Koppel v. Moses

1

JAMES KOPPEL, Plaintiff, v. WILLIAM MOSES, Defendant.

No. 20-CV-11479-LTS

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts

December 21, 2023

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANT WILLIAM MOSES' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

DONALD L. CABELL, CH. U.S.M.J.

This case arises from an incident involving two former students at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (“MIT”). Plaintiff James Koppel (“Koppel”) and defendant William Moses (“Moses”), both graduate students at the time belonged to a student organization known as the Student Information Processing Board (“SIPB”). SIPB leadership decided following certain events to request that Koppel refrain from participating any further in the group and Moses, acting as the organization's chair, sent two emails to other SIPB members communicating the organization's decision. Contending that the emails were false and defamatory, Koppel brought this action which following prior litigation, asserts a single claim for defamation. Moses moves for summary judgment on the claim and the motion has been referred to me for a report and recommendation. For the reasons explained below I recommend that the motion be denied.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Entitlement to summary judgment requires the movant to show “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.” Dusel v. Factory Mut. Ins. Co., 52 F.4th 495, 503 (1st Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). If the movant is “able to make a showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, with respect to each issue on which [he] would bear the burden of proof at trial, demonstrate that a trier of fact could reasonably resolve that issue in [his] favor.” Id. (citation omitted); see Clifford v. Barnhart, 449 F.3d 276, 280 (1st Cir. 2006) (“[A]s to any essential factual element of its claim on which the nonmovant [or movant] would bear the burden of proof at trial, its failure to come forward with sufficient evidence to generate a trialworthy issue warrants summary judgment.”) (citation omitted).

The record, including all reasonable inferences, is viewed in Koppel's favor as the nonmovant. See Motorists Com. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hartwell, 53 F.4th 730, 734 (1st Cir. 2022). Uncontroverted statements of fact in the movant's L.R. 56.1 statement are deemed admitted. Ing v. Tufts Univ., 2023 WL 5542779, at *1 n.1 (1st Cir. Aug. 29, 2023).

II. DEFAMATION LAW

To prevail on a defamation claim, a plaintiff must establish: “(1) that the defendant published a written statement; (2) of and concerning the plaintiff; that was both (3) defamatory, and (4) false; and (5) either caused economic loss, or is actionable without proof of economic loss.” Noonan v. Staples, 556 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).

Even where such a showing is made, Massachusetts law recognizes a conditional common law privilege for otherwise defamatory statements where the publisher and recipient share some legitimate mutual interest ‘reasonably calculated' to be served by the communication.” Catrone v. Thoroughbred Racing Ass'n of N. Am., Inc., 929 F.2d 881, 887 (1st Cir. 1991) (citations omitted); Lawless v. Estrella, 160 N.E.3d 1253, 1260 (Mass. App. Ct. 2020) (stating privilege applies when “publisher and the recipient share a common interest in the subject, and the statement is reasonably calculated to further or protect that interest”), review denied, 165 N.E.3d 158 (Mass. 2021).

That said, “Massachusetts law recognizes two ways in which a defendant may relinquish the protection of a conditional privilege: by publishing statements recklessly or by publishing statements with actual malice.” Zeigler v. Rater, 939 F.3d 385, 393-94 (1st Cir. 2019). The plaintiff carries “the burden of establishing abuse.” Id. at 393.

III. THE PARTIES' ARGUMENTS

Koppel's defamation claim revolves around two purportedly defamatory emails, one sent on February 27, 2020 to a subgroup of SIPB members known as “keyholders,”^[1]and a second email sent on March 2, 2020 to a wider audience of SIPB members. (D. 54, ¶¶ 3138, 82). In moving for summary judgment, Moses argues that (1) Koppel has not adduced sufficient evidence to create a triable issue that any portion of the February 27 and March 2 emails were false; (2) the common interest privilege entitled Moses in any event to publish the emails; and (3) Koppel has failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence that Moses recklessly abused the privilege.

Koppel argues in opposition that certain portions of the emails were false; that Moses and the email recipients did not share a common interest, rendering the privilege inapplicable here; and that Moses lost the privilege assuming he initially did enjoy it by unnecessarily and recklessly publishing the communications to a large number of people knowing portions of the emails were false.

