Kraemer v. Rostraver Twp.

WENDI KRAEMER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ROSTRAVER TOWNSHIP, et al, Defendants.

No. 2:22-cv-01232

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania

February 24, 2023

OPINION

Mark R. Hornak, Chief United States District Judge

Before the Court are two Motions to Dismiss: Defendants Andrea Palmer (“Palmer”) and All But Furgotten Inc.'s (“ABF”) Motion to Dismiss under Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 21) and Defendant Nic Pesante's^[1] (“Pesante”) Motion to Dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) (ECF No. 52). Because the Court concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction as to the claims against Palmer, ABF, and Pesante, the Court GRANTS Pesante's Motion (ECF No. 52) and dismisses the claims against Pesante, and all claims against Palmer and ABF sua sponte, all such dismissals being without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. Palmer and ABF's 12(b)(6) motion (ECF No. 21) is DISMISSED AS MOOT.

I. BACKGROUND

a. Factual Background^[2]

The Defendants relevant to these Motions to Dismiss play minor roles in what otherwise appears to be a factually complicated dispute. As such, the Court recounts only those facts relevant to the disposition of the instant Motions.

Plaintiff Wendi Kraemer (“Kraemer”) is the CEO of Plaintiff Angels Journey Home Rescue (“Rescue”), a non-profit corporation that works with veterans and provides them with service and therapy dogs. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 5,6,20.) Plaintiff Rescue is located at Kraemer's property in Belle Vernon, PA. (Id. ¶ 18.) Kraemer purchased that property in 2015, and “[v]arious members of the community have informed” Kramer that Defendant Gary Beck (“Beck”)-who was, at all times relevant to the Complaint, a Commissioner of Defendant Rostraver Township (“Township”)-wanted to purchase that property before Kraemer's offer was accepted. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 19.) In sum and substance, a feud with Beck appears to have ensued and Kraemer alleges that, as a result, members of the community-alongside Beck and Frank Monack (“Monack”), a zoning officer for the Defendant Township (id. ¶ 9)-have intentionally made it more difficult to run her rescue.

For instance, she alleges that “on several occasions throughout the years,” including from approximately April through November 2021, “Defendant Township's garbage collection service refused to collect” trash from her property. (Id. ¶¶ 28-29.) Plaintiff also alleges that a band of community members-many of whom are defendants in this action but are otherwise not relevant here-posted defamatory statements about her online, alleging that she is a hoarder and calling the legitimacy of Plaintiff Rescue into question. (See id. ¶¶ 58-74.) As a result of these statements, Plaintiffs fundraising page on Cuddly.com was disabled, thereby impairing her ability to fundraise. (Id.¶ 74.)

Moreover, in the wake of a fire that damaged Kraemer's property, Plaintiff was allegedly given inaccurate information about permitting by Defendant Township officials (id. ¶ 76-78), was treated differently than other similarly situated individuals in that she was required to obtain a structural engineer's report (id. ¶¶ 77-78) and later had difficulty getting the necessary permits for construction (id. ¶¶ 80-84)-all allegedly in retaliation for her running feud with Beck.

The three Defendants who filed the instant Motions to Dismiss are allegedly involved as follows. After a fire on Plaintiffs property, the Rescue's animals needed temporary homes. (Id. ¶ 50) Several individuals volunteered to house the displaced animals. (Id.} Thereafter, Defendant Palmer, an employee of Defendant ABF, allegedly contacted several of those volunteers via text message and told them, in her capacity as a humane officer for ABF, not to return the animals to Kraemer and Plaintiff Rescue. (Id. ¶ 51.) Palmer also allegedly told several individuals that she wanted to “build a case” against Plaintiffs for not properly vetting their animals (id. ¶ 52) and described Kraemer as a “hoarder” (id. ¶ 53).

The allegations against Pesante are even more sparse. Shortly after the fire that damaged Kraemer's property was extinguished, Kraemer “witnessed [Pesante] trespassing in her residence and dumping trash inside the house.” (Id. ¶ 43.) Kraemer “did not permit [Pesante] to be” on the property at the relevant time. (Id. ¶ 44.)

b. Procedural Background

On the basis of the allegations described above, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint alleging, as relevant here, one count of defamation (libel) against Palmer and ABF (id. ¶¶ 132-137) and one count of trespass against Pesante. (Id. ¶¶ 125-127.)

On November 17, 2022, Palmer and ABF filed a Motion to Dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for defamation. (ECF No. 21.) On December 8, 2022, Plaintiffs filed a Response in Opposition (ECF No. 35). Defendants Palmer and ABF did not file a Reply or otherwise request an extension of time to do so. After reviewing the briefing, the Court sua sponte concluded that the propriety of its exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the state law defamation (and sole) claim asserted against Defendants Palmer and ABF was at issue. The Court therefore ordered and received the submission of additional briefing on the issue of supplemental jurisdiction. (See ECF Nos. 49, 54, 55.) Thus, Palmer and ABF's 12(b)(6) motion is ripe for deposition.

On February 2,2023, Pesante filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). (ECF No. 52.) On February 13,2023, Plaintiffs filed a Response in Opposition. (ECF No. 56.) Pesante did not file a Reply or otherwise request an extension of time to do so. Thus, Pesante's 12(b)(1) Motion is ripe for disposition

II. LEGAL STANDARD

a. 12(b)(6)

Generally, under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court may dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Detailed factual allegations are not required to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, but “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” is insufficient. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[M]ere conclusory statements” similarly “do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing id. at 555). Instead, the plaintiff's factual allegations must “raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and state a plausible claim for relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56. In order to cross “the line between possibility and plausibility,” the complaint must do more than “plead[] facts that are ‘merely consistent with' a defendant's liability.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting id. at 557). The Court should not dismiss a complaint, however, simply because it has provided an “imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted.” Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10, 11 (2014).

However, notwithstanding the plausibility of any claim Plaintiffs have made for relief, a federal court has the obligation to address a question of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte. Potter v. Cozen & O'Connor, 46 F.4th 148, 155 (3d Cir. 2022) (“[A] court can and must raise jurisdictional issues sua sponte.”} b. 12(b)(1)

“A challenge to subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) may be either a facial or a factual attack.” Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 346 (3d Cir. 2016). A facial attack, such as the one at issue here, challenges subject matter jurisdiction without disputing the complaint's factual allegations,^[3] and requires the court to “consider the allegations of the complaint as true.” Id. (quoting Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 302 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006)). In reviewing a facial attack, “the court must only consider the allegations of the complaint and documents referenced therein and attached thereto, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Const. Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 358 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting In re Schering Plough Corp., 678 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2012)). Thus, a facial 12(b)(1) attack requires a district court to apply the same standard of review it would use when considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)6)-that is construing the alleged facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.

III. DISCUSSION

At issue here is the propriety of this Court's exercise of supplemental jurisdiction^[4] over purely state law claims-the only claims alleged against Palmer, ABF, and Pesante-under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, which confers “supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within” a district court's “original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

As § 1367 has been interpreted by the courts, three requirements must be satisfied before a federal district court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim that, save for supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367, could not be heard in federal court. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Teleconcepts, Inc., 71 F.3d 1086,1102 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)). First, the federal claim must have substance sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court. Id. Second, the state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative facts; and third, the claims must be such that they would ordinarily be expected to be tried in one judicial proceeding. Id. “Mere tangential overlap of facts is insufficient, but total congruity between the operative facts” of the two claims “is unnecessary.” Nanavati v. Burdette Tomlin Mem. Hosp., 857 F.2d 96, 105 (3d Cir. 1988).

No party to this case has disputed that the first requirement-the propriety of this Court's jurisdiction over the...