Kuhstoss v. Steele

234 A.3d 789

Barry O. KUHSTOSS, Appellant

v.Donald R. STEELE, Sara Jane Steele, and James K. Steele t/a Steele's Lumber Company And Richard Steele a/k/a Rick Steele

No. 1092 WDA 2019

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted February 3, 2020

Filed June 25, 2020

John M. Sharpe V, Chambersburg, for appellant.

Jon A. Barkman, Somerset, for appellees.

BEFORE: OLSON, J., McCAFFERY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

OPINION BY MUSMANNO, J.:

Barry O. Kuhstoss ("Kuhstoss") appeals from the Order granting the Motion for Injunctive Order filed by Donald R. Steele, Sara Jane Steele, and James K. Steele, T/A Steele's Lumber Company, and Richard Steele, a/k/a Rick Steele (collectively, "the Steeles"), regarding a prescriptive easement over Kuhstoss's property. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.¹

This case involves a years-long dispute over the use of a private dirt right-of-way (the "Hunting Road") that runs through real property owned by the parties, who own adjacent parcels in rural Bedford County.

Kuhstoss acquired his property (the "Kuhstoss Property") from his parents in October 1987. Kuhstoss primarily uses the Kuhstoss Property for residential purposes. The Kuhstoss Property contains various residential and agricultural buildings, and includes a mixture of open fields and woodlands. The Steeles have owned their property (the "Steele Property") since 1963, which is located roughly north of the Kuhstoss Property. The Steeles currently use the Steele Property exclusively for hunting and recreational use. The Steele Property is primarily woodlands, and contains no buildings or other improvements.

The Hunting Road is accessed from Sherman's Valley Road in Broad Top Township, Bedford County, and traverses several thousand feet north, through woodlands on the Kuhstoss Property, before reaching the Steele Property. Though the deed history for the Kuhstoss Property does not contain express written permission for the Steeles to use the Hunting Road, the Steeles have used the Hunting Road as their primary means to access the Steele Property for more than fifty years.² The Steeles typically use the Hunting Road several times throughout the year to hunt on the Steele Property, and primarily drive on the Hunting Road using their personal vehicles. On occasion, the Steeles have performed maintenance and repairs to the Hunting Road.

In 1992, Kuhstoss erected and placed a cable across the Hunting Road to block outside vehicular access. The cable was not locked, and the Steeles were able to remove the cable from the Hunting Road to access the Steele Property with their vehicles. In July 2012, Kuhstoss installed a gate, locked with a chain, blocking vehicular access to the Hunting Road. However, the Steeles would cut the chain and open the gate in order to use their vehicles to access the Steele Property. In the years that followed, the Steeles sought to reach an amicable solution with Kuhstoss, so that the Steeles could access the Steele Property with their vehicles via the Hunting Road. However, the parties could not come to an agreement.

On December 1, 2014, Kuhstoss filed a Complaint to Quiet Title. In the Complaint, Kuhstoss argued that the Steeles did not possess a right-of-way over the Hunting Road because the Steeles were not expressly granted a right-of-way for the Hunting Road; an alternative right-of-way existed for the Steeles to access the Steele Property; and the Pennsylvania Unenclosed Woodlands Act³ precluded the Steeles from acquiring a prescriptive easement. Complaint, 12/1/14, at ¶¶ 38-57. The Steeles filed an Answer, arguing that they were entitled to a prescriptive easement based on their long history of using the Hunting Road with Kuhstoss's knowledge, and the unavailability of the alternative right-of-way due to the bridge washing out several decades ago, where the construction of a new bridge would be impracticable. Answer and New Matter, 6/23/15, at ¶¶ 31, 46-57. The Steeles also filed an Ejectment Counterclaim, seeking to formally recognize a prescriptive easement based on the lack of a viable alternative right-of-way; their continuous, visible, open, and notorious usage of the Hunting Road for more than 21 years; and their occasional improvement of the Hunting Road. Ejectment Counterclaim, 6/23/15, at ¶¶ 3-5. Kuhstoss filed an Answer with New Matter. The Steeles filed an Answer to the New Matter, and, on May 28, 2019, the Steeles filed a Motion for Injunctive Order for Special Relief Pending Litigation.⁴ The Motion sought to remove the felled trees, and permit the Steeles to access the Hunting Road until the underlying issues were resolved.

