Kuhlman v. State

317 Ga. 232

892 S.E.2d 753

KUHLMAN v. The STATE.

S23A0699

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: September 6, 2023

John R. Monroe, John Monroe Law, PC 156 Robert Jones Road Dawsonville Georgia 30534, for Appellant.

Fani T. Willis, District Attorney, Kevin C. Armstrong, Assistant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Beth A. Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Tina M. Piper, Cristina M. Correia, Senior Assistant Attorneys General, Stephen J. Petrany, Solicitor-General, Ross W. Bergethon, Deputy Solicitor-General, for Appellee.

Ellington, Justice.

After the Georgia Board of Public Safety ("the Board") denied Rick Allen Kuhlman's application for relief from the prohibition on the possession of firearms by convicted felons in OCGA § 16-11-131, Kuhlman sued the State of Georgia in the Superior Court of Fulton County, seeking a declaratory judgment "that he qualifies for relief" from that prohibition pursuant to subsection (d) of the statute. His complaint, as amended, also included claims that the statute, as applied to him, violated his right to bear arms under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section I, Paragraph VIII of the Georgia Constitution of 1983. The superior court granted summary judgment to the State on all claims. In its order, the court ruled that Kuhlman's statutory claim was barred by sovereign immunity, that he could not maintain his federal constitutional claim, and that OCGA § 16-11-131 did not violate the state Constitution. Nevertheless, the superior court went on to rule in the alternative on the merits of Kuhlman's statutory claim, but it failed to reach the merits of his federal constitutional claim. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the portion of the superior court's judgment that is based on sovereign immunity, we affirm the court's alternative ruling on the merits of Kuhlman's statutory claim, we vacate the portion of the judgment that relates to Kuhlman's constitutional claims, and we remand the case to the superior court for reconsideration of Kuhlman's constitutional claims consistent with this opinion.

1. In 2011, Kuhlman pled guilty in federal court to one count of health care fraud under 18 USC § 1347. In 2014, he was sentenced to 30 months in prison followed by three years of extended supervision that was terminated early in February 2019. In 2021, Kuhlman applied to the Board for relief pursuant to subsection (d) of OCGA § 16-11-131. Under that subsection, a person who has been convicted of a "felony pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, or restraint of trade" may apply to the Board for "relief from the disabilities imposed by this Code section." OCGA § 16-11-131 (d). ¹ See also Ferguson v. Perry , 292 Ga. 666, 673 (2) (c), 740 S.E.2d 598 (2013) (recognizing that "when a citizen is precluded by law from possessing firearms as a consequence of his felony conviction, he suffers a ‘disability imposed by law,’ " that "the Georgia statutes that prohibit convicted felons ... from possessing firearms ... are disabilities imposed by state law," and that "in OCGA § 16-11-131 the General Assembly described statutory prohibitions against possessing firearms in just these terms"). The Board denied Kuhlman's application, "determin[ing] that [his] application for [relief from] [d]isabilities pursuant to OCGA § 16-11-131 does not qualify for the relief sought."

A week later, Kuhlman filed his action for declaratory relief, seeking a declaration that his "conviction pertained to antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, or restraint of trade and therefore qualifies for relief under OCGA § 16-11-131 (d)." The superior court denied the State's motion to dismiss Kuhlman's complaint, and Kuhlman amended his complaint to also seek declarations that " OCGA § 16-11-131 is unconstitutional as applied to him to the extent it prohibits his possession of firearms," under both the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section I, Paragraph VIII of the Georgia Constitution of 1983.

In its order granting the State's motion for summary judgment, the superior court ruled that "[s]overeign immunity bars [Kuhlman's] claim for a declaration as to the nature of his conviction"; that "[e]ven if not barred by sovereign immunity, [Kuhlman] is not entitled to a declaration that his conviction qualifies for relief pursuant to OCGA § 16-11-131 (d)"; that Kuhlman's "federal claim cannot be maintained because the State of Georgia is not a person for purposes of 42 USC § 1983"; and that " OCGA § 16-11-131 does not violate the Georgia Constitution." This Court granted Kuhlman's application for discretionary appeal to consider whether the superior court erred when it ruled that, because "[f]ederal constitutional claims, whether in federal or state courts, are necessarily brought pursuant to 42 USC § 1983" and a state is not a "person" subject to suit under that statute, Kuhlman "cannot maintain his federal constitutional claim against the State of Georgia."

