Kugler v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi.

JOHN KUGLER, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff.

16 C 8305

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

July 26, 2017

Judge John Z. Lee

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff John Kugler ("Kugler") filed this suit against Defendant Board of Education of the City of Chicago ("the Board") under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that certain Board actions have violated his rights under the First Amendment. In turn, the Board has filed a counterclaim for a declaratory judgment affirming that its actions toward Kugler are reasonable and comport with the First Amendment, as well as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Illinois Human Rights Act (IHRA), 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/1-101 et seq. Kugler has moved to dismiss the counterclaim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(6), or in the alternative, to strike the counterclaim under Rule 12(f). For the reasons that follow, Kugler's motion [38] is granted in part and denied in part.

Factual Background¹

This lawsuit arises from a letter dated May 6, 2016, by which the Board restricted Kugler's access to Board personnel and property. Countercl. ¶¶ 31-32, ECF No. 21. The letter informed Kugler that restrictions were being imposed due to his "disruptive, violent, and threatening actions," and recounted specific incidents of such behavior. See id. ¶¶ 16-32; see also id., Ex. 2, 5/6/16 Letter from Board to Kugler ("5/6/16 Letter"). The Board cited Kugler's verbally abusive and physically threatening behavior during various school meetings and grievance hearings while acting as a Chicago Teacher's Union ("CTU") representative. Id. ¶¶ 16-24; see also 5/6/16 Letter. The letter also discussed an email Kugler had sent that the Board deemed a potential security threat. Countercl. ¶¶ 27-28.

As a result of his conduct, and as explained in the letter, the Board has prohibited Kugler from entering Board property, except to attend public meetings or school activities involving his children, and then only when notice is provided to school officials. Id. ¶ 5. In addition, the letter imposed certain restrictions on Kugler's communications with Board employees. See id.; 5/6/16 Letter. On May 17, 2016, the Board issued a separate letter clarifying the latter restriction as it pertains to communications with CTU members versus Board management. Countercl. ¶ 33; see also id., Ex. 3, 5/17/16 Letter from Board to Kugler.

Subsequently, on August 24, 2016, Kugler filed this suit, alleging that the restrictions violate his rights under the First Amendment. Id. ¶ 34; see also Compl., ECF No. 1. In its counterclaim, the Board seeks a declaratory judgment that:

i. The First Amendment does not prohibit the Board from imposing reasonable restrictions on Kugler to prevent him from engaging in verbal or physical abuse, including the use of profanities and vulgarities, directed at school principals, Board hearing officers, and other Board employees;

ii. The First Amendment does not prohibit the Board from imposing reasonable restrictions on Kugler to prevent him from harming school principals, Board hearing officers, or other Board employees or threatening or suggesting harm to school principals, Board hearing officers, or other Board employees or Board property; and

iii. The Board may impose reasonable restrictions on Kugler to foster a workplace that is not hostile and does not violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, or the Illinois Human Rights Act, 775 ILCS 5/1-101.

Countercl. ¶ 46.

Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted. Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012). Under the federal notice pleading standards, a complaint must "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The complaint "need only provide a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, sufficient to provide the defendant with fair notice of the claim and its basis." Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1081 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).These pleading standards are equally applicable to counterclaims. See Cozzi Iron & Metal, Inc. v. U.S. Office Equip., Inc., 250 F.3d 570, 574 (7th Cir. 2001) (applying the same standard in reviewing a motion to dismiss a counterclaim as with a motion to dismiss a complaint).

In reviewing a motion to dismiss a counterclaim under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept as true all well-pleaded allegations in the counterclaim and must draw all possible inferences in the counter-plaintiff's favor. See Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1081. In addition, while reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court may consider not only the allegations in the counterclaim itself, but also any documents attached to the counterclaim. See Geinosky v. City of Chi., 675 F.3d 743, 745 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012).

