Kozlowski v. Kijakazi

1

ASHLEY KOZLOWSKI, Plaintiff v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration Defendant

Civil Action No. 4:21-CV-1882

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania

March 1, 2023

(BRANN, C.J.)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

William I. Arbuckle, U.S. Magistrate Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Ashley Kozlowski (“Plaintiff”), an adult who lives in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, seeks judicial review of the final decision of the Acting Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g).

This matter has been referred to a magistrate judge to prepare a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons explained herein, it is RECOMMENDED that:

(1) The final decision of the Commissioner be AFFIRMED;

(2) Final judgment be issued in favor of the Commissioner; and

(3) The Clerk of Court be directed to close this case.

II. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 17, 2020, Plaintiff protectively filed an application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. (Admin. Tr. 16; Doc. 12-2, p. 17). In this application, Plaintiff alleged she became disabled on December 31, 2019, when she was forty-four years old, due to the following conditions: congenital birth defect (hands), Hashimoto's disease, fibromyalgia, myofascial pain syndrome, degenerative disc disease, degenerative joint disease, hypothyroidism, osteoarthritis, chronic fatigue syndrome, and generalized anxiety. (Admin. Tr. 192; Doc. 12-6, p. 6). Plaintiff alleges that the combination of these conditions affects her ability to lift, squat, bend, stand, reach, walk, sit, kneel, climb stairs, and use her hands. (Admin. Tr. 219; Doc. 12-6, p. 33). She also alleges her conditions affect her memory. Id. Plaintiff completed high school and two years of college. (Admin. Tr. 193; Doc. 12-6, p. 7). Before the onset of her symptoms, Plaintiff worked as an administrative assistant. (Admin. Tr. 29; Doc. 12-2, p. 30).

On June 25, 2020, Plaintiff's application was denied at the initial level of administrative review. (Admin. Tr. 16; Doc. 12-2, p. 17). On November 23, 2020, Plaintiff's application was denied on reconsideration. Id. On December 15, 2020, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing. Id.

On April 1, 2021, Plaintiff, assisted by counsel, appeared and testified during a telephone hearing before Administrative Law Judge Randy Riley (the “ALJ”).

(Admin. Tr. 16; Doc. 12-2, p. 17). On April 23, 2021, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff's application for benefits. (Admin. Tr. 30; Doc. 12-2, p. 31). On June 22, 2021, Plaintiff requested that the Appeals Council of the Office of Disability Adjudication and Review (“Appeals Council”) review the ALJ's decision. (Admin. Tr. 166; Doc. 12-4, p. 65).

On September 2, 2021, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. (Admin. Tr. 1; Doc. 12-2, p. 2).

On November 4, 2021, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the district court. (Doc. 1). In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ's decision denying her application is not supported by substantial evidence, and improperly applies the law. (Doc. 1, ¶ 13). As relief, Plaintiff requests that the court reverse the Commissioner's decision and award benefits, or in the alternative remand this matter for a new administrative hearing. (Doc. 1, ¶ 14).

On January 12, 2022, the Commissioner filed an answer. (Doc. 11). In the answer, the Commissioner maintains that the decision denying Plaintiff's application was made in accordance with the law and is supported by substantial evidence. (Doc. 11, ¶ 17). Along with her answer, the Commissioner filed a certified transcript of the administrative record. (Doc. 12).

Plaintiff's Brief (Doc. 13), the Commissioner's Brief (Doc. 16), and Plaintiff's Reply (Doc. 18) have been filed. This matter is now ready to decide.

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Before looking at the merits of this case, it is helpful to restate the legal principles governing Social Security Appeals.

A. Substantial Evidence Review - the Role of This Court

A district court's review of ALJ decisions in social security cases is limited to the question of whether the findings of the final decision-maker are supported by substantial evidence in the record.^[1] Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”^[2] Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla.^[3] A single piece of evidence is not substantial evidence if the ALJ ignores countervailing evidence or fails to resolve a conflict created by the evidence.^[4] But in an adequately developed factual record, substantial evidence may be “something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [the ALJ's decision] from being supported by substantial evidence.”^[5] “In determining if the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence the court must scrutinize the record as a whole.”^[6]

The Supreme Court has underscored the limited scope of district court review in this field, noting that:

The phrase “substantial evidence” is a “term of art” used throughout administrative law to describe how courts are to review agency factfinding. T-Mobile South, LLC v. Roswell, 574 U.S.__,__, 135 S.Ct. 808, 815, 190 L.Ed.2d 679 (2015). Under the substantial-evidence standard, a court looks to an existing administrative record and asks whether it contains “sufficien[t] evidence” to support the agency's factual determinations. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938) (emphasis deleted). And whatever the meaning of “substantial” in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high. Substantial evidence, this Court has said, is “more than a mere scintilla.” Ibid.; see, e.g., Perales, 402 U.S. at 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420 (internal quotation marks omitted). It means-and means only-“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Consolidated Edison, 305 U.S. at 229, 59 S.Ct. 206. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 153, 119 S.Ct. 1816, 144 L.Ed.2d 143 (1999) (comparing the substantial-evidence standard to the deferential clearly-erroneous standard).^[7]

In practice, this is a twofold task. First, the court determines whether the final decision is supported by substantial evidence. To accomplish this task, the court must decide not only whether “more than a scintilla” of evidence supports the ALJ's findings, but also whether those findings were made based on a correct application of the law.^[8] In doing so, however, the court is enjoined to refrain from trying to reweigh evidence and “must not substitute [its] own judgment for that of the fact finder.”^[9]

Second, the court must ascertain whether the ALJ's decision meets the burden of articulation the courts demand to enable judicial review. As the Court of Appeals has noted on this score:

In Burnett, we held that an ALJ must clearly set forth the reasons for his decision. 220 F.3d at 119. Conclusory statements . . . are insufficient. The ALJ must provide a “discussion of the evidence” and an “explanation of reasoning” for his conclusion sufficient to enable judicial review. Id. at 120; see Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 & n. 3 (3d Cir. 2004). The ALJ, of course, need not employ particular “magic” words: “Burnett does not require the ALJ to use particular language or adhere to a particular format in conducting his analysis.” Jones, 364 F.3d at 505.^[10]

B. Standards Governing the ALJ's Application of The Five-Step Sequential Evaluation Process

To receive benefits under the Social Security Act by reason of disability, a claimant must demonstrate an inability to “engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.”^[11] To satisfy this requirement, a claimant must have a severe physical or mental impairment that makes it impossible to do his or her previous work or any other substantial gainful activity that exists in the national economy.^[12] To receive benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, a claimant must show that he or she contributed to the insurance program, is under retirement age, and became disabled prior to the date on which he or she was last insured.^[13]

In making this determination at the administrative level, the ALJ follows a five-step sequential evaluation process.^[14] Under this process, the ALJ must sequentially determine: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant's impairment meets or equals a listed impairment; (4) whether the claimant is able to do his or her past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant is able to do any other work, considering his or her age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity (“RFC”).^[15]

Between steps three and four, the ALJ must also assess a claimant's RFC. RFC is defined as “that which an individual is still able to do despite the limitations caused by his or her impairment(s).”^[16] In making this assessment, the ALJ considers all the claimant's medically determinable impairments, including any...