Kosienski v. City of Meriden, No. CV 02-0282973-S (CT 1/25/2005)

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Unpublished Opinion

Robert Kosienski et al. v. City of Meriden et al. Opinion No.: 88153.

No. CV 02-0282973-S

Superior Court of Connecticut

Judicial District of New Haven at Meriden

January 25, 2005

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

TANZER, JUDGE.

This action arises out of a dispute involving the calculation of pension benefits for retired police department employees in the city of Meriden. The plaintiffs are Robert Kosienski, George Caffrey and Amos Matteucci, former chiefs of police; Nelson Cosette, a former deputy chief of police; and Theresa Magruder and Lillian Custy, widows of former chiefs of police for the city of Meriden.

FACTS

On December 12, 2002, the plaintiffs filed an eighteen-count complaint against the city of Meriden (the city) and the Meriden Municipal Pension Board (the board) which manages the city's pension and retirement system, alleging that the city, acting through the board, refused to increase the pension benefits to which the plaintiffs are entitled. The plaintiffs participate in a pension plan established by 25 Spec. Acts 977, No. 229, §2 (1949), as amended by 26 Spec. Acts 947, No. 340 (1953). The plaintiffs claim they are entitled to an increase in their respective pensions based upon 25 Spec. Acts 977, No. 229, §2 (1949), as amended by 26 Spec. Acts 947, No. 340 (1953),¹ which provides in relevant part: "The rate of pension of any retired fireman or policeman shall be one-half of the prevailing rate of pay for the rank he has attained and holds at the time of retirement. Prevailing rate of pay means the annual pay as fixed from time to time by the board of public safety, and in addition thereto shall include such cost-of-living bonus or other emolument as may be granted to the active members of the fire and police departments by the board of apportionment and taxation."

In their complaint, each plaintiff sets forth three theories of liability. First, the plaintiffs claim that they are entitled to a writ of mandamus ordering the city to pay increased pension benefits in accordance with the special acts. Second, the plaintiffs contend that the city breached its contract with the plaintiffs when it refused to increase the plaintiffs' pension benefits. Third, the plaintiffs allege that the city has been unjustly enriched as a result of its failure to pay the plaintiffs the increased pension benefits to which they claim entitlement. In addition, the plaintiffs request money damages and payment of interest pursuant to General Statutes §37-3a, as well as such other relief as the court deems fair and equitable.

The parties tried this case before the court on July 27, 2004. Following the trial, the parties submitted post-trial briefs in support of their respective positions. After considering the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by the parties, as well as their admissions, including those contained in their pleadings and briefs, I find following facts, most of which are undisputed: The plaintiff, Robert Kosienski, retired from his position as police chief for the city on June 30, 2001 after forty years of service. At the time of his retirement, Kosienski was earning a base annual salary of approximately $75,058 plus an additional sum of approximately $3,464.16 for holiday pay. Subsequent to his retirement, the city provided Kosienski with a monthly pension comprised of one-half of the base monthly salary he had been earning, plus an additional monthly sum for holiday pay and life and health insurance benefits.

One day after the retirement of Kosienski, on July 1, 2001, William Abbatematteo commenced work as the new chief of police for the city, earning a base annual salary of. $85,000 including holiday pay.² Abbatematteo had accepted the city's offer of employment at a staffing salary of $85,000 on May 22, 2001. The pension benefits of retired chiefs of police Kosienski, Caffrey and Matteucci, and of the widows³ of former chiefs of police, Magruder and Custy, were not increased to reflect the higher starting salary of Abbatematteo.

One year later, on July 1, 2002, Abbatematteo received a five percent pay raise. At that time, the city increased the pensions of Kosienski, Caffrey and Matteucci by five percent and the pensions of Magruder and Custy were similarly adjusted. On July 1, 2003, Abbatematteo received an additional pay raise of five and one-half percent. The city thereafter increased the pensions of the retired police chiefs and the widows by five and one-half percent.

