Krell v. Queen Anne's Cnty.

EDWIN CHARLES KRELL, Plaintiff, v. QUEEN ANNE'S COUNTY, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL NO. JKB-18-637

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

December 12, 2018

MEMORANDUM

Edwin Krell ("Plaintiff") filed a twelve-count complaint against Queen Anne's County ("the County") and nine state and local officials seeking monetary damages stemming from his alleged unlawful arrest in 2015. The counts include five federal claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and seven claims arising under Maryland law. Pending before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed by Maryland State Police Trooper Sargent Tyson Brice and Trooper First Class Kyle Braightmeyer ("State Defendants").¹ Also before the Court is a motion to dismiss and bifurcate filed by the County, Sheriff Gary Hofmann, Warden LaMonte Cooke of Queen Anne'sCounty Detention Center, Corrections Officer Duckery, and Corrections Officer Crabtree ("County Defendants").² Corrections Officer Marcie Hamifee separately moves to dismiss and bifurcate. The motions have been fully briefed, and no hearing is required, Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2016).

For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant in part and deny in part the State Defendants' motion and County Defendants' motion, and it will grant Officer Hamifee's motion entirely.

I. Allegations of the Complaint

At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court takes the allegations of the complaint as true, see, e.g., Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 474 (4th Cir. 1997), and construes any disputed allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, In re Royal Ahold N.V. Secs. & ERISA Litig., 351 F. Supp. 2d 334, 376 n.32 (D. Md. 2004) ("[R]esolution of [a] factual dispute is inappropriate when ruling on a motion to dismiss . . . ."). Here, the Court summarizes Plaintiff's allegations.

On March 3, 2015, at approximately 9:00 a.m., law enforcement officers of the County Drug Task Force arrested Plaintiff. (Compl. ¶ 23, ECF No. 1.) The arrest occurred in Plaintiff's Chestertown home where he resides with his male partner. (Id. ¶ 31.) As a result of rotator cuff surgery in 2009, Plaintiff's ability to reach his right arm behind his back was limited, but he experienced no pain or other limitations. (Id. ¶ 51.) At the time of the arrest, Plaintiff was wearing nothing but boxer shorts; as such, injuries to his upper body, like his shoulder, would have been visible. (Id. ¶ 24, 28.)

That morning, Plaintiff saw the officers approaching his home, and, before they entered, he got down on his knees and placed his hands behind his head. (Id. ¶ 24.) Plaintiff's pet Chihuahua was "agitated" so Plaintiff lowered his hands to calm the dog. (Id. ¶ 25.) One of the law enforcement officers, later identified as Defendant State Trooper Braightmeyer, grabbed Plaintiff's arm and twisted it behind his back; then, he shoved Plaintiff's face to the floor so that Plaintiff's face cracked a floor tile. (Id. ¶ 25-26.) Braightmeyer placed his boot on Plaintiff's neck. (Id. ¶ 26.) Braightmeyer handcuffed Plaintiff and pulled him up by the handcuffs, pushing him into a chair. (Id. ¶ 27.) Plaintiff screamed in pain and lost feeling in his right arm. (Id.)

Defendant State Trooper Brice noticed that Plaintiff was injured and asked Braightmeyer to handcuff Plaintiff in front of his body, but Braightmeyer responded, "This faggot is staying handcuffed just like this. I'm sticking to protocol." (Id. ¶ 29.) Braightmeyer continued to call him a "faggot" and curse at him. (Id. ¶ 30.) Plaintiff alleges that none of the officers chose to touch him after Braightmeyer made these derogatory comments. (Id. ¶ 29.)

Between his arrest at 9:00 a.m. and his arrival at the County's detention center at 5:00 p.m., Plaintiff constantly complained to Braightmeyer of the pain and loss of feeling in his right arm. (Id. ¶ 33-34.) The officers searched Plaintiff's home for about an hour before transporting Plaintiff to the Police Centreville Barracks, the District Court Commissioner, and the detention center. (Id. ¶ 32, 34.) At one point, Braightmeyer hiked the handcuffs up Plaintiff's arm toward his shoulder, and Plaintiff screamed in pain and requested medical attention. (Id. ¶ 33.)