IV. BACKGROUND

A. Koppel and Moses' Relationship Prior to February 2020

In 2015, Moses, a Ph.D. candidate at MIT who also received his undergraduate degree from there in 2014, met Koppel at an MIT programming retreat. (D. 133, ¶¶ 13, 15) (D. 129-3, p. 10) (D. 145, ¶¶ 1-2).^[2]Koppel was a Ph.D. candidate who also received his undergraduate degree from MIT, in 2015. (D. 133, ¶ 14) (D. 1293, p. 10). In 2017, they became friends and spent time with each other, including sharing meals, walking and talking together, and “hang[ing] out in [Moses'] room.” (D. 133, ¶ 15) (D. 129-3, p. 430). In 2018 and 2019, they considered becoming roommates. (D. 133, ¶ 15). In August or September 2018, Koppel became a member of SIPB. (D. 133, ¶ 14).

At various times, Koppel, who is “autistic to a certain degree,” would hug Moses and rub his head with Koppel's fist. (D. 133, ¶ 16) (D. 129-2, p. 9) (D. 132, ¶ 6). The hugs and rubs on the head made Moses uncomfortable. (D. 131-11, pp. 9, 15). Nonetheless, Moses does not remember thinking that any hug was a sexual advance and does not recall a specific unwanted sexual advance by Koppel.^[3] (D. 133-11, pp. 10, 16). Moses testified he asked Koppel to stop but Koppel testified that Moses did not ask him to stop.^[4](D. 133-11, p. 10) (D. 129-3, p. 436). Around the fall of 2019, Koppel determined that Moses “was not into the hugs” and decided to stop them. (D. 129-3, pp. 436-438).

B. SIPB, Its Constitution, and Email Distribution Lists

SIPB is a computer science group at MIT. (D. 133, ¶ 1). It is officially chartered by MIT and has been in existence for more than 50 years. (D. 133, ¶ 2). The group offers classes, talks, and computing infrastructure. (D. 145, ¶ 3) (D. 133, ¶ 3). It also controls certain spaces on MIT's campus, including the SIPB Office. (D. 145, ¶ 3). The office houses computing-related equipment and resources and is available to SIPB student members and, as defined below, associate keyholders. (D. 145, ¶ 3) (D. 133, ¶ 4) (D. 129-3, p. 397).

Under SIPB's constitution, any individual may become a member of SIPB by agreeing to its principles and participating in the group's work. (D. 129-1, Art. III). An “active member” is “defined as a member in good standing who has participated in some service furthering” SIPB's goals and “attended at least one meeting during the preceding 30 days.” (D. 129-1, Art. III). The constitution also defines various membership categories and distinguishes between members and members elected to keyholder status. (D. 129-1, Art. III, IV).

SIPB keyholders are afforded full privileges and retain their status and privileges after graduation. (D. 129-1) (D. 133, ¶ 6). They have a physical key to the SIPB Office and maintain that key as well as their student email addresses indefinitely after graduation. (D. 133, ¶¶ 6, 8). “Student keyholders” are MIT students whereas “associate keyholders” are all other keyholders, including alumni keyholders. (D. 129-1, Art. III) (D. 133, ¶ 7). As stated in the constitution, “[o]nly active student keyholders may vote in elections.” (D. 129-1, Art. III). Active student keyholders also nominate and elect SIPB members to become keyholders. (D. 129-1, Art. IV.1). The procedure entails an active student keyholder making a motion to nominate a “member for keyholder status” that is “proposed and seconded by active student keyholders present at” an SIPB meeting. (D. 129-1, Art. IV, § IV.1).

The executive committee of SIPB (“EC”) consists of nine members and is charged with the decision-making of SIPB. (D. 1291, Art. V). Throughout Moses' time at SIPB, the EC made decisions relating to the governance of the group. (D. 145, ¶ 10). The EC held meetings open to all members of the MIT community as well as meetings limited to EC members. (D. 129-1, Art. VII). The SIPB constitution requires the EC to report the business conducted at an EC meeting to the membership of SIPB. (D. 129-1, Art. VII).

The SIPB constitution also endows the EC with the authority to sanction any SIPB member who is “found to be detrimental to the functioning and goals of [SIPB].” (D. 129-1, Art. X). Pertinent here is the EC's authority to revoke an individual's SIPB membership if two-thirds of the EC vote in favor of this sanction. (D. 129-1, Art. X). The constitution further commands that any SIPB member under consideration for the sanction of revoking that person's membership “shall have the right to be informed of the reasons for which” this sanction is being considered “and have an opportunity to respond.”^[5](D. 129-1, Art. X). It also sets out a procedure allowing “the active keyholding membership . . . to overrule the [EC's] decision.” (D. 129-1, Art. IX).

The EC often utilized email distribution lists to communicate with SIPB student members and/or keyholders. (D. 145, ¶ 7). In particular, the EC informed SIPB members, including keyholders, of its decisions primarily through the...