Krupien v. Ritcey

112 N.E.3d 302

Teresa KRUPIEN

v.Elizabeth Anne RITCEY & another.¹

No. 17-P-870.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued March 1, 2018

Decided September 26, 2018

Scott C. Gladstone, Chestnut Hill, for the plaintiff.

Jessica L. Shaffer, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendants.

Present: Trainor, Kinder, & Henry, JJ.

HENRY, J.

The plaintiff, Teresa Krupien, an employee of the Chelsea Soldiers' Home (the home), brought this action in Superior Court against the home's chief operating officer and acting superintendent, Elizabeth Anne Ritcey; and the home's human resources liaison, Faith M. Kirkland (collectively, defendants). Krupien alleges that Kirkland and Ritcey substantially burdened her right to the free exercise of her religion in violation of the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, G. L. c. 12, §§ 11H and 11I (the MCRA). Ritcey and Kirkland barred Krupien from the home's campus, which includes Krupien's church, during an investigation of a claim by another employee that Krupien injured that employee's wrist while transferring a patient from a bed to a wheelchair. The stay-away directive,² until subsequently modified, prohibited Krupien from attending her church for thirty-seven days, including Christmas. The sole issue before this court is whether the defendants, State actors, are entitled to qualified immunity.³ We conclude that they are not.

Background. In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Curtis v. School Comm. of Falmouth, 420 Mass. 749, 753, 652 N.E.2d 580 (1995).

Krupien began working at the home, a Commonwealth facility, in 1994. The home's campus includes the Quigley building, from which the home operates. Also on the campus are the St. Michael's Chapel (chapel) and several other buildings. The chapel serves both patients from the home and outside persons. The buildings are distinct and not connected above ground; they are connected through an underground tunnel.

On December 21, 2013, a coworker of Krupien's, Marlene Ravanis, alleged that Krupien injured Ravanis's wrist while they were moving a patient into a wheelchair. Shortly after the alleged incident, Ravanis reported the allegation to the charge nurse, Beth Moon, and to the nurse supervisor, Michele Nickerson.⁴ Nickerson interviewed Ravanis and asked her if she felt uncomfortable working with Krupien. Ravanis replied, "No," and declined Nickerson's offer to move to a different part of the home. Although Ravanis repeatedly asserted that her wrist was bruised, Nickerson did not observe bruising on Ravanis's wrist on December 21, 2013, nor the following day. Ravanis and Krupien worked together uneventfully for the remainder of the shift, including when Ravanis again asked Krupien to help her move a patient, which they accomplished without incident.

On December 23, 2013, Kirkland learned of the alleged incident between Ravanis and Krupien when Ravanis gave her a medical record indicating "possible tendinitis" and recommending that Ravanis remain out of work for ten days. Kirkland reviewed written statements, interviewed Ravanis and Martin, and discussed this medical record with Ritcey. Kirkland did not know or ask Ravanis if Ravanis had a work-related need to enter the chapel, if she took patients from the home to the chapel, or if she herself attended the chapel. Kirkland did not review Krupien's personnel file.⁵

Kirkland advised Ritcey what should be done -- that Krupien should be given a stay-away directive. As a result of her discussion with Kirkland, Ritcey suspended Krupien with pay and signed a letter that stated:

"I am ordering you to refrain from entering the property of the Chelsea Soldier[s'] Home and from contacting any of its employees. Failure to heed my directive will result in contacting appropriate law enforcement agencies and appropriate administrative action."

That same day, via a telephone call, Kirkland informed Krupien about the stay-away directive. Krupien alleges, and we take to be true for the purpose of summary judgment, that during this call she informed Kirkland that her church was located on the campus of the home; that she has attended services at the chapel continuously for nineteen years, since 1994; that she wanted to attend Christmas service in two days; and that she was very involved in that worship community. Kirkland advised Krupien to go to another church. As a result of the stay-away directive, Krupien was not able to attend services at the chapel, which she describes as her "spiritual home."⁶

On January 31, 2014, Ritcey and Kirkland sought legal counsel for the first time concerning the alleged incident and, that same day, the home modified the directive (the modified directive) thereby allowing Krupien to return to the chapel and to her second job at the United States Department of Veterans Affairs facility under certain conditions. By the date of the modified directive, the stay-away directive had prevented Krupien from attending her church for thirty-seven days.

