Krass v. Obstacle Racing Media, LLC

667 F.Supp.3d 1177

Ameer KRASS, a/k/a Ameer Haroun, Plaintiff, v. OBSTACLE RACING MEDIA, LLC, d/b/a obstacleracingmedia.com and Matthew B. Davis, Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:19-CV-5785-JPB

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division

Signed March 21, 2023

Daniel Robert Warner, RM Warner, P.L.C., Scottsdale, AZ, David M. Lilenfeld, Lilenfeld, P.C., Atlanta, GA, Kennington Groff, Bekiares Eliezer LLP dba Founders Legal, Atlanta, GA, Robin L. Gentry, Cohan Law Group, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff.

Clare Rivka Norins, University of Georgia School of Law, Athens, GA, Erin Marie Morrissey Victoria, Kristen Rasmussen, Ian Kyle Byrnside, S. Derek Bauer, Baker & Hostetler LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant Obstacle Racing Media, LLC.

Clare Rivka Norins, Lindsey Michele Floyd, First Amendment Clinic at Univ. of Georgia School of Law, Athens, GA, Erin Marie Morrissey Victoria, Kristen Rasmussen, Ian Kyle Byrnside, S. Derek Bauer, Baker & Hostetler LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant Matthew B. Davis.

ORDER

J. P. BOULEE, United States District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on Obstacle Racing Media, LLC, ("ORM") and Matthew Davis's (together, "Defendants") Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 110] and Defendants' Request for Oral Argument on Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 113]. This Court finds as follows:

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case involves allegations that Defendants published two articles in 2019 on the ORM website that contained false and defamatory statements about Ameer Krass ("Plaintiff"). Plaintiff filed this action on December 23, 2019, bringing the following claims against Defendants: (1) defamation and defamation per se, (2) false light invasion of privacy, (3) public disclosure of private facts and (4) tortious interference with current and prospective business relationships.¹ [Doc. 1].

On April 15, 2020, Defendants moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim. [Doc. 15]. On June 1, 2020, Defendants filed a motion for oral argument on the motion to dismiss. [Doc. 28]. The Court granted the motion for oral argument on October 6, 2020, and held oral argument on December 4, 2020.² See [Doc. 36]. On February 2, 2021, the Court denied Defendants' motion to dismiss. [Doc. 39]. Defendants filed the instant Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment on August 8, 2022, seeking summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims.³ [Doc. 110].

II. FACTUAL HISTORY

The Court derives the facts of this case from the following documents: (1) Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, [Doc. 110-21]; (2) Plaintiff's Response in Opposition and Objection to Defendants' Statement of Material Facts, [Doc. 111-1]; (3) Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts in Dispute, [Doc. 111-70]; and (4) Defendants' Response and Objections to Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts in Dispute, [Doc. 112-1].

The Local Rules of this Court require a respondent to a summary judgment motion to include with its responsive brief "[a] response to the movant's statement of undisputed facts." N.D. Ga. Civ. R. 56.1(B)(2)(a). Responses to the movant's facts must be concise and nonargumentative. N.D. Ga. Civ. R. 56.1(B)(2)(a)(1). The Local Rules make clear that the Court will deem each of the movant's facts admitted unless the respondent

(i) directly refutes the movant's fact with concise responses supported by specific citations to evidence (including page or paragraph number); (ii) states a valid objection to the admissibility of the movant's fact; or (iii) points out that the movant's citation does not support the movant's fact or that the movant's fact is not material or otherwise has failed to comply with the provisions set out in [Local Rule] 56.1(B)(1).

N.D. Ga. Civ. R. (B)(2)(a)(2). Further, in accordance with the Local Rules, this Court will not consider unsupported facts. The Court will, however, use its discretion to consider all facts the Court deems material after reviewing the record. For the purpose of adjudicating the instant Motions, the facts of this case are as follows, divided into these sections: (A) Introduction; (B) Spartan 4-0 Facebook Group; (C) Plaintiff's Conduct with Women in Spartan 4-0; (D) Discussions in Spartan 4-0 and Moderation of Spartan 4-0 Content; and (E) the First and Second Articles.

A. Introduction

Davis owns and operates the website onlineracingmedia.com, where he publishes news and information about the sport of Obstacle Course Racing ("OCR"). [Doc. 111-1, p. 1]. Davis is not a professional journalist; he is a "content creator" for OCR. [Doc. 112-3, p. 37]. Spartan Race, Inc. ("Spartan") is the largest company in the OCR industry worldwide. [Doc. 111-1, p. 3]. Plaintiff, who lives in New Jersey with his wife and two daughters, became involved in OCR in 2015. Id. at 2. Plaintiff has been separated from his wife at various times, including in 2015 and 2016. [Doc. 112-1, p. 22].

