Korcz v. United States

1

ELIZABETH KORCZ, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

Nos. 2:23-cv-08002-RDP, 2:19-cr-00193-RDP-JHE-1

United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Southern Division

April 18, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION

R. DAVID PROCTOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the court is Petitioner Elizabeth Korcz's Amended Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence. (Doc. # 5).^[1] The motion has been fully briefed.^[2] (Docs. # 5; 8). After careful review, and for the reasons discussed below, the motion is due to be denied.

I. Background

Petitioner Elizabeth Korcz was previously a licensed physician who operated a medical clinic with an in-house dispensary in Hoover, Alabama.^[3] (Cr. Doc. # 89 at 3). Petitioner was the only licensed medical provider at the clinic, and while she had several employees, none were authorized to prescribe controlled substances. (Id.). As a licensed physician, Petitioner was authorized to prescribe controlled substances to patients, but only if the prescriptions were issued for a legitimate medical purpose and within the usual course of professional practice. (Id. at 4). Physicians are not authorized to pre-sign blank prescriptions for controlled substances, and prescriptions of that nature are not issued within the usual course of professional practice. (Id.).

In late 2015, Petitioner was traveling outside of Alabama and was not present at the clinic. (Id. at 5). During that time Petitioner, with the agreement of several employees, knowingly prescribed controlled substances to patients outside of the course of professional practice in violation of the standard of care. (Id.). Specifically, certain patients received prescriptions for controlled substances, namely hydrocodone and oxycodone, without seeing Petitioner or any other licensed medical provider. (Id. at 4). Additionally, Petitioner authorized 1,926 pills of hydrocodone to be unlawfully dispensed by unlicensed employees in her absence. (Id. at 5).

On March 28, 2019, Petitioner was charged in a fifteen-count indictment with one count of conspiracy to unlawfully distribute and dispense controlled substances; one count of maintaining a drug-involved premises; five counts of unlawful distribution of a controlled substance; one count of conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud; and seven counts of healthcare fraud. (Cr. Doc. # 1 at 12-24). On December 16, 2020, Petitioner pled guilty to Count One-conspiracy to unlawfully distribute and dispense controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1). (Cr. Doc. # 177).

In the plea agreement, Petitioner acknowledged that she read, understood, and approved the entire agreement; discussed the agreement with her attorney; and was satisfied with her attorney's representation. (Cr. Doc. # 89 at 17-18). She also certified that “no other promises or representations have been made to me by the prosecutor, or by anyone else, nor have any threats been made or force used to induce me to plead guilty.” (Id. at 18).

Petitioner also agreed to waive her right to appeal and file a later lawsuit seeking post-conviction relief. (Id. at 9). Petitioner further agreed to the following specific waiver:

I waive and give up my right to argue that: (1) the statute to which I am pleading guilty is unconstitutional, and (2) the admitted conduct does not fall within the scope of this statute.

(Id.). Petitioner reserved her right to contest a sentence imposed in excess of the applicable statutory maximum or guideline range, as well as the right to raise ineffective assistance of counsel claims. (Id. at 10).

On December 16, 2020 the court held a plea hearing. (Cr. Doc. # 177). At that hearing, Petitioner reaffirmed that she reviewed the plea agreement with her attorney and understood it; had adequate time to consult with her attorney about her case; and was fully satisfied with her attorney's representation. (Id. at 5-6). She also testified that she was not suffering from any mental or emotional impairment, physical injury, or illness that could affect her ability to understand the proceedings. (Id. at 5). The court explained the substantive rights that Petitioner would waive by pleading guilty, and Petitioner stated she understood. (Id. at 6-9). Additionally, Petitioner confirmed that she was not induced to plead guilty by any promise or assurance, no one threatened or coerced her in any way to cause her to plead guilty, and that she was pleading guilty because she was in fact guilty of the charge. (Id. at 19).

