Krasniqi v. Holdahl, Inc.

VISAR KRASNIQI, Plaintiff, v. HOLDAHL, INC., Defendant.

No. 4:20-CV-04090-KES

United States District Court, D. South Dakota, Southern Division

March 2, 2022

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RELIEF UNDER RULE 56(D)

KAREN E. SCHREIER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Visar Krasniqi, filed a complaint in South Dakota Circuit Court alleging claims of negligence and premises liability against defendant, Holdahl, Inc. Docket 1-1. Holdahl removed this action to the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Docket 1. Holdahl moves under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 for summary judgment. Docket 11. Krasniqi opposes the motion and seeks relief under Rule 56(d). Docket 17. For the following reasons, the court denies Holdahl's motion for summary judgment and denies Krasniqi's motion for relief under Rule 56(d).

BACKGROUND

The facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Krasniqi, the non-moving party, are as follows:

Krasniqi is a resident of Sioux Falls, South Dakota. Docket 1-1 ¶ 1; Docket 2 ¶ 2. Holdahl is a Minnesota corporation whose principal place of business is in Plymouth, Minnesota and who maintains a business facility in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. Docket 1-1 ¶ 2; Docket 2 ¶ 3. Krasniqi claims that he was injured while operating a dock plate at Holdahl's facility in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, on February 8, 2018. Docket 20 ¶ 1. At the time Krasniqi was a truck driver for Old Dominion Freight Lines and was making a delivery to Holdahl's Sioux Falls facility. Docket 1-1 ¶¶ 5-6; Docket 2 ¶¶ 5-6.

The dock plate is operated by inserting a metal bar into a designated slot and then moving that bar backward and forward to extend the dock plate, thus bridging the gap between the loading dock and a trailer to facilitate cargo loading and unloading. Docket 20 ¶ 2. Krasniqi claims that the dock plate malfunctioned while he was using it, causing the dock plate's metal bar to strike his head. Id. ¶ 3. Krasniqi testified that he inserted the metal bar into the dock plate and pulled the bar backwards, but when he tried to push the bar forward to extend the dock plate, the plate was stuck and would not move. Id. ¶ 5. At that point, Krasniqi walked around the bar to see if anything was impeding the movement of the docket plate and, as he bent over, Krasniqi claims he was struck in the head. Id. ¶ 6.

Holdahl's expert avers that the dock plate was properly maintained, that it operated correctly on February 18, 2018, and that it continued to operate correctly after that date. Id. ¶ 20. Krasniqi's fact witnesses aver that the dock plate was unusually difficult to operate, it did not function as it should have, and that it malfunctioned when Krasniqi operated it on February 18, 2018. Docket 19-11 at 4; Docket 19-12 at 1, 4, 9; Docket 19-13 at 1.

Krasniqi alleges that Holdahl “owed a duty to exercise ordinary care . . . in maintaining a safe loading dock and a safe and functioning docket plate[.]” Docket 20 ¶ 7. Holdahl breached that duty, Krasniqi asserts, “by failing to maintain and/or repair the dock plate mechanism which injured [Krasniqi] when it malfunctioned.” Id. ¶¶ 8-9. Krasniqi brings two causes of action against Holdahl: negligence and premises liability. Docket 1-1 at 4-6.

The court's scheduling order states, “[t]he identity of and report from retained experts . . . will be due from [Krasniqi] by January 1, 2021, and from [Holdahl] by March 15, 2021; any rebuttal experts will be disclosed by April 15, 2021.” Docket 10 ¶ 6. Krasniqi served his expert disclosures on December 31, 2020. Docket 20 ¶ 11. Krasniqi identified several experts and provided reports from his retained expert. Id. ¶ 12. Holdahl asserts that “[n]one of the experts disclosed by [Krasniqi] were qualified to provide an opinion on the condition, operation, or maintenance of the dock plate.” Id. ¶ 13. Krasniqi asserts that it timely and properly disclosed Dr. Pond to rebut Holdahl's expert opinion regarding the dock plate. Id. ¶ 22.

