Kuczak v. City of Trotwood Police Dep't

PATRICIA J. KUCZAK, Appellant/Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF TROTWOOD POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., Appellees/Defendants.

Case No. 3:13-cv-101

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION

September 15, 2016

JUDGE WALTER H. RICE

DECISION AND ENTRY ADOPTING IN PART AND REJECTING IN PART UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (DOC. #50); SUSTAINING IN PART AND OVERRULING IN PART APPELLEES/DEFENDANTS' OBJECTIONS THERETO (DOC. #51); SUSTAINING IN PART AND OVERRULING IN PART APPELLEES/DEFENDANTS' COMBINED MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT AND MOTION TO REMAND ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL (DOC. #40); DISMISSING DECLARATORY JUDGMENT/CLASS ACTION CLAIM WITH PREJUDICE; OVERRULING MOTION TO REMAND; DIRECTING ADDITIONAL BRIEFING

Pursuant to Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506, Appellant/Plaintiff, Patricia J. Kuczak, appeals the February 13, 2013, decision of a hearing officer for the City of Trotwood, who found her responsible for a violation of Trotwood City Ordinance ("TCO") § 333.09. That ordinance governs civil enforcement proceedings for speeding violations captured by an automated traffic camera, and imposes an $85.00 civil penalty.

On behalf of herself and others similarly situated, Kuczak also seeks declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That statute provides an avenue of relief for individuals whose constitutional rights have been violated by a person acting under color of state law. Kuczak alleges that the civil enforcement proceedings set forth in TCO § 333.09, and in TCO § 333.11, a substantially similar ordinance governing red light violations captured by an automated traffic camera, violate procedural due process rights as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution. Named defendants include the City of Trotwood Police Department, the City of Trotwood, and Quincy Pope, in his official capacity as Chief of Police.

Although Kuczak initially filed these claims in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, Appellees/Defendants removed the case to federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. Appellees/Defendants then filed a Combined Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint and Motion to Remand Administrative Appeal. Doc. #40. On July 8, 2016, United States Magistrate Judge Michael J. Newman issued a Report and Recommendations, Doc. #50, recommending that the Court deny that combined motion in its entirety. This matter is currently before the Court on Appellees/Defendants' Objections to that Report and Recommendations, Doc. #51.

I. Background and Procedural History

On November 6, 2012, at 5:50 a.m., an automated traffic camera in Trotwood, Ohio, clocked a car owned by Patricia Kuczak traveling 51 mph in a posted 35-mph zone. Thereafter, Kuczak received a Notice of Liability in the mail, alleging a violation of TCO § 333.09. Doc. #20-3, PageID#151. That ordinance "imposes monetary liability on the owner of a vehicle operating a vehicle in excess of the limits set forth in Section 333.03." TCO § 333.09(a)(1). Kuczak was given the option of paying the $85.00 civil penalty, or requesting an administrative hearing. Doc. #20-3, PageID#150. Kuczak requested a hearing. At the hearing, which was held on February 13, 2013, she was represented by her husband, an attorney. At the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing officer found that Kuczak was, in fact, responsible for the alleged violation. Doc. #20-14, PageID#171.

On March 5, 2013, Kuczak filed the instant action, which was removed to federal court on April 4, 2013. In Count I of her Second Amended Complaint, she appeals the hearing officer's decision, alleging that it was "unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, and/or is unsupported by a preponderance of substantial, reliable and probative evidence." Doc. #37, PageID#299.

In Count II, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, Kuczak seeks a declaratory judgment that the civil enforcement proceedings set forth in TCO §§ 333.09 and § 313.11 violate the procedural due process rights of individuals subject to the civil penalties, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, Section 16 of the OhioConstitution. She also seeks damages, and an order permanently enjoining the City of Trotwood from enforcing these ordinances.

More specifically, Kuczak alleges:

A. Said ordinance, as enacted and as applied fails to provide persons affected with the right to appeal alleged traffic enforcement camera violations at a hearing where the right to subpoena and compel and confront witnesses is guaranteed.