On July 1, 2001, the plaintiff, Nelson Cosette, retired from his position as deputy police chief for the city of Meriden. Prior to his retirement, Nelson Cosette earned a base annual salary of approximately $70,000 plus an additional sum for holiday pay. Subsequent to his retirement, the city provided Nelson Cosette with a monthly pension comprised of one-half of the base monthly salary he had been earning, plus an additional monthly sum for holiday pay and life and health insurance benefits. On April 1, 2002, the city appointed Jeffrey Cosette to the position of deputy police chief for the city of Meriden. When he commenced work, the new deputy chief, Jeffrey Cosette, earned a base annual salary of $76,000, including holiday pay. The pension of retired deputy police chief, Nelson Cosette, was not increased to reflect the new deputy chief's higher starting salary. On April 1, 2003, deputy chief Jeffrey Cosette received a three percent raise. At that time, the city increased the pension of former deputy chief Nelson Cosette by three percent of his base salary.

In short, with the exception of the initial jumps in the starting salaries of Abbatematteo as the new chief of police and Jeffrey Cosette as the new deputy chief of police, whenever the chief and deputy chief received pay increases, the plaintiffs received increases in their respective pensions in the same proportion or percentages. Other pertinent facts will be referred to in the ensuing discussion.

Plaintiffs Kosienski, Caffrey, Matteucci, Magruder and Custy claim that, in addition to the increases in their pension benefits received as a result of the pay raises received by chief of police Abbatematteo in 2002 and 2003, they are entitled to an increase in their pension benefits based on the new chief's higher starting salary in June 2001. Similarly, Nelson Cosette contends that he is entitled to an increase in his pension benefits as a result of the new deputy chief's higher starting salary in April 2002. These claims form the crux of the plaintiffs' complaint.

DISCUSSION

The plaintiffs contend that each is entitled to a higher monthly pension benefit pursuant to 25 Spec. Acts 977, No. 229, §2 (1949), as amended by 26 Spec. Acts 947, No. 340 (1953), and incorporated into the former Meriden city code as §85B (collectively, the statute). Specifically, the plaintiffs claim that in addition to increases in their pension benefits associated with the percentage cost-of-living raises granted to the successor chief or deputy chief of police, the statute requires the city to increase their pension benefits based on the higher starting salaries enjoyed by the successor chief and deputy chief of police. In support of their claim, the plaintiffs point to the language of the statute, its legislative history and the past practice of the city in calculating pension benefits. In opposition to the plaintiffs' claim, the city argues that the statute requires that the pension of a retiree be based on the salary earned by the retiree at the time he retired. The city maintains that the statute provides that pensions be increased in accordance with cost-of-living bonuses or other emoluments granted to current, active members of the department, but does not require pension increases based upon increases in the starting salary for successor chiefs or deputy chiefs of police.

Statutory Interpretation

As a preliminary matter, the court notes that the parties do not dispute the applicability of 25 Spec. Acts 977, No. 229, §2 (1949), as amended by 26 Spec. Acts 947, No. 340 (1953). Accordingly, the present case hinges on statutory interpretation. "The question of whether a particular statute . . . applies to a given state of facts is a question of statutory interpretation. . . . Statutory interpretation presents a question of law for the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Biller Associates v. Rte. 156 Realty Co., 52 Conn.App. 18, 26, 725 A.2d 398 (1999), aff'd, 252 Conn. 400, 746 A.2d 785 (2000). "It is well settled that one of the primary guides for interpreting a statute, indeed the first guide to be consulted, is the language of the statute itself." Garrison v. Planning Board, 66 Conn.App. 317, 321, 784 A.2d 951, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 944, 786 A.2d 429 (2001).

The first sentence of the statute states: "The rate of pension of any retired fireman or policeman shall be one-half of the prevailing rate of pay for the rank he has attained and holds at the time of retirement." The city argues that "the plain meaning of this language is that the pension rate of a retiring officer is initially set at the time of the retirement of the retiring officer, not at the time of the hiring of that officer's replacement, and is based on the rate of pay of the retiring officer, not that of the officer's replacement." The city contends that the "the rate of pension of a retiree can only be based upon his rate of pay at the time of his retirement" and that the statute "mandates that the pension be computed based upon the salary of the retiring officer at the time of the retirement." (Emphasis in original.) Under the construction of the statute urged by the city, the phrase "at the time of retirement" must modify "the prevailing rate of pay." There is another possible construction of the statute. The phrase "at the time of retirement" may alternatively modify "the rank he has attained and holds." This distinction, although technical, causes the text to be...