Kramer v. Koeller

RACHEL M. KRAMER andCLAIRE E. KRAMER, Petitioners/Counter-Respondents, v. ROBERT M. KOELLER, individually,and ROBERT M. KOELLER, in his capacity asSuccessor Trustee of the REVOCABLE TRUST AGREEMENTof BARBARA K. KRAMER a/k/aBARBARA J. KRAMER, Respondent/Counter-Petitioner.

No. 19-cv-3247

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

May 7, 2020

OPINION

TOM SCHANZLE-HASKINS, U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE:

This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner/Counter Respondents Rachel M. Kramer and Claire E. Kramer's Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims (d/e 22) (Motion). The parties consented to proceed before this Court. Consent to the Exercise of Jurisdiction by a United States Magistrate Judge and Reference Order entered February 20, 2020 (d/e 15). For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

Counter-Petitioner Robert M. Koeller is the brother of Barbara Kramer, deceased. Counter-Respondents Rachel M. Kramer and Claire E. Kramer (the Daughters) are the children of the late Barbara Kramer. Barbara Kramer died on November 11, 2018. At the time of her death, Barbara Kramer's Last Will and Testament (Will) named Koeller as Executor. Barbara Kramer also executed a trust agreement entitled "REVOCABLE TRUST AGREEMENT of BARBARA K. KRAMER a/k/a BARBARA J. KRAMER" on October 8, 2012 (Trust). The Trust named Barbara Kramer as Trustee and Koeller as successor Trustee. The Daughters filed this action in state court to set aside the Will and Trust. Koeller removed the action to this Court. Koeller has filed an Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaims. Respondent's Answer to Petitioner's Amended Complaint (d/e 17) (Answer); Respondent's Affirmative Defenses (d/e 18) (Affirmative Defenses); Respondent's Counterclaims (d/e 19) (Counterclaims). Koeller filed the Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaims both individually and as successor Trustee of the Trust, The Daughters responded with the pending Motion to dismiss the Counterclaims.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

For purposes of the Motion, the Court assumes the well-pleaded factual allegations in the Counterclaims are true and will view those allegations in the light most favorable to Koeller. See e.g., Bogie v. Rosenberg, 705 F.3d 603, 605 (7^th Cir. 2013). The Court can also take notice of matters of public record and documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are referenced in the Counterclaims that are central to the claims. See Henson v. CSC Credit Services, 29 F.3d 280, 284 (7^th Cir. 1994); Wright v. Associated Ins. Cos. Inc., 1244, 1248 (7^th Cir. 1994). In this case, the Court takes notice of the fact that Barbara Kramer executed a deed in 2012 conveying her home (Residence) into the Trust, which deed was recorded in the Macoupin County, Illinois, Recorder's Office; Barbara Kramer died on November 11, 2018; and her Will was filed with the Macoupin County, Illinois Circuit Court, but no probate proceeding was ever opened for her.

Koeller alleges in the Counterclaims that he is the Executor of Barbara Kramer's estate (Estate). He alleges that when Barbara Kramer died, the Daughters handled the disposition of Barbara Kramer's remains (Remains). Koeller alleges that as Executor he had the first priority right to handle the disposition of the Remains, pursuant to the Illinois Disposition ofRemains Act (Act), 755 ILCS 65/1 et seq. He alleges the Remains were cremated. He alleges that some 15 months after Barbara Kramer's death, the Remains may still be disposed of in accordance with Barbara Kramer's directions. He now asserts his right to handle the disposition of the Remains. He asks the Court to resolve whether he or the Daughters should control the completion of the disposition of the Remains. He also asserts a claim for damages. (Counterclaim I).

Koeller asserts a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Koeller alleges that Rachel Kramer made all the arrangements for disposition of the Remains without Koeller's prior knowledge, consultation, or approval. He alleges that Rachel Kramer made the arrangements to meet the desires of the Daughters for disposition of the Remains but not the desires of Barbara Kramer for disposition of her Remains that she had told to Koeller. He alleges that the Daughters took the Remains out of state in violation of law. Koeller alleges the disposition of the Remains violated Koeller's right to control the disposition as Executor of the Estate. Koeller alleges that the Daughters engaged in this conduct maliciously and intentionally or recklessly to inflict emotional distress on him. He seeks damages for his emotional distress. (Counterclaim II).