B. Said ordinance arbitrarily establishes an $85.00 (eighty five dollar) so-called "civil penalty," the amount of which parties who receive Notice(s) of Violation have no right to appeal, and which hearing officer[s] have no discretion to alter.

C. Said ordinance as applied establishes a procedure where appeals of Notices of Violation(s) are heard in non-public hearings at which only the appellants and their counsel are allowed to attend.

D. That portion of said ordinance which declares,

A certified copy of the notice of liability alleging that a violation of this ordinance has occurred, sworn to or affirmed by a duly authorized Police Officer of the City of Trotwood, with the recorded images produced by a traffic control photographic system shall be prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein and shall be admissible in a proceeding alleging a violation under this section

[] deprives affected persons in administrative proceedings of having matters adjudicated on the basis of a preponderance of substantial, reliable, and probative evidence and by per se depriving affected persons [of] the right to confront witnesses at hearings.

E. Said ordinance as applied deprives persons affected from asserting their rights to appeal under ORC § 2505.04 as agents and employees of the City of Trotwood and Quincy Pope interfere with those rights by promulgating and enforcing a policy of refusing to accept or acknowledge receipt of notices of appeal of administrative decisions and mis-advising personsthat notices of appeal must be filed contrary to the provisions of ORC § 2505.04.

F. Said ordinance as applied in conjunction with other ordinances and agreements of the City of Trotwood, confers a direct financial benefit upon the party or parties who provide the means of generating Notices of Violation from traffic enforcement cameras which are deemed by said ordinance to be prima facie proof of violation(s).

G. Said ordinances attempt to divest the Montgomery County Municipal Court of its jurisdiction to hear persons contesting the Notices of Violation issued by the Trotwood Police Department in violation of Article IV, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution.

Doc. #37, PageID##300-01.

Kuczak further alleges that TCO § 333.09 is unconstitutional in that it "arbitrarily establishes a violation without regard to reasonable and proper speed of motor vehicles." Id. at PageID#301. She maintains that this is contrary to TCO § 333.03 and Ohio Revised Code § 4511.21, which both provide that "[n]o person shall operate a motor vehicle . . . at a speed greater or less than is reasonable or proper, having due regard to the traffic, surface, and width of the street or highway and any other conditions . . . "

Because the issue of the constitutionality of a similar automated traffic camera ordinance was then on appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio in Walker v. City of Toledo, this Court stayed Kuczak's case pending that decision. Doc. #30. In Walker, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that: (1) municipal courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction over traffic ordinance violations; and (2) municipalities have authority to establish administrative proceedings for civil enforcement of red light and speeding violations captured by automated camera systems. Walker v. City ofToledo, 143 Ohio St. 3d 420, 2014-Ohio-5461, 39 N.E.3d 474. See also Jodka v. City of Cleveland, 143 Ohio St. 3d 50, 2015-Ohio-860, 34 N.E.3d 99 (reversing court of appeals' decision on the authority of Walker).

After Walker was decided, this Court lifted the stay. Appellees/Defendants filed a Combined Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint and Motion to Remand for Administrative Appeal, Doc. #40, arguing that Kuczak's declaratory judgment/class action claim is no longer plausible in light of the Walker decision, and must be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). They also ask the Court to remand Kuczak's administrative appeal to state court for further proceedings.

II. Report and Recommendations (Doc. #50)

After the Combined Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint and Motion to Remand for Administrative Appeal was fully briefed, Magistrate Judge Newman issued a Report and Recommendations, Doc. #50, recommending that the Court deny the motion in its entirety. He correctly noted that, because Appellees/Defendants had already filed an Answer, the motion was more appropriately captioned a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). Nevertheless, the standard of review is the same under both Rule 12(b)(6) and 12(c). Lindsay v. Yates, 498 F.3d 434, 437 n.5 (6th Cir. 2007). The relevant question is whether the Complaint contains "sufficient factualmatter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

Magistrate Judge Newman found that Walker was not dispositive, because it did not directly address Kuczak's procedural due process claims. Citing Balaban v. City of Cleveland, No. 1:07-cv-1366, 2010 WL 481283 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 5, 2010), he acknowledged that some courts have rejected similar due process challenges involving civil administrative enforcement...