Kornegay v. High Point Birmingham, LLC

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KINSLEY KORNEGAY, a minor, by and through her parent and guardian, MATTHEW KORNEGAY, Plaintiff, v. HIGH POINT BIRMINGHAM, LLC, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:21-cv-00505-NAD

United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Southern Division

August 23, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

NICHOLAS A. DANELLA, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

For the reasons stated below and on the record in the June 7, 2023 motion hearing, the court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the motion for summary judgment (Doc. 34) filed by Defendants High Point Birmingham LLC and High Point Climbing, LLC (collectively, “High Point”).

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Kinsley Kornegay, a minor, by and through her parent and guardian, Plaintiff Matthew Kornegay (collectively, the Kornegays), filed a complaint alleging that Kinsley was injured when she fell from an indoor rock climbing wall while visiting a climbing gym owned and operated by High Point. Doc. 1. The Kornegays alleged negligence and wantonness claims against High Point in connection with Kinsley's fall. Doc. 1. It is undisputed that Kinsley fell from High Point's “lava wall” after she did not clip into the wall's auto-belay system, climbed to the top of the wall, and then pushed off (expecting to be safely lowered to the floor by the auto-belay device). See infra.

In light of the record evidence and controlling law, there is no triable issue on the Kornegays' wantonness claim, or on their negligence claim based on an alleged failure to train Kinsley. But there are triable issues of fact for a jury on the Kornegays' negligence claim based on a theory of premises liability.

BACKGROUND

A. Procedural background

On April 9, 2021, the Kornegays filed a complaint against High Point, alleging negligence and wantonness. Doc. 1. The parties consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction. Doc. 17; 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Fed.R.Civ.P. 73.

On February 21, 2023, after the close of discovery, High Point filed this summary judgment motion with supporting evidentiary material. Doc. 34; see Doc. 33. The parties fully briefed the motion (Doc. 37; Doc. 39), and the Kornegays also submitted evidentiary material in opposition to the motion (Doc. 35; Doc. 36). On June 7, 2023, the court held a motion hearing. See Doc. 40; Minute Entry (Entered: 06/07/2023).

B. Legal background

Under Alabama law, a plaintiff who alleges a negligence claim must prove the following elements, regardless whether the claim relates to premises liability: “duty, breach of duty, cause in fact, proximate or legal cause, and damages.” Ex parte Harold L. Martin Distrib. Co., 769 So.2d 313, 314 (Ala. 2000) (“In [a] premises-liability case, the elements of negligence are the same as those in any tort litigation: duty, breach of duty, cause in fact, proximate or legal cause, and damages.” (citations and quotation marks omitted)).^[1]

The difference between a generic negligence claim and a negligence claim based on a theory of premises liability is “whether the injury was caused by some affirmative conduct of the landowner or by a condition of the premises.” Lilya v. Greater Gulf State Fair, Inc., 855 So.2d 1049, 1053 (Ala. 2003) (citing Baldwin v. Gartman, 604 So.2d 347 (Ala. 1992)).

Where the plaintiff alleges a negligence claim based on a theory of premises liability, “the duty owed an injured person in a premises-liability case depends on the legal status of the person when the injury occurred, i.e., whether the person injured was a trespasser, a licensee, or an invitee.” Unger v. Wal-Mart Stores, East L.P., 279 So.3d 546 (Ala. 2018) (citation omitted).

As explained below (see infra), it is undisputed that Kinsley was an invitee at High Point's climbing gym. A property owner “owes an invitee the duty to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition and, if the premises are unsafe, to warn of hidden defects and dangers that are known to the landowner but that are hidden or unknown to the invitee.” Galaxy Cable, Inc. v. Davis, 58 So.3d 93, 98 (Ala. 2010); see also Jones Food Co. v. Shipman, 981 So.2d 355, 361 (Ala. 2006) (“The duty owed by the invitor to an invitee is to exercise ordinary and reasonable care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition.” (citing Winn-Dixie v. Godwin, 349 So.2d 37 (Ala. 1977))); Cornutt v. Bolin, 404 So.2d 38, 40 (Ala. 1981) (“Alabama law is well settled that a landowner owes an invitee a duty to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition, or in the event that the premises are not safe because of a defect or danger, to warn the invitee of any danger or defective condition.”).

Generally speaking, if the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, “then the questions of breach of that duty, proximate causation, and damages are normally resolved by the jury.” Jones Food, 981 So.2d at 361.