Davis published two articles on the ORM website that featured Plaintiff and that are now at the center of this lawsuit. On October 21, 2019, Davis published an article titled "#MeToo Hits OCR"; this is the "First Article." [Doc. 111-1, p. 1]; see also [Doc. 1-1, pp. 2-11] (the First Article). Davis published an article titled "Spartan Race Bans Ameer Haroun" on October 22, 2019; this is the "Second Article." [Doc. 111-1, p. 2]; see also [Doc. 1-3, pp. 2-8] (the Second Article). The First Article contain allegations from six women—J.C., A.D., T.A.S., A.C., J.H. and K.C.—about Plaintiff's conduct. In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants knowingly and intentionally published false and defamatory statements in the First Article.⁴See [Doc. 1, pp. 8-19]. The Court will discuss the facts relevant to this case and to these articles before setting forth the allegedly defamatory statements.

B. Spartan 4-0 Facebook Group

Spartan operates several Facebook groups comprised of Spartan OCR participants with shared characteristics, such as geography. [Doc. 111-1, p. 4]. Other Facebook groups are similarly comprised of Spartan OCR participants but are not formally operated by the company. Id. One such group is Spartan 4-0. Its creation, administrators and members are relevant to this case and are discussed below.

1. Creation of Spartan 4-0

J.C. and A.D. are two women who were involved in OCR and who were members of a Facebook group called "Spartans of the Northeast." Id. at 5. In 2015, A.D. posted in Spartans of the Northeast about participating in OCR after the age of forty. Id. J.C. commented on that post and explained that she planned to start a Facebook group for OCR participants over the age of forty. Id. J.C. created a Facebook group on October 2, 2015, and named it "Spartan 4-0." Id. at 6; [Doc. 112-1, p. 2]. She added A.D. and Plaintiff as administrators of the group. [Doc. 111-1, p. 6]. Spartan 4-0 gained at least a thousand members within its first few months. Id. Davis joined Spartan 4-0 after it was formed and was a member of the group at least as early as December 2015. [Doc. 112-1, p. 21].

2. Trademark Discussions

On October 19, 2015, J.C. raised to Plaintiff and A.D. in a Facebook Messenger thread the idea of trademarking the name "Spartan 4-0." [Doc. 111-1, p. 6]. A.D. responded that she agreed with the proposal, and Plaintiff responded "Good idea. Will we need a company?" [Doc. 110-6, p. 82]. Plaintiff, J.C. and A.D. then discussed logistics about creating a business entity and registering a trademark for the group. Id. at 89-93.

In the course of that conversation, Plaintiff asked who would own the trademark. Id. at 91. J.C. responded that she thought she would own the trademark since she named the group but clarified that if A.D. or Plaintiff disagreed, she was "totally open" and that they could discuss the issue. Id. Plaintiff said that J.C. was "[n]ot starting this on the right foot." Id. Plaintiff explained that he expected that ownership of the trademark would be divided equally among himself, J.C. and A.D. Id. J.C. stated she was open to that idea. Id. at 91-92. J.C. later said that she was "comfortable with trademarking the name first and then taking the next steps." Id. at 93. Plaintiff responded with these messages:

Please tell me you read what I wrote[.]

That upset me a little and it takes a lot to get me upset[.]

[A.D.] & [J.C.] if you choose to take steps in that regard without us agreeing on them first it would be a sign of what is to come and I would want non[e] of that.

Id. at 93-94. After the three individuals discussed scheduling a phone call to continue the conversation, Plaintiff sent the following messages:

In the [meantime] if you proceed individually with any steps without us agreeing on them I'll be concerned. The brand Spartan 4-0 is about the spirit and if that spirit is gone that brand won't stand for much[.]

Sorry ladies I like to work with people who respect me [in] the same way I respect them. I'm surprised[.]

Id. at 95. J.C. responded that she would prefer to talk on the phone because she felt that "this [was] getting uncomfortable." Id. Plaintiff agreed and asked J.C. and A.D. when they were available to talk.

Id. At that point, J.C. sent the following message: "I am so sorry guys but I cannot do this. I feel like I am being bullied. I am going to leave the group. [IT'S] ALL YOURS AMEER. I am done." Id. at 95-96; see also [Doc. 111-1, p. 9].

The parties dispute whether Plaintiff and J.C. ever discussed the trademark issue anywhere other than on Facebook Messenger. [Doc. 111-1, pp. 8-9]. Defendants argue that Plaintiff texted with J.C. about the trademark dispute. To support their position, Defendants point to a declaration submitted by J.C., in which she stated that Plaintiff "sent [her] text messages telling [her] that if [she] moved forward with the trademark without him, [she] would regret it." [Doc. 110-5, p. 6]. J.C. "understood that to be a threat." Id. J.C. further declared that she "actually [felt] unsafe due to the tone of his messages and how upset...