Kruse v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety

906 N.W.2d 554

Philip George KRUSE, petitioner, Appellant,

v.COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Respondent (A17-0552),andState of Minnesota, Respondent (A17-0564),

v.Philip George Kruse, Appellant.

A17-0552

A17-0564

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

Filed January 8, 2018

Robert D. Schaps, Schaps Law Office, Litchfield, Minnesota (for appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Saraswati D. Singh, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and David Jon Torgelson, Renville County Attorney, Olivia, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Larkin, Judge.

LARKIN, Judge

In this consolidated appeal, appellant challenges his conviction of driving while impaired and the revocation of his license to drive. He argues that the underlying traffic stop was unconstitutional and that the district court therefore erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the stop and by sustaining the attendant license revocation. Because the traffic stop was supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion, we affirm.

FACTS

Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Philip George Kruse with two counts of fourth-degree driving while impaired (DWI), and respondent Commissioner of Public Safety revoked Kruse’s license to drive, following Kruse’s arrest for DWI. Kruse moved to suppress the evidence supporting the charges, arguing that he was unlawfully seized without reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Kruse also petitioned for rescission of the license revocation on the same ground. The district court held a combined hearing on Kruse’s suppression motion and implied-consent petition. Officer Lucas Jacques of the Renville County Sheriff’s Office testified at the hearing, and a squad video of the underlying traffic stop was received as evidence. The district court found that the video evidence did not contradict the officer’s testimony and that the relevant facts based on that testimony were as follows.

On September 22, 2016 at approximately 11:50 p.m., Officer Jacques was on routine patrol traveling north on County Road 24 when he observed a vehicle approximately one mile in front of him traveling in the same direction. Officer Jacques was patrolling that location because there had been parties there in the past.¹ Officer Jacques caught up to the vehicle, and when he was approximately three car lengths behind the vehicle, he observed it move right and onto the fog line,² but not over the fog line. Officer Jacques then observed the vehicle move left and onto the center line, but not over the center line. Officer Jacques initiated a traffic stop and identified Kruse as the driver of the vehicle. Kruse performed poorly on field sobriety tests, and Officer Jacques arrested him for DWI.

The district court denied Kruse’s motion to suppress and sustained the revocation of his license to drive. Kruse stipulated to the prosecution’s case under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, to obtain review of the suppression ruling, and the district court found him guilty of fourth-degree DWI. Kruse separately appealed the judgment of conviction (A17-0564) and the order sustaining the revocation of his license to drive (A17-0552). This court consolidated the appeals.³

ISSUE

Does driving a vehicle on a marking that delineates a lane for traffic constitute movement from the lane within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 7(a) ?

ANALYSIS

The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. U.S. Const. amend. IV ; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. However, a police officer may initiate a limited, investigative stop without a warrant if the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. State v. Munson , 594 N.W.2d 128, 136 (Minn. 1999) (citing Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ). In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, Minnesota courts "consider the totality of the circumstances and acknowledge that trained law enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that would be beyond the competence of an untrained person." State v. Richardson , 622 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001).

A traffic stop " ‘must be justified by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.’ " State v. George , 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997) (quoting United States v. Cortez , 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981) ). It cannot be based on a "hunch" or be "the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity." Id. ; State v. Pike , 551 N.W.2d 919, 921-22 (Minn. 1996) (citing Terry , 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880 ). However, "if an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, no matter how insignificant the traffic law, that observation forms the requisite particularized and objective basis for conducting a traffic stop." State v. Anderson , 683 N.W.2d 818, 823 (Minn. 2004). "[T]he factual basis required to support a stop for a ‘routine traffic check’ is minimal." State v. Engholm , 290 N.W.2d 780, 783 (Minn. 1980) (quotation omitted).

This court reviews a district court’s determination of reasonable suspicion de novo, but accepts the district court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Smith , 814 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 2012). In reviewing the district court’s factual findings, we defer to the district court’s credibility determinations. State v. Miller , 659 N.W.2d 275, 279 (Minn. App. 2003), review denied (Minn. July 15, 2003). The district court here reasoned that Officer Jacques had a reasonable basis to conduct a traffic stop because he observed a suspected violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 7. That statute provides,

When any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic ...:

(a) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.

Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 7 (2016).

Kruse contends that the evidence does not support the district court’s reasoning. He argues that "the [district court’s] findings that [he] ... drifted to the left side of the traffic lane such that his left side tires could be seen atop the centerline of the highway is contradicted by the video evidence, which is the best evidence of [his] driving conduct." Kruse further argues that "[t]he video evidence establishes beyond any doubt that [Officer Jacques’s] testimony in this regard was false" and that the district court’s "finding that the video does not contradict the deputy’s testimony is clearly erroneous." (Emphasis omitted.) Kruse concludes that the district court "clearly erred by adopting the testimony of Officer Jacques."

Although Kruse challenges Officer Jacques’s testimony that he drove on the center line, he does not dispute that he drove on the fog line or that the squad video clearly shows his vehicle on the fog line before Officer Jacques stopped him. The video is less supportive of Officer Jacques’s testimony that Kruse drove on the center line. But we need not decide whether the district court clearly erred by finding that Kruse drove on the center line if driving on the fog line provided a lawful basis for a stop, which is one of the commissioner’s arguments on appeal.

As to this issue, Kruse argues that a "momentary touch of the fog line of a highway, [without] crossing it, does not constitute a violation of [ Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 7(a) ]," which, again, provides that "[a] vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and should not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety." Kruse’s argument presumes that driving on the fog line is not movement from a lane because a marking that delineates a lane for traffic is part of the lane.

Kruse’s argument presents a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. Larson v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co. , 855 N.W.2d 293, 301 (Minn. 2014). The goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the legislature’s intent. Id. ; see also Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2016). If the language of the statute is unambiguous, we apply its plain meaning. Larson , 855 N.W.2d at 301. We construe nontechnical words and phrases according to their plain and ordinary meanings and look to dictionary definitions to determine the plain meanings of words. Id .

To determine whether driving on a fog line is movement from a lane and, therefore, a potential violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 7(a), we must define the term "lane" within the meaning of the statute. Neither Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 7(a), nor the definitional section of chapter 169 defines the term. See Minn. Stat. § 169.011 (2016). Because the term is not technical, we look to dictionary definitions to determine its plain meaning. See Larson , 855 N.W.2d at 301 ; cf. Minn. Stat. § 645.08 (2016) (stating that in construing statutes, "technical words and phrases and such others as have acquired a special meaning, or are defined in this chapter, are construed according to such special meaning or their definition").

The American Heritage College Dictionary defines "lane" as "[a] narrow way or passage between walls, hedges, or fences" and as "[a] strip delineated on a street or highway for a single line of vehicles." The American Heritage College Dictionary 779 (4th ed. 2007). The same dictionary defines "delineate" as "[t]o draw or trace the outline of; sketch out," and it defines "between" as "[i]n or through the position or interval separating." Id. at 136, 375. Combined, these definitions indicate that the markings referred to in Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 7(a), delineate lanes for traffic and that the areas between the markings, but not the markings themselves, constitute the lanes.⁴ Thus,...