Koza v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

692 F.Supp.3d 197

Christopher Robert KOZA, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

22 Civ. 889 (GWG)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

Signed September 18, 2023

Howard David Olinsky, Olinsky Law Group, Syracuse, NY, for Plaintiff.

Ariella Renee Zoltan, Graham Morrison, Social Security Administration Office of the General Counsel, Office of Program Litigation, Baltimore, MD, for Defendant.

OPINION & ORDER

GABRIEL W. GORENSTEIN, United States Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff Christopher Robert Koza brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to obtain judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner") denying his claim for benefits under the Social Security Act ("the Act"). See Complaint, filed Feb. 2, 2022 (Docket # 1) ("Compl."). Both Koza and the Commissioner have moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c).¹

For the reasons set forth below, Koza's motion is denied, and the Commissioner's cross motion is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

On July 17, 2018, Koza applied for Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits, Supplemental Security Income, and Social Security Child's Insurance Benefits. Administrative Record, filed June 23, 2022 (Docket # 12) ("R."), at 258, 261, 282. The Social Security Administration ("SSA") denied Koza's applications on September 25, 2018. See R. 103, 107. Koza requested a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ") to challenge the initial denial. R. 117, 120. A hearing took place via teleconference on June 8, 2020. See R. 49-76. In a written decision dated August 4, 2020, the ALJ found that Koza was not disabled under the relevant statutes and denied Koza's claims. See R. 10-24. The SSA Appeals Council denied a request for review. R. 1. Koza filed this action on February 2, 2022. See Compl.

B. The Hearing before the ALJ

Koza appeared by telephone at the ALJ's June 8, 2020, hearing with an attorney. R. 51-52. Vocational Expert ("VE") Yaakov Taitz was present at the hearing and also testified. Id. At the time of the hearing Koza was 20 years old. See R. 16, 51.²

The record reflects that Koza testified that at the time of the hearing he lived with his parents and had graduated high school in June 2018, two years earlier. R. 55-56. Koza would attempt to do homework and chores while in high school, but "most of the time" was not able to do so because of depression and stress. R. 57. Since graduation, he had generally been at home every day except for doctor's appointments and that at home he did dishes and laundry when reminded. R. 57-58. Koza never held a job. R. 60. Koza said he would experience stress and sudden anger "out of nowhere." Id. Koza had a history of asthma, foot problems that affected what shoes he could wear and how long he could wear them for, and tremors in his arms. R. 60-61.

At the hearing, the ALJ questioned the VE as follows:

Q Hypothetical #1, I'd like you to assume a hypothetical person of claimant's age, education, and work history. The person has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels, but with the following non[-]exertional limitations. The person cannot climb ropes, ladders, or scaffolds. The person must avoid unprotected heights and hazardous machinery. And the person can understand, remember, and carry out simple, routine, repetitive work-related tasks with only occasional contact with the public, co-workers, and supervisors. Is there any work in the national economy for such a person?

A Yes . . . Okay, so hand packager, DOT code #920.587-018, exertion medium, SVP 2. For this DOT code, there are 80,000 jobs in the national economy. Cleaner, DOT code #381.687-018, exertion medium, SVP 2. For this DOT code, there are 50,000 jobs in the national economy . . . . And dining room attendant, DOT code #311.677-018, exertion medium, SVP 2. For this DOT code, there are 140,000 jobs in the national economy.

***

Q And if I was to give you Hypothetical #1 again, but I was to add the person would be off task 15% of the -- of the workday, in addition to regularly scheduled breaks, would that person be able to find any jobs in the national economy?

A No jobs.

R. 68-70.

C. The Medical Evidence

Both Koza and the Commissioner have provided detailed summaries of the medical evidence. Pl. Mem. at 3-7; Def. Mem. at 3-5, 8-9. The Court directed the parties to specify any objections they had to the opposing party's summary of the record. See Scheduling Order, filed June 24, 2022 (Docket # 13), ¶ 5. Neither party made any specific objections to the opposing side's summary of the record. Accordingly, we adopt the parties' summaries of the medical evidence as accurate and complete for purposes of the issues raised in this suit. We discuss the medical evidence pertinent to the adjudication of this case in Section III below.

D. The ALJ's Decision

The ALJ denied Koza's application on August 4, 2020, determining that Koza was not "under a disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act from November 5, 1999, through the date of this decision." See R. 10, 14.

In accordance with the five-step test set forth in the SSA's regulations, the ALJ first found that Koza had "not engaged in substantial gainful activity since November 5, 1999, the alleged onset date." R. 16. At step two, the ALJ found that Koza had "the following severe impairments: obstructive sleep apnea, autism spectrum disorder, attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), learning disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), bipolar disorder, anxiety disorder and disruptive mood dysregulation disorder." Id.

At step three, the ALJ found that Koza did "not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 44.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926)." See R. 17; see also 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. The ALJ found no evidence of medical tests that would satisfy "listing 3.02 for chronic respiratory disorders" and no evidence that Koza "had exacerbations or complications requiring three hospitalizations within a 12-month period and at least 30 days apart, as defined in 3.02D." R. 17. The ALJ found that Koza's mental impairments "singly and in combination" did not meet or equal listings 12.04, 12.06, 12.10, 12.11, and 12.15. Id. The ALJ made this finding by applying the "paragraph B" criteria. R. 17-18.³

Before moving to step four, the ALJ determined that Koza had the "residual functional capacity" ("RFC") to

perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following non[-]exertional limitations: The claimant cannot climb ropes, ladders or scaffolds. The claimant must avoid unprotected heights and hazardous machinery. The claimant can understand, remember and carry out simple, routine and repetitive work-related tasks with only occasional contact with the public, co-workers and supervisors.

R. 18.

At step four, the ALJ found that Koza had no past relevant work. R. 22. At step five, the ALJ considered Koza's RFC and the testimony of the VE, and he found that Koza was "capable of making a successful adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy." R. 23. As such, the ALJ found Koza was not disabled from November 5, 1999 through the date of the ALJ's decision. Id.

II. GOVERNING STANDARDS OF LAW

A. Scope of Judicial Review Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)

A court reviewing a final decision by the Commissioner "is limited to determining whether the [Commissioner's] conclusions were supported by substantial evidence in the record and were based on a correct legal standard." Selian v. Astrue, 708 F.3d 409, 417 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (citation omitted); accord Greek v. Colvin, 802 F.3d 370, 374-75 (2d Cir. 2015) (per curiam); see generally 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ("The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . ."). "Even where the administrative record may also adequately support contrary findings on particular issues, the ALJ's factual findings must be given conclusive effect so long as they are supported by substantial evidence." Genier v. Astrue, 606 F.3d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citation and punctuation omitted). Thus, "[i]f the reviewing court finds substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's final decision, that decision must be upheld, even if substantial evidence supporting the claimant's position also exists." Johnson v. Astrue, 563 F. Supp. 2d 444, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing Alston v. Sullivan, 904 F.2d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 1990)).

Importantly, it is not a reviewing court's function "to determine de novo whether [a claimant] is disabled." Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted); accord Cage v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 692 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2012). Rather, substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (punctuation omitted) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)); accord Greek, 802 F.3d at 375; Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 127-28 (2d Cir. 2008). "It means — and means only — such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154, 203 L.Ed.2d 504 (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). "[T]he threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high." Id. The Second Circuit has held that "[t]he substantial evidence standard means once an ALJ finds facts, [a court] can reject those facts only if a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude otherwise." Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (emphasis in original) (citation and punctuation omitted...