At the detention center, Plaintiff told corrections officers that he needed medical attention. Upon arrival, Plaintiff told an unidentified corrections officer that his shoulder was dislocated, that he was in pain, that he had lost feeling in his right arm, and that he requiredmedical care, to which the officer replied, "We'll tell medical." (Id. ¶ 35.) The next day, a district court judge conducted Plaintiff's video bail review hearing, during which Plaintiff requested medical attention. (Id. ¶ 37.) Warden Cooke was present at the hearing and asked the unidentified corrections officers why they had not taken Plaintiff to see a doctor. (Id. ¶ 37.)

Plaintiff received medical attention three days after his arrest. On March 6, Officer Duckery and another corrections officer took Plaintiff to the University of Maryland emergency care facility, where staff members were unable to fix Plaintiff's dislocated shoulder. (Id. ¶ 38-39.) The two officers then took Plaintiff to the Shock Trauma Center, where staff members stabilized Plaintiff's shoulder and said that he needed immediate surgery—certainly, within the next two days. (Id. ¶ 39-41.) Both, or one of, the two officers told Warden Cooke that Plaintiff needed surgery in the next two days. (Id. ¶ 41-42.) Plaintiff was returned to the detention center, and, despite repeatedly asking when he would undergo surgery, he did not see a doctor until March 23, at which time the orthopedic surgeon confirmed that Plaintiff should have had surgery two weeks earlier. (Id. ¶ 43-44.) While on pretrial release, Plaintiff resumed treatment with the orthopedic surgeon, who operated on Plaintiff in August 2015. (Id. ¶ 45-46.)

Plaintiff was sentenced in November 2015 and incarcerated until the end of January 2016 when the center released him to home detention. (Id. ¶ 47-49.) On January 3, 2016, the orthopedic surgeon wrote a letter to the detention center, stating that Plaintiff needed physical therapy three to five times a week and an evaluation by a neurosurgeon. (Id. ¶ 48.) Plaintiff alleges that, nearly every day, he filed written grievances with the center requesting physical therapy and an evaluation by a neurosurgeon. (Id.) The center never provided the requested medical attention. (Id.) After Plaintiff's release, he was unable to begin physical therapy forsome time because the detention center was billing Plaintiff's insurance for his treatment while at the center. (Id. ¶ 50.)

Since Plaintiff's arrest, he has experienced and complained of constant pain. (Id. ¶ 52.) Plaintiff alleges that he has difficulty sleeping; that he has had to train himself to use his left hand; that he has undergone additional surgeries, causing further scarring and disfigurement; and that he is more susceptible to injury. (Id. ¶ 52-54.) Although Plaintiff had no psychological issues before his arrest, he has become suicidal due to his pain and has undergone three psychiatric hospitalizations. (Id. ¶ 55.)

On March 2, 2018, Plaintiff filed this law suit, alleging twelve counts against ten defendants. Eight of the defendants move to dismiss all twelve counts.³

II. Standard of Review

A. Rule 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a plaintiff's complaint. Presley v. Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006). A complaint need only satisfy Rule 8(a), which requires a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must allege sufficient facts, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Facial plausibility exists where the facts allow the court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). But, inferring the "mere possibility of misconduct" is not enough to establish a plausible claim. Id. at 679. Moreover, a complaint offering "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

B. Rule 12(b)(1)

To the extent that defendants raise the defense of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, this Court reviews that defense under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). The Fourth Circuit has not decided whether sovereign immunity is grounds for dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) or for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), but this Court favors analysis under Rule 12(b)(1) because immunity functions "as a block on the exercise of that jurisdiction." Gross v. Morgan State Univ., 308 F. Supp. 3d 861, 865 (D. Md. 2018) (quoting Biggs v. Meadows, 66 F.3d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1995)). "A motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to [Rule 12(b)(1)] raises the question of whether the court has the competence or authority to hear the case. Davis v. Thompson, 367 F. Supp. 2d 792, 799 (D. Md. 2005). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction. Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982); see also Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting challenge may be either facial, i.e., complaint fails to allege facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction can be based, or factual, i.e., jurisdictional allegations of complaint are not true). Where defendants raise the defense of sovereign immunity, they make a facial challenge to the complaint. See, e.g., Weiss v. Price, Civ. No. ELH-17-1127, 2018 WL 1156770, at *2 (D. Md. March 5, 2018); Downing v. Balt. City Bd. of School Comm'rs, Civ. No. RDB-12-1047, 2012 WL 6615017, at *3 (D. Md. Dec. 18,...