Under Rule 12(f), "[t]he court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Motions to strike are generally disfavored because they "potentially serve only to delay." Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., 883 F.2d 1286, 1294 (7th Cir. 1989). But when "motions to strike remove unnecessary clutter from the case, they serve to expedite, not delay." Id. A district court "has considerable discretion in striking any redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matter." Delta Consulting Grp., Inc. v. R. Randle Constr., Inc., 554 F.3d 1133, 1141 (7th Cir. 2009).

Analysis

Kugler raises three principal arguments in support of his motion, contending that the counterclaim: (1) fails to satisfy the Article III case-or-controversy requirement; (2) is redundant of the complaint; and (3) should be dismissed under the Court's discretion to do so in declaratory judgment actions. The Court will first address each of these arguments as to the counterclaim's allegations arising under the First Amendment. The Court will then turn to the counterclaim's allegations arising under Title VII and the IHRA.

I. Article III Case-or-Controversy Requirement

First, Kugler argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction over the counterclaim because it concerns future hypothetical events, and therefore does not concern a live case or controversy. He maintains that the declaration sought by the Board is "advisory in nature[ ] and cannot serve as a general declaration of the defendant's rights as to persons other than the plaintiff." Pl.'s Mot. Dismiss at 1, ECF No. 38.

The Declaratory Judgment Act ("DJA") "is not an independent source of federal subject matter jurisdiction." lGNB Battery Techs., Inc. v. Gould, Inc., 65 F.3d 615, 619 (7th Cir. 1995). But, assuming an independent source of jurisdiction, id., the DJA provides that a court "may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party," 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). Under the DJA, district courts have "'unique and substantial discretion in deciding whether to declare the rights of litigants.'" MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 136 (2007) (quoting Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286 (1995)). The DJA restricts courts, however, from "exercis[ing] this discretionary power in the absence of an 'actualcontroversy' between the parties." Deveraux v. City of Chi., 14 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 1994).

"The DJA's 'actual controversy' requirement is equivalent to Article III's case-or-controversy requirement." Duehning v. Aurora E. Unified Sch., 102 F. Supp. 3d 968, 980 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (citing MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 126-27). Yet, assessing whether a ripe controversy exists in this context is complicated because, to some extent, all declaratory judgment actions seek preemptive relief. Wis. Cent., Ltd. v. Shannon, 539 F.3d 751, 759 (7th Cir. 2008). Thus, "'it would be difficult, if it would be possible, to fashion a precise test'" to distinguish between an abstract question and an actual controversy as contemplated by the DJA. Deveraux, 14 F.3d at 330 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting Maryland Cas. Co., 312 U.S. at 273).

Fortunately, the Supreme Court has provided some guidance in this area, reiterating that "[b]asically, the question in each case is whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant issuance of a declaratory judgment." Wis. Cent., 539 F.3d at 759 (quoting MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 127).

Here, unlike many declaratory judgment actions brought in advance of an impending suit, the Board brings its declaratory judgment action as a counterclaim. The immediacy and reality of the controversy between Kugler and the Board is evidenced by the fact that litigation is already pending between the parties. There is certainly a live dispute between parties having adverse interests: Kugler seeksrelief from the restrictions placed upon him by the Board, while the Board seeks to declare that those restrictions are reasonable. Kugler admits as much in his reply. See Pl.'s Reply at 2, ECF No. 52.

But Kugler goes on to interpret the Board's counterclaim as purportedly seeking "guidance as to what restrictions are 'reasonable' or in what circumstances" beyond the acknowledged controversy at issue. Id. at 4. The Court does not interpret the Board's counterclaim in this manner. On the contrary, the counterclaim seeks a ruling that the restrictions currently in force against Kugler are permissible under the First Amendment. Neither the restrictions imposed on Kugler nor the circumstances that prompted them are hypothetical. Thus, the Court finds that the counterclaim alleges facts sufficient to establish an actual controversy within the meaning of the DJA and within this...