2. We turn first to Kuhlman's contention that the superior court erred by ruling that sovereign immunity barred his statutory claim. ²

Article I, Section II, Paragraph V (b) (1) of the Georgia Constitution of 1983 waives sovereign immunity for certain actions seeking declaratory relief for alleged "acts" of state boards (as well as many other types of governmental entities, officials, and employees) that are "outside the scope of lawful authority or in violation of the laws or the Constitution of this state or the Constitution of the United States." ³ In this case, Kuhlman claims that the Board's "act" of denying his application for relief under OCGA § 16-11-131 (d) was "in violation of" the following: the laws of this State – OCGA § 16-11-131 (d) ; the Constitution of this State – Article I, Section I, Paragraph VIII ; and the Constitution of the United States – the Second Amendment. The first of these claims seeks a declaration that the Board's decision that Kuhlman failed to qualify for relief was contrary to the law, specifically that his felony conviction pertained to "antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, or restraint of trade" and consequently qualifies for relief under OCGA § 16-11-131 (d). ⁴ For this reason, Kuhlman's statutory claim is a claim that the Board's act of denying his application was "in violation of the laws ... of this state," and that claim therefore comes within the constitutional waiver of sovereign immunity in Article I, Section II, Paragraph V (b) (1). ⁵ Accordingly, the portion of the superior court's judgment based on sovereign immunity must be reversed.

3. Having made the necessary threshold determination that sovereign immunity does not bar Kuhlman's statutory claim, we next consider the superior court's ruling on the merits of that claim. ⁶ In the absence of any Georgia case law construing OCGA § 16-11-131 (d), the superior court looked to federal case law interpreting a broader exclusion from the federal statutory law that prohibits felons from possessing firearms. Kuhlman argues only that his conviction for health care fraud meets the test used in federal case law for determining whether a crime comes within the federal exclusion.

When interpreting a Georgia statute, federal court decisions construing a federal statute or rule have persuasive value only to the extent that the language and context of the Georgia statute at issue are materially similar to the federal statute or rule. See General Motors, LLC v. Buchanan , 313 Ga. 811, 821 (2) (c), 874 S.E.2d 52 (2022) ("[W]here the language of a Georgia statute deviates from the federal rules [of evidence], the persuasive value of the authority interpreting and applying the federal rules is diminished."); Stubbs v. Hall , 308 Ga. 354, 358 (3) (a), 840 S.E.2d 407 (2020) ("In construing a Georgia statute that closely tracks federal statutory law, we may look to federal court decisions and commentary interpreting the federal statute as persuasive authority." (citation and punctuation omitted)); Community & Southern Bank v. Lovell , 302 Ga. 375, 377 (2) n.6, 807 S.E.2d 444 (2017) ("[A]lthough there are some differences between the state and federal provisions, those differences are not material to the question presented here. We may, therefore, look for guidance in decisions of the federal courts."). See also Buckner-Webb v. State , 314 Ga. 823, 834 (1), 878 S.E.2d 481 (2022) (Pinson, J., concurring) ("[W]hen we need to figure out the meaning of Georgia law, decisions of federal courts ... are helpful ‘only to the extent that [those] decisions actually were guided by the same language, history, and context’ of the Georgia law in question. When we rely on such federal decisions without making sure the relevant text and context match up, we risk giving an ‘interpretation’ of Georgia law that is arbitrary, wrong, or both." (quoting Elliott v. State , 305 Ga. 179, 188 (II) (C), 824 S.E.2d 265 (2019) )).

The federal statute that contains language similar to OCGA § 16-11-131 (d) was part of the Gun Control Act of 1968 and, as originally enacted, excluded the following from the felonies that disqualified convicted persons from acquiring or possessing firearms: "Federal or State offenses pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, restraints of trade, or other similar offenses relating to the regulation of business practices as the Secretary [of the Treasury] may by regulation designate." Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 921 (a) (20) (A), 82 Stat. 1213, 1216 (1968). See also Reyes v. Sessions , 342 F.Supp.3d 141, 143 (I) (D. D.C. 2018) (recounting and explaining the history of that provision). "Ultimately, the Secretary never designated any ‘similar offenses’ as excluded, and in 1986 Congress eliminated from the definition the phrase, ‘as the Secretary may by regulation designate[.]’ " Reyes , 342 F.Supp.3d at 143 (I). Thus, since 1986, the...