Krekelberg v. City of Minneapolis

Amy Elizabeth Krekelberg, Plaintiff, v. City of Minneapolis; Minneapolis Park & Recreation Board; Keith Rowland,acting in his individual capacity as an Officer ofthe Minneapolis Park and Recreation Board Police Department;John Wurm, in his individual capacity as a Park Patrol Agent ofthe Minneapolis Park and Recreation Board Police Department;Mark Gasior, acting in his individual capacity as an Officer of the Minneapolis Police Department;Heather Jorges, acting in her individual capacity as an Officer of the Minneapolis Police Department;Matthew Olson, acting in his individual capacity as an Officer of the Minneapolis Police Department;John and Jane Does (1-1000), acting in their individual capacity as supervisors, officers, deputies,staff, investigators, employees or agents of the other governmental agencies;Entity Does (1-50), including cities, counties, municipalities,and other entities sited in Minnesota, Defendants.

Civil No. 13-3562 (DWF/TNL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

July 30, 2018

REDACTED MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Jeffrey M. Montpetit, Esq., Marcia K. Miller, Esq., and Susan M. Holden, Esq., SiebenCarey, P.A.; and Lorenz F. Fett, Jr., Esq., Sonia L. Miller-Van Oort, Esq., Robin M. Wolpert, Esq., and Jonathan A. Strauss, Esq., Sapientia Law Group PLLC; counsel for Plaintiff.

Brian Scott Carter and George Norris Henry, Assistant City Attorneys, Minneapolis City Attorney's Office, counsel for Defendants City of Minneapolis and Heather Jorges.

Ann E. Walther, Esq., and Erik Bal, Esq., Rice, Michels & Walther, LLP, counsel for Defendants Minneapolis Park & Recreation Board, Keith Rowland, and John Wurm.

Joseph E. Flynn, Esq., Jason M. Hill, Esq., Jardine Logan & O'Brien PLLP, counsel for Defendant Matthew Olson.

INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court on Defendant City of Minneapolis's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. No. 446) and Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 451). For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the motions. Also before the Court is Plaintiff's appeal (Doc. No. 440) of Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung's August 9, 2017 Order addressing a number of discovery motions (Doc. No. 430). Upon careful review, the Court sustains Plaintiff's objection and respectfully sets aside the Magistrate Judge's order to the extent it precludes the parties from seeking attorney fees and costs in connection with particular discovery motions.

BACKGROUND

This case relates to the alleged unlawful access of Plaintiff Amy Elizabeth Krekelberg's personal information by various government entities and their employees. According to Plaintiff, Defendants viewed her information—contained in the Department of Vehicle Services' ("DVS") motor-vehicle records database for Minnesota drivers—in violation of the Driver's Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2721, et seq. ("DPPA"). A prior order in this case, issued on November 7, 2014, contains a summary ofKrekelberg's factual allegations. (Doc. No. 118.) The Court incorporates that summary by reference. The specific procedural and factual background relevant to each of the pending motions is detailed below.

DISCUSSION

I. City of Minneapolis's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

A. Background

On December 17, 2013, Plaintiff filed the original Complaint in this matter against numerous entity defendants as well as individual officers identified as John and Jane Doe. (Doc. No. 1 at 1-2.) Approximately eighteen months later,¹ on June 16, 2015, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint naming individual Doe defendants. (Doc. No. 137 at 1-6.) The Amended Complaint alleged DPPA violations against all defendants, including vicarious liability against entity defendants for the actions of the individual defendants. (See id. ¶¶ 277-98.)

On August 19, 2016, the Court concluded that the claims against numerous individual named defendants were barred by the statute of limitations. (Doc. No. 246 at 13-18.) Thus, the Court dismissed the claims against these defendants with prejudice, and they were dismissed from the lawsuit. (See id. at 22-23.) Minneapolis now seeks judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the dismissal of the claims against theseindividual officers mandates dismissal of the corresponding vicarious liability claims against Minneapolis. (See Doc. Nos. 446, 448.)

