freed v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 18cv359-BAS (LL), 2019 WL 582346, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2019) (quoting Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 2013 WL 4536808, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2013)).

Krenitsky v. Kirsch, No. 218CV0690WBSDBP, 2020 WL 5017270, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2020). Noted in Krenitsky, “[i]n contrast to a motion to quash, a party has standing to seek a protective order to limit discovery from a third party.” Id. at *1 n.1 (citing Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Southeast Floating Docks, Inc., 231 F.R.D. 426, 429 (M.D. Fla. 2005)).

Konyen asserts she has standing because she “has a legitimate interest in receiving the protections of the Court's Order limiting discovery to the rebuttal issue.” (ECF No. 30 at 2.) Lowes argues that Konyen does not have standing to quash the document request because Konyen cannot allege any privilege or vested interest in the responsive documents. (ECF No. 34.)

The Court agrees with Lowes that Konyen does not have standing to quash the subpoena of records on third-party witness Scrottish. Specifically, Konyen has not asserted any claims of privilege with respect to the requested documents. Further, it does not appear Konyen would be able to assert any privilege, as the requested records consist of...