Holdahl disclosed its experts on March 15, 2021, and included David Hallman of Hallman Engineering, LLC. Id. ¶¶ 14-15. On March 19, 2021, Holdahl made its Sioux Falls facility available to Krasniqi for inspection. Id. ¶ 16. Krasniqi's counsel was present at the inspection and was accompanied by an individual identified as an expert, Dr. John Hansen. Id. ¶ 17. Hallman also attended the March 19, 2021 inspection. Id. ¶ 18. Holdahl served an amended expert disclosure on April 15, 2021, that included a report from Hallman. Id. ¶ 19. Also on April 15, 2021, Krasniqi served a rebuttal expert disclosure identifying Dr. Brett Pond as an expert who would respond to Hallman's report. Id. ¶ 21. On April 20, 2021, Krasniqi requested that Holdahl make its facility available for a second inspection to allow Dr. Pond to prepare a report, and Holdahl objected to the second inspection six days later. Id. ¶¶ 23-24. Krasniqi disputes many of the findings in Hallman's report and argues that he was never given an opportunity to properly rebut Hallman's report using the opinions of Dr. Pond. Id. ¶ 20.

DISCUSSION

I. Holdahl's Motion for Summary Judgment

Holdahl argues that Krasniqi is required to provide expert testimony to establish that the dock plate malfunctioned or was improperly maintained or repaired. See Docket 13 at 2. Holdahl asserts that Krasniqi did not properly disclose an expert or rebuttal expert to opine on the function of the dock plate. Id. at 4. Thus, Holdahl argues, it is entitled to summary judgment. Id. at 4-6. Krasniqi argues that he is not required to provide expert testimony on the function of the dock plate, but if expert testimony is required, his rebuttal expert was timely disclosed. See Docket 18 at 12-14.

A. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party can meet its burden by presenting evidence that there is no dispute of material fact or that the nonmoving party has not presented evidence to support an element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The moving party must inform the court of the basis for its motion and also identify the portions of the record that show there is no genuine issue in dispute. Hartnagel v. Norman, 953 F.2d 394, 395 (8th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).

To avoid summary judgment, “[t]he nonmoving party may not ‘rest on mere allegations or denials, but must demonstrate on the record the existence of specific facts which create a genuine issue for trial.' ” Mosley v. City of Northwoods, 415 F.3d 908, 910 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Krenik v. Cnty. of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995)). Summary judgment is precluded if there is a genuine dispute of fact that could affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). When considering a summary judgment motion, the court views the facts and the inferences drawn from such facts “in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 58788 (1986) (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)).

“It is . . . well-settled that in a suit based on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction the federal courts apply federal law as to matters of procedure but the substantive law of the relevant state.” Hiatt v. Mazda Motor Corp., 75 F.3d 1252, 1255 (8th Cir. 1996). Here, South Dakota law governs substantive issues.

B. Whether Krasniqi's Claims Require Expert Testimony

The South Dakota Supreme Court has stated:

Expert testimony is only required when the issues presented relate to matters so far removed from the realm of common experience or beyond the ken of the average layman that with all the facts before it, the jury, without the assistance of expert opinion, could not be expected to draw a correct inference.

Thomas v. St. Mary's Roman Cath. Church, 283 N.W.2d 254, 257 (S.D. 1979); see also Luther v. City of Winner, 674 N.W.2d 339, 344 (S.D. 2004) (“There is no requirement that a party produce expert testimony when the question is within a layperson's knowledge.”) (citing Bland v. Davison Cnty., 566 N.W.2d 452, 461 (S.D. 1997)). “Unless the issues are unusually complex, expert testimony is not required.” Mid-Western Elec., Inc. v. DeWild Grant Reckert & Assoc. Co., 500 N.W.2d 250, 255 (S.D. 1993) (citation omitted).

Whether expert testimony is required depends in part on the duty of care owed to the plaintiff. See Luther, 674 N.W.2d at 344. “[E]xpert testimony is ordinarily required to establish a claim of negligence in a products liability action” because “it is not within the common expertise of a jury to deduce merely from an accident and injury that a product was defectively designed.” Burley v. Kytec Innovative Sports Equip., Inc., 737 N.W.2d 397, 407 (S.D. 2007). Lawyers have a professional duty of care, thus “it is most often necessary to have an expert witness explain how [a] lawyer's actions f[a]ll below the standard of care.” Robinson-Podoll v. Harmelink, Fox & Ravnsborg Law Office, 939 N.W.2d 32, 46 (S.D. 2020) (quoting Zhi Gang Zhang v. Rasmus, 932 N.W.2d 153, 162 (S.D. 2019)). Similarly, in medical malpractice cases, “[t]he general rule . . . is that negligence must be established by the testimony of medical experts.” Magbuhat v. Kovarik, 382 N.W.2d 43, 46 (S.D. 1986) (emphasis added). But even in a medical malpractice case, there are exceptions to the general rule:

[E]xpert evidence is not exclusively required to establish negligence.

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