B. Legal Standard

A party may move for judgment on the pleadings at any point after the close of the pleadings, so long as it moves early enough to avoid a delay of trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). "Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate only when there is no dispute as to any material facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.]" See Ashley Cty. v. Pfizer, Inc., 552 F.3d 659, 665 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Wishnatsky v. Rovner, 433 F.3d 608, 610 (8th Cir. 2006)). The Court evaluates a motion for judgment on the pleadings under the same standard as a motion brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See id.

In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court assumes all facts in the complaint to be true and construes all reasonable inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to the complainant. Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1986). In doing so, however, a court need not accept as true wholly conclusory allegations, Hanten v. Sch. Dist. of Riverview Gardens, 183 F.3d 799, 805 (8th Cir. 1999), or legal conclusions drawn by the pleader from the facts alleged, Westcott v. City of Omaha, 901 F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th Cir. 1990).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Although a complaint need not contain "detailed factual allegations," it must contain facts with enough specificity "to raise a right to relief above the speculativelevel." Id. at 555. As the Supreme Court reiterated, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements," will not pass muster under Twombly. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In sum, this standard "calls for enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [the claim]." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

C. Minneapolis's Vicarious Liability for Time-Barred Officers

Minneapolis argues that the prior dismissal of Plaintiff's claims against individual Minneapolis officers on statute-of-limitations grounds bars Plaintiff's vicarious liability claims against Minneapolis based on those officers' lookups. Because these officers have been dismissed from the action with prejudice, Minneapolis argues, the Court should hold as a matter of law that the corresponding vicarious liability claims against Minneapolis based on those officers' conduct are barred. Minneapolis emphasizes that Plaintiff must establish the underlying liability of these officers under the DPPA in order to assert successful vicarious liability claims against Minneapolis. However, Minneapolis contends, Plaintiff cannot establish these officers' liability because a statute-of-limitations dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits of Plaintiff's claims under the federal common law as well as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As a result, Minneapolis suggests, this dismissal has a preclusive effect as to subsequent claims. Minneapolis argues that the case law reaching a different conclusion is either distinguishable or wrong. Further, Minneapolis asserts that policy considerations weigh against imposing vicarious liability based on these time-barred claims.

Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that the statute-of-limitations dismissal of the individual officers does not exonerate Minneapolis for these officers' conduct. As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff contends that a motion seeking judgment on the pleadings should only address the pleadings. In her complaint, Plaintiff contends, she has adequately pled Minneapolis's vicarious liability for its officers' actions. In addition, Plaintiff suggests that the majority of courts hold that a dismissal on statute-of-limitations grounds does not eliminate the liability of the principal. According to Plaintiff, the cases cited by Defendant holding otherwise are not persuasive. Plaintiff also disputes Defendant's suggestion that res judicata or collateral estoppel have any application here because the claims at issue are not identical, and the court did not address the underlying facts relating to the officers' liability. Relatedly, Plaintiff emphasizes that a statute-of-limitations defense is personal to the individual and notes that Plaintiff could have sued Minneapolis alone for vicarious liability without even adding the individual officers as Defendants. Finally, Plaintiff argues that policy considerations support imposing vicarious liability against Minneapolis for its officers' conduct.

Minneapolis has identified caselaw out of seven jurisdictions which holds that a statute-of-limitations dismissal of an agent bars the imposition of vicarious liability against the principal. See Preis v. Lexington Ins. Co., 508 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1078 (S.D. Ala. 2007), aff'd, 279 F. App'x 940 (11th Cir. 2008); Al-Shimmari v. Detroit Med. Ctr., 731 N.W.2d 29, 36-38 (Mich. 2007); Stephens v. Petrino, 86 S.W.3d 836, 843 (Ark. 2002); Buettner v. Cellular One, Inc., 700 So. 2d 48, 48-49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Greco v. Univ. of Del., 619 A.2d 900, 903-04 (Del. 1993); Karaduman v. Newsday, Inc.,416 N.E.2d 557, 563 (N.Y. 1980);² Kapitan v. DT Chicagoland Express Inc., Civ. No. 2:12-321, 2013 WL 5655704, at *2-4 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 15, 2013). Minneapolis also cites Brown v. Garlich Printing Co., Civ. No. 4:07CV1668, 2008 WL 942861 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 7, 2008), which holds that "[d]ismissal for failure to comply with the statute of limitations operates as an adjudication on the merits," thereby rendering some support to...