The trial court conducted a hearing on the Motion for Injunctive Order on June 26, 2019. At the hearing, Richard and James Steele testified as to the character of the two properties, the history of the relationship between the two families, and their account of the dispute over the Hunting Road. See N.T., 6/26/19, at 7-51. Kuhstoss did not testify, but presented a series of exhibits purporting to demonstrate that the Hunting Road passed through unenclosed woodlands. Following the hearing, the trial court entered an Order granting the Steeles’ Motion for Injunctive Relief, prohibiting Kuhstoss from infringing on the Steeles' use of the Hunting Road, with limitations, and requiring the Steeles to be responsible for removing the felled trees that were blocking the Hunting Road. Trial Court Order, 6/26/19, at 1-2. Kuhstoss timely filed a Notice of Appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal.

Kuhstoss raises the following questions for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred in granting a preliminary injunction based on a prescriptive easement, where the purported right[-]of[-]way sought by prescription passes through unenclosed woodlands, which is a bar to the acquisition of a prescriptive easement under [the Pennsylvania Unenclosed Woodlands Act,] and where an unlocked cable across a road, and a seven-year[-]old locked gate do constitute an "[e]nclosure" within the meaning of the statute[?]

2. Whether the trial court erred in using equitable principles alone when granting [the Steeles] a preliminary injunction, where the [the Steeles] failed to show that their right of relief was clear and where [they] were not likely to prevail on the merits[?]

Brief for Appellant at 4.

Our standard of review over a trial court's grant of a preliminary injunction is well settled.

[I]n general, appellate inquiry is limited to a determination of whether an examination of the record reveals that any apparently reasonable grounds support the trial court's disposition of the preliminary injunction request. In ruling on a preliminary injunction request, a trial court has "apparently reasonable grounds" for its denial of relief where it properly finds that any one of the following "essential prerequisites" for a preliminary injunction is not satisfied. First, a party seeking a preliminary injunction must show that an injunction is necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable harm that cannot be adequately compensated by damages. Second, the party must show that greater injury would result from refusing an injunction than from granting it and, concomitantly, that issuance of an injunction will not substantially harm other interested parties in the proceedings. Third, the party must show that a preliminary injunction will properly restore the parties to their status as it existed immediately prior to the alleged wrongful conduct. Fourth, the party seeking the injunction must show that the activity it seeks to restrain is actionable, that its right to relief is clear, and that the wrong is manifest, or, in other words, must show that it is likely to prevail on the merits. Fifth, the party must show that the injunction it seeks is reasonably suited to abate the offending activity. Sixth and finally, the party seeking an injunction must show that a preliminary injunction will not adversely affect the public interest.

Summit Towne Ctr., Inc. v. Shoe Show of Rocky Mount, Inc. , 573 Pa. 637, 828 A.2d 995, 1001 (2003) (paragraph breaks, citations, footnote, and some quotation marks omitted).

We will address Kuhstoss's issues together, as they both challenge the trial court's determination that the Steeles are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim of a prescriptive easement. Brief for Appellant at 8. Kuhstoss argues that the Unenclosed Woodlands Act bars the Steeles from acquiring a prescriptive easement, because the Hunting Road travels through "unenclosed woodlands." Id. at 11-12. Kuhstoss argues that the trial court improperly determined that the gate restricting access to the Hunting Road could constitute an "enclosure" under the statute. Id. at 10-12. Finally, Kuhstoss argues that equitable considerations are not sufficient to grant a prescriptive easement without the moving party fulfilling all of the factors necessary for acquiring the easement. Id. at 13. In support of this contention, Kuhstoss points to the trial court's statement that the Steeles' argument on the merits was "highly questionable" but, regardless, the court entered the Order granting the Steeles' request. Id. at 14-15.

Under common law, a party may generally acquire a prescriptive easement through the property of another party by proving adverse, open, notorious, continuous, and uninterrupted use of the easement for a period of 21 years. Williams v. Taylor , 188 A.3d 447, 451 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citing PA Energy Vision, LLC v. South Avis Realty, Inc. , 120 A.3d 1008, 1014 (Pa. Super. 2015) ). In 1850, the General Assembly passed the Unenclosed Woodlands Act, which barred the acquisition of prescriptive easements that pass through "unenclosed woodlands." The Unenclosed Woodlands Act provides that

[n]o right of way shall be hereafter acquired by user, where such way passes through un[e]nclosed woodland; but on clearing such woodland, the owner or owners thereof shall be at liberty

...