Koeller alleges that the Residence was sold in July 2019, roughly eight months after Barbara Kramer died in November 2018. Koeller alleges that for the eight months from Barbara Kramer's death until the Trust sold the Residence in July 2019, the Daughters entered the Residence several times and removed personal property from the Residence. Koeller alleges that the Daughters took papers without authority. He alleges that the wrongful taking of these papers interfered with his ability to execute his duties as Executor and successor Trustee. Based on these allegations, he alleges a claim for trespass to land. (Counterclaim III).

Koeller also alleges a claim for trespass to chattels. (Counterclaim IV). The Will contained two specific bequests; a piano to Claire Kramer and two rings to a niece Kristen Koeller Sneider. Motion, Exhibit A, Will. The Will provided that the remaining personal property would be divided equally between the Daughters with the assistance of the Executor. The Will stated that Barbara Kramer might leave a memorandum identifying items that she wished to go to a specific person to be administered by the Executor. Koeller does not allege that Barbara Kramer left such a memorandum. Koeller alleges that the Daughters trespassed onto the Residence and took personal property, including financial records. Koeller does not allege that the Daughters took the rings given to Sneider. Koellerseeks damages for these wrongful trespasses. Koeller alleges damages because the Daughters took financial documents needed to administer the Estate and Trust.

The Daughters now move to dismiss the Counterclaims.

ANALYSIS

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), dismissal is proper where a complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Federal Rules require only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," and allegations must be "simple, concise, and direct." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) & (d)(1). The Court may also consider matters of public record in determining whether a complaint states a claim. Henson, 29 F.3d at 284. The Court may also consider documents that are attached to the Motion, referenced in the claim, and central to the claim. Wright, 29 F.3d at 1244. While a complaint need not contain detailed, specific factual allegations, it must contain sufficient facts to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible if the plaintiff "pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is plausibleon its face if it provides the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 608 (7^th Cir. 2007). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate when "the factual detail in a complaint [is] so sketchy that the complaint does not provide the type of notice of the claim to which the defendant is entitled under Rule 8." Airborne Beepers & Video, Inc. v. AT & T Mobility, LLC, 499 F.3d 663, 667 (7^th Cir. 2007). The Court addresses each Counterclaim separately.

Counterclaim I

Koeller states a claim for a determination of whether he or the Daughters are the proper person(s) to complete the disposition of the Remains. The Act authorizes a cause of action to resolve such disputes. 755 ILCS 65/50.¹

Koeller also alleges a claim for damages in Counterclaim I for violation of the Act. The Act does not expressly authorize a private cause of action for damages. The parties have not addressed whether such a private cause of action exists. See Metzger v. DaRosa, 209 Ill.2d 30, 36-40, 805 N.E.2d 1165, 1168-71 (Ill. 2003) (discussing the Illinois law regarding whether a statute contains an implied private right of action).The parties have not addressed this issue and the Court will not do so any further at this juncture. Regardless, Koeller states a claim for a judicial determination of whether he or the Daughters should determine the final disposition of the Remains.

The Daughters argue that Koeller fails to state a claim under the Act because Koeller did not open a probate proceeding. They argue that he is not really the Executor of the Estate unless and until he opens a probate proceeding and the probate court appoints him as executor and issues him letters testamentary. See 755 ILCS 5/6-2, 5/6-4, 5/6-8. Because he is not the Executor, the Daughters argue, he has no standing under the Act to claim a right to decide the disposition of the Remains.

The Act identifies in order of priority the individuals who are entitled to determine the disposition of a decedent's remains. The executor of the decedent's estate has second priority after an individual specifically named by the decedent in her will. The children of the decedent have fourth priority. 755 ILCS 65/5. The Act does not define the term executor. The general definition of "executor" is "a person appointed by a testator to carry out the directions and requests in his will, and to dispose of the property according to his testamentary provisions after his decease." Black's Law Dictionary (4^th ed.1968) at 680. The general...