However, “[t]he owner of a premises has no duty to warn an invitee of open and obvious [dangers] which the invitee is aware of, or should be aware of, in the exercise of reasonable care on the invitee's part.” Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Taylor, 28 So.3d 737, 742 (Ala. 2009) (quotation marks omitted). “‘A condition is “open and obvious” when it is known to the [plaintiff] or should have been observed by the plaintiff in the exercise of reasonable care.'” Daniels v. Wiley, 314 So.3d 1213, 1225 (Ala. 2020) (quoting Denmark v. Mercantile Stores Co., 844 So.2d 1189, 1194 (Ala. 2002)).

Whether an alleged unreasonably dangerous condition was open and obvious also is normally a question for the jury. See, e.g., Cuevas v. W.E. Walker, Inc., 565 So.2d 176, 178 (Ala. 1990) (stating that “questions of . . . whether the plaintiff should have been aware of the defect[] are normally questions for the jury” (quoting Bogue v. R. & M. Grocery, 553 So.2d 545 (Ala. 1989))); Marquis v. Marquis, 480 So.2d 1213, 1215-16 (Ala. 1985) (reasoning that the Alabama Supreme Court has “long been committed to the proposition that the plaintiff's appreciation of the danger is, almost always, a question of fact for the determination of the jury” (quoting Kingsberry Homes Corp. v. Ralston, 285 Ala. 600, 607 (1970))); see also Wallace v. Tri-State Motor Transit Co., 741 F.2d 375, 378 (11th Cir. 1984) (“Of course, disputed issues of fact going to the obviousness of the danger or the adequacy of the landowner's warning would be questions for the jury in determining the scope of the duty.” (applying Alabama law)).

Separately, to prove wantonness, a plaintiff must show both the defendant's “conscious doing of some act or the omission of some duty while knowing of the existing conditions,” and that the defendant was “conscious that, from doing or omitting to do an act, injury will likely or probably result.” Ex parte Essary, 992 So.2d 5, 9 (Ala. 2007) (emphasis added); see Bozeman v. Central Bank of the South, 646 So.2d 601, 603 (Ala. 1994); see also Ala. Code § 6-11-20(b)(3) (defining wantonness as “[c]onduct which is carried on with a reckless and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others”).

C. Factual background

Unless stated otherwise, the following facts are undisputed.

High Point's climbing gym provides an indoor rock climbing experience to its patrons. Doc. 35 at 4. On August 2, 2019, Kinsley Kornegay went with friends to High Point's climbing gym in Birmingham, Alabama. Doc. 7 at 3; Doc. 34 at 4. As a patron of High Point's climbing gym, Kinsley was an invitee. Doc. 7 at 3; Doc. 34 at 15-20. At the time of her visit to High Point's climbing gym, Kinsley was 12 years old. Doc. at 3; Doc. 35 at 4.

Kinsley's parents were not present at High Point's gym on August 2, 2019; but, before Kinsley began climbing, her father Matthew electronically had signed a liability waiver. Doc. 34 at 6; Doc. 33-5 (“High Point Climbing and Fitness Gym Rules and Waiver”).

The waiver required acknowledgment that indoor rock climbing is “inherently dangerous,” and acknowledgment of the risks associated with climbing, including the risks of “falls from walls” and a climber “failing to properly secure [herself] to belay devices.” Doc. 33-5 at 2 (“I understand that climbing [is] inherently dangerous and that [climbers] will be exposed to risks including, among others: failing to properly secure themselves to belay devices or ropes; [and] falls from walls ....”).

The waiver also required acknowledgement that a climber-like Kinsley- would not be supervised while climbing. Doc. 33-5 at 2 (“I understand that High Point staff have no responsibility to assist, supervise or even observe [climbers] in their activities or movement about the facility ....”).

After Matthew had signed the waiver, Kinsley and her friends received some training, or a “safety orientation,” on how to use High Point's safety harnesses and auto-belay system. Doc. 7 at 3; Doc. 34 at 7-8. Specifically, Kinsley received at least “two brief demonstrations of how to [use the safety harness to] clip in and out of the auto-belay devices.” Doc. 37 at 6.

An auto-belay system allows “climbers to climb up the wall by themselves and then the device will slowly release the climber back to the ground.” Doc. 7 at 3.

The “Operations Manual” for the auto-belay system that High Point used at its climbing gym (i.e., the “Perfect Descent Climbing” system) states as follows: “Climbers should be under constant supervision by a trained operator. Before ascending the wall, operators should check to verify that each climber has . . . [p]roperly clipped their harness onto the Perfect Descent Climbing System.” Doc. 35-2 at 18.

High Point's auto-belay system also included a safety gate consisting of a “yellow triangle with a stop sign below the clip.” Doc. 34 at 9; see Doc. 35-4. Before clipping her safety harness into the...