Discussion. On appeal, summary judgment is reviewed de novo. See Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n v. Hendricks, 463 Mass. 635, 637, 977 N.E.2d 552 (2012). "The standard of review of a grant of summary judgment is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, all material facts have been established and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Augat, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mass. 117, 120, 571 N.E.2d 357 (1991). See Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 (c), as amended, 436 Mass. 1404 (2002).

"[T]he relevant inquiry on summary judgment as to the defense of qualified immunity is whether a reasonable official could have believed his actions were lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information possessed by the official at the time he acted." Clancy v. McCabe, 441 Mass. 311, 322, 805 N.E.2d 484 (2004). We apply a three-part test which asks "(1) whether the facts taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff demonstrate that there was a violation of the plaintiff's ... constitutional or statutory rights; ... (2) if so, whether at the time of the violation those rights were clearly established; and (3) whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would understand that his conduct violated those clearly established rights."⁷ Cristo v. Evangelidis, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 585, 590, 62 N.E.3d 94 (2016). Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense and the defendants have the burden of proof. Id.

It is undisputed that Ritcey and Kirkland implemented a stay-away directive that barred Krupien from the home's campus and, therefore, for a period of time, prohibited her from attending her place of worship. For purposes of this opinion, we take Krupien's allegations as true that she immediately told Kirkland that she worshipped at the chapel on the campus and that she wished to attend the Christmas services. The stay-away directive clearly interfered with Krupien's ability to worship in the church she identifies as her spiritual home. Accordingly, there is sufficient evidence for a trier of fact to find that Ritcey and Kirkland substantially interfered with Krupien's freedom of religion in violation of the MCRA.⁸

At issue is whether it was clearly established that the prohibitions against Krupien violated her freedom of religion, and whether a reasonable person in Kirkland's and Ritcey's positions "would appreciate that the conduct in question was unlawful." LaChance v. Commissioner of Correction, 463 Mass. 767, 777, 978 N.E.2d 1199 (2012), quoting Longval v. Commissioner of Correction, 448 Mass. 412, 419, 861 N.E.2d 760 (2007). Ritcey and Kirkland argue, and the judge concluded, that it was not clearly established that an employer's stay-away directive, in place while the employer investigated an employee misconduct claim, violated a constitutional right because there were no cases at that time with similar issues on point. However, "general statements of the law are not inherently incapable of giving fair and clear warning, and in other instances a general constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question, even though ‘the very action in question has [not] previously been held unlawful.’ " United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997), quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). See Caron v. Silvia, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 271, 273, 588 N.E.2d 711 (1992) ("To overcome a claim of immunity, it is not necessary for the courts to have previously considered a particular situation identical to the one faced by the government official. It is enough, rather, that there existed case law sufficient to clearly establish that, if a court were presented with such a situation, the court would find that the plaintiff's rights were violated") (citations omitted).

"When a fundamental right is at stake, the so-called ‘strict scrutiny’ formula for examining the constitutionality of State infringement on that right comes into play. See Aime v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 667, 673 [611 N.E.2d 204] (1993). This formula traditionally is stated in terms of requiring (1) a legitimate and compelling State interest to justify State action, and (2) careful examination to ascertain whether the action taken was ‘narrowly tailored to further [that] interest.’ [ Id. ]" Blixt v. Blixt, 437 Mass. 649, 655-656, 774 N.E.2d 1052 (2002).⁹ See Ahmad v. Department of Correction, 446 Mass. 479, 485, 845 N.E.2d 289 (2006) ; Rasheed v. Commissioner of Correction, 446 Mass. 463, 465, 845 N.E.2d 296 (2006) ; AttorneyGen. v. Desilets, 418 Mass. 316, 330-331, 636 N.E.2d 233 (1994) ; Commonwealth v. Martin, 417 Mass. 187, 193, 629 N.E.2d 297 (1994). "[O]nly those interests of the highest order ... can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215, 92 S.Ct....