Kostrzewski v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

52 Conn. App. 326

727 A.2d 233

BARBARA KOSTRZEWSKI v. COMMISSIONER OF MOTOR VEHICLES

(AC 17359)

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued September 17, 1998.

Officially released March 23, 1999.

Foti, Landau and Hennessy, JS. Jeffrey D. Brownstein, with whom, on the brief, was Gregory A. Thompson, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Robert L. Marconi, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, for the appellee (defendant).

Opinion

HENNESSY, J.

The plaintiff, Barbara Kostrzewski, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing her appeal from the decision of the defendant, the Connecticut commissioner of motor vehicles. The commissioner suspended the plaintiff's Connecticut license to operate a motor vehicle pursuant to General Statutes § 14-111c,¹ the driver license compact (compact), following her conviction in Florida for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly (1) upheld the hearing officer's admission of the Florida traffic citation and report of conviction into evidence and allowed the plaintiffs conviction, which was based on a plea of nolo contendere, to be considered as a basis for suspending her license under the compact, (2) held that the compact was constitutional, (3) held that the enforcement of the compact did not violate the equal protection clause of the Connecticut constitution, (4) held that the Connecticut and Florida statutes are substantially similar for purposes of the compact, (5) held that the report of conviction from Florida complied with the requirements of the compact and (6) held that the suspension of the plaintiffs license did not violate the double jeopardy clause of the United States constitution and the Connecticut constitution. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. The plaintiff, a holder of a Connecticut motor vehicle operator's license, was arrested in Florida for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic beverages in violation of Florida Statutes § 316.193. The plaintiff pleaded nolo contendere to the charge and, as a result, the Florida trial court found her guilty of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcoholic beverages.

Pursuant to the compact, of which both Florida and Connecticut are member states, the Florida authorities sent notification of the plaintiffs Florida conviction to the commissioner. Upon receipt of the notification from Florida, the commissioner issued the plaintiff a notice of hearing to determine whether her Connecticut license should be suspended as a result of her Florida conviction. On November 1, 1996, the commissioner conducted a hearing on the license suspension before a hearing officer. The plaintiff was present at the hearing and was represented by an attorney.

Subsequent to the hearing, the hearing officer found that the plaintiff was arrested and convicted in Florida for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and that this conviction remains on the plaintiffs driver history. The hearing officer concluded that, under the compact, "any conviction in Florida for driving under the influence shall result in Connecticut treating the conviction as if it had occurred [in Connecticut]." The hearing officer further concluded that a conviction in Connecticut for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol would result in the suspension of a motor vehicle operator's license for one year. Accordingly, the hearing officer ordered that the plaintiff's Connecticut license be suspended for one year.

The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), General Statutes § 4-183. The Superior Court rendered judgment dismissing the plaintiff's appeal. This appeal followed. Other facts will be discussed where relevant to the issues on appeal.

I

The plaintiff first claims that the trial court improperly upheld the hearing officer's admission of a report of conviction and traffic citation, marked as state's exhibit B, into evidence and allowed the plaintiff's conviction, which was based on a plea of nolo contendere, to be considered as a basis for suspending her license under the compact.

"Judicial review of an administrative agency's action is governed by the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), General Statutes § 4-166 et seq., and the scope of that review is limited.... When reviewing the trial court's decision, we seek to determine whether it comports with the [UAPA].... We look to see if the [trial] court reviewing the administrative agency acted unreasonably, illegally, or in abuse of discretion.... Dortenzio v. Freedom of Information Commission, 48 Conn. App. 424, 430, 710 A.2d 801 (1998)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dept. of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission, 51 Conn. App. 100, 104, 720 A.2d 268 (1998).

A

The plaintiff first argues that exhibit B was not sufficiently reliable or trustworthy and, therefore, its admission in evidence substantially prejudiced the plaintiffs rights. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the documents contained in exhibit B are not in compliance with article III of the compact because there was no proof that her conviction in Florida was reported by the "licensing authority" in Florida, as required, because there was no signature or logo evidencing that the documents were reported by the Florida department of motor vehicles. The following additional facts are necessary to the resolution of this issue. The trial court found that exhibit B, as introduced by the state at the administrative hearing, included "the original traffic ticket citing the plaintiff on the drunk driving charge." The Florida "DUI Uniform Traffic Citation" provides the date and time of the offense, the statute violated and the blood alcohol level of the plaintiff, and contains the signatures of the arresting officer and the plaintiff. The other side of the document is an abstract of the court disposition and indicates the name of the presiding judge and bears an original signature, although there is no indication of the signer's title or position. The information from the Florida trial court indicates that the plaintiff pleaded nolo contendere, was found guilty, fined and placed on probation and had her driving privileges revoked in Florida for a period of six months.

The trial court concluded that the hearing officer properly admitted the document into evidence and used it to support his final decision because the document bore sufficient indicia of reliability, including the signature of the plaintiff. The trial court further concluded that it is of no significance that "there is no evidence to show whether it was the Florida department of motor vehicles or the Florida court that forwarded it to Connecticut."

Insofar as the plaintiff is arguing that exhibit B itself is inadmissible, we note that "[a]dministrative tribunals are not strictly bound by the rules of evidence and ... they may consider evidence which would normally be incompetent in a judicial proceeding, so long as the evidence is reliable and probative.... There is, moreover, no specific prohibition against hearsay evidence in the [UAPA], which provides that [a]ny oral or documentary evidence may be received, but [that] the agency shall, as a matter of policy, provide for the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious evidence." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cassella v. Civil Service Commission, 4 Conn. App. 359, 362, 494 A.2d 909 (1985), aff'd, 202 Conn. 28, 519 A.2d 67 (1987).

We conclude, as did the trial court, that the document bears sufficient indicia of reliability, including the signature of the plaintiff. The information contained on the uniform traffic citation was not disputed by the plaintiff² nor was it irrelevant or immaterial.

Insofar as the plaintiff is arguing that the compact requires that the conviction be provided by the "licensing authority"³ and, if not, it is inadmissible as evidence of a conviction, we note that "[w]ith regard to questions of fact, it is neither the function of the trial court nor of this court to retry the case or to substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency.... Judicial review of the conclusions of law reached administratively is also limited. The court's ultimate duty is only to decide whether, in light of the evidence, the [agency] has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally, or in abuse of discretion.... Although the interpretation of statutes is ultimately a question of law ... it is the well established practice of this court to accord great deference to the construction given [a] statute by the agency charged with its enforcement.... Conclusions of law reached by the administrative agency must stand if the court determines that they resulted from a correct application of the law to the facts found and could reasonably and logically follow from such facts." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State Board of Labor Relations v. Freedom of Information Commission, 244 Conn. 487, 494, 709 A.2d 1129 (1998).

Because the information is reliable and probative its admissibility into evidence by the commissioner was proper despite the fact that there is no evidence to show whether it was the Florida department of motor vehicles or the Florida trial court that forwarded the document to the commissioner. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court acted reasonably and did not abuse its discretion in upholding the decision of the hearing officer.

B

The plaintiff next claims that the her plea of nolo contendere cannot be the basis for a suspension of her license.⁴ Specifically, the plaintiff argues, relying on Lawrence v. Kozlowski, 171 Conn. 705, 372 A.2d 110 (1976), cert. denied,...