The court also explained the elements of the charge to which Petitioner pled guilty, stating:

Count one charges you with violating 21 United States Code, Section 846 and 841(a)(1). Before you could be found guilty of that charge, the government would have to prove the following facts to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt:

[F]irst, that two or more persons in some way or manner agreed to try to accomplish a shared and unlawful plan. And the plan was the distribution and dispensing of mixtures and substances containing detectable amounts of controlled substances . . . Second, the government would have to prove that you knew the unlawful purpose of the plan and willfully joined into the plan.

And third, the government would have to prove . . . that the object of the unlawful plan was to distribute and dispense controlled substances[.]

(Id. at 9-10) (emphasis added). Petitioner affirmed that she understood the charge, and that the court's explanation was consistent with what her lawyer explained to her:

THE COURT: Do you understand these three elements that the government would have to prove to a jury?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Do I need to review the specific controlled substances listed in the indictment with you to make sure you understand what those are?

THE DEFENDANT: No. We don't have to go over them.

THE COURT: All right. Do I need to define any of the terms I used any further for you?

THE DEFENDANT: No. I understand fully.

THE COURT: All right. You've gone over with your lawyer what the government would have to prove in order to convict you of the charge?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And is what I just told you about the government's burden of proof consistent with what you and your lawyer discussed before you got on the videoconference today?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So I don't need to give you any further explanation. You understand this charge against you and what the government would have to prove in order to convict you of this charge?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: All right.

(Id. at 10-11). Also, during her plea hearing, Petitioner admitted that the following recitation of facts contained in the factual basis of her plea agreement (Doc. # 89 at 2-6) was true and correct (Doc. # 177 at 14).

II. FACTUAL BASIS FOR PLEA

The government is prepared to prove, at a minimum, the following facts at the trial of this case:

A. Relevant Individuals and Entities

The defendant, Elizabeth Korcz, M.D., was a physician licensed by the State of Alabama to practice medicine. She maintained a Controlled Substance Registration, which allowed her to prescribe controlled substances for a legitimate medical purpose and within the course of her professional medical practice. The defendant owned and operated Hoover Alt MD along with her husband and codefendant, Matthew Korcz. Hoover Alt MD was a medical clinic with an in-house dispensary (the "Korcz Dispensary"), operating in Hoover, Alabama.

The defendant was the sole physician at Hoover Alt MD. Matthew Korcz, who held no medical licensure or certification, was Hoover Alt MD's practice manager. The defendant employed her co-defendant Austin Haskew as a pharmacy technician. Matthew Korcz and Austin Haskew were often in charge of the Korcz Dispensary.

For much of the period covered in the Indictment approximately June 2015 through May 2018, the defendant was the only licensed medical professional at Hoover Alt MD. Hoover Alt MD generally did not employ people licensed by the Alabama Board of Nursing.

B. Relevant Controlled Substances

Hydrocodone and oxycodone are Schedule II controlled substances. Hydrocodone and oxycodone are opioids with a high abuse potential and risk of fatal overdose. A physician can prescribe hydrocodone or oxycodone, but such prescriptions must be issued for a legitimate medical purpose and within the usual course of professional practice. Pharmacies and dispensaries can similarly dispense prescriptions for hydrocodone or oxycodone, but only when the prescriptions are issued for a legitimate medical purpose and within the course of professional practice.

Physicians cannot pre-sign blank prescriptions for controlled substances, including hydrocodone and oxycodone. Pre-signed blank prescriptions are not issued within the usual course of professional practice. C. Unlawful Prescribing and Dispensing

The defendant saw patients prior to initially prescribing them controlled substances. Sometimes, however, she was absent from Hoover Alt MD, and patients would receive prescriptions for hydrocodone without seeing the defendant or any other licensed medical provider. Some of the patients would receive hydrocodone directly from the Korcz dispensary in the defendant's absence, often from Matthew Korcz or Austin Haskew, outside the course of professional medical practice.

Between June 29, 2015, and July 12, 2015; between July 29, 2015, and August 3, 2015; and again on November 14, 2016, the defendant was out of Alabama. The defendant, in agreement with Matthew Korcz, Austin Haskew, and others, prescribed controlled substances to the following patients outside the course of professional practice in violation of the standard of care:

Date

Patient

Drug

Quantity

6/29/2015

J.T.

Hydrocodone

180

6/29/2015

P...