L.B. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.

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L.B., individually and on behalf of her child, E.B a minor, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Defendant.

No. 21-CV-1033 (VEC)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

March 8, 2022

OPINION & ORDER

VALERIE CAPRONI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

L.B the mother of E.B., a child with disabilities, has sued the New York City Department of Education (the “DOE”) pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). The parties have cross-moved for summary judgment on the applicability of the IDEA statute of limitations to Plaintiff's claims for tuition reimbursement for part of the 2017- 2018 school year.^[1] For the reasons that follow Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part and Defendant's cross-motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

At all times relevant, E.B. was a teenaged female who qualified for special education services. Compl., Dkt. 9 ¶¶ 16-18. Both parties agree that E.B. is disabled and that she qualified for residential placement under the statute. Pl. Mem. of Law, Dkt. 19 at 1; Def. Mem. of Law, Dkt. 21 at 4; SRO Decision, Dkt. 24-1 at 7.

On February 22, 2016, the DOE's Committee on Special Education (“CSE”) held an annual review to develop E.B.'s individualized education plan (“IEP”) for the 2016-2017 school year. DOE Br. to IHO, Dkt. 24-3 at 38.^[2] On June 23, 2016, the DOE sent L.B. written notice of E.B.'s IEP for the 2016-2017 school year, and soon thereafter, on July 28, 2016, the DOE sent her a school location letter and offer of placement. Id. at 39. During the 2016-2017 school year, E.B. attended New Leaf Academy (“New Leaf”), a full time, private therapeutic boarding school located in Bend, Oregon. New Leaf Letter, Dkt. 24-5 at 34. Although an annual review of E.B.'s IEP was scheduled for February 19, 2017, that meeting never occurred. DOE Br. to IHO at 38; SRO Decision at 16.

The CSE never contacted L.B. to schedule an annual review of E.B.'s IEP for the 2017- 2018 school year. First Due Process Compl. (“DPC I”), Dkt. 24-3 at 45. The CSE also did not provide L.B. with prior written notice of E.B.'s IEP, or lack thereof, for the 2017-2018 school year, and it failed to send a school location letter with an offer of placement for E.B as it had the year before.^[3] Id. On June 20, 2017, L.B. notified the CSE that she would be keeping E.B. at New Leaf for the 2017-2018 school year and that she was seeking tuition reimbursement. Id. On June 28, 2017, L.B. filed a due process complaint with the Impartial Hearing Office of the DOE, alleging that the DOE had denied E.B. a Free Appropriate Public Education (“FAPE”) for the 2017-2018 school year and requesting tuition reimbursement for tuition at New Leaf.^[4] See id. at 44-47.

On August 23, 2017, L.B. filed a ten-day notice letter with the CSE, alleging that it had failed to hold an annual review, develop an IEP, or make a program recommendation for E.B. for the 2017-2018 school year. Ten Day Letter, Dkt. 24-3 at 76. The letter stated that L.B. was “left with no alternative but to unilaterally place [E.B.] at the Grier School in Pennsylvania for the 2017-2018 school year, ” and that she had already signed a contract with the Grier School (“Grier”).^[5] Id. In fact, E.B.'s father had signed an enrollment contract with Grier for the 2017- 2018 school year on March 17, 2017, and he made a non-refundable $5, 000 deposit to Grier on that date. Grier Enrollment Contract, Dkt. 24-6 at 51-52.^[6] The DOE did not respond to the mother's ten-day letter. Pl. Mem. of Law at 2.

E.B. was subsequently enrolled at Grier, where she remained from September 5, 2017, to January 2018. Id. at 2; Amend. DPC I, Dkt. 24-3 at 52. In January 2018, E.B. transferred from Grier to the Solebury School (“Solebury”), where she remained for the balance of the 2017- 2018, 2018-2019, and 2019-2020 school years.^[7] Pl. Mem. of Law at 2.

L.B. withdrew DPC I on June 28, 2018, see DOE Br. to IHO at 33, but she filed a second due process complaint (“DPC II”) soon thereafter, setting forth substantially the same allegations, see Pl. Second Due Process Compl. (“DPC II”), Dkt. 24-3 at 57-60. On September 3, 2019, L.B. filed a third due process complaint (“DPC III”), alleging that the DOE had denied E.B. a FAPE for the 2017-2018, 2018-2019, and 2019-2020 school years and seeking reimbursement of tuition for E.B.'s placement at Grier from September 2017 to January 2018 and at Solebury from January 2018 onward. Pl. Third Due Process Compl. (“DPC III”), Dkt. 24-3 at 61-73.^[8] The DOE never answered DPC III. IHO Decision, Dkt. 24-3 at 6. DPC III is the due process complaint that is at issue in this lawsuit.

The DOE moved to dismiss L.B.'s claims for the 2017-2018 school year, arguing that the complaint was filed outside IDEA's two-year statute of limitations. Pl. Mem. of Law at 2. The IHO denied the motion to dismiss in a one-page decision, stating without explanation that because the 2017-2018 school year began on September 5, 2017, and because the due process complaint was filed on September 3, 2019, the complaint was filed within the statute of limitations. IHO Decision on Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. 24-3 at 1. At the hearing on the merits, the DOE did not contest that E.B. had been denied a FAPE for the three school years in question. IHO Decision at 6. As a result, the IHO found in favor of Plaintiff on all claims and ordered the DOE to reimburse L.B. for the entirety of E.B.'s tuition for the 2017-2018, 2018-2019, and 2019-2020 school years. Id. at 23.

The DOE appealed to the New York State Review Officer (“SRO”), challenging only the IHO decision that found L.B.'s claims for the 2017-2018 school year timely. Pl. Mem. of Law at 3. In a decision dated October 5, 2020, the SRO found that L.B.'s claims related to the 2017- 2018 school year were barred by the two-year statute of limitations. SRO Decision at 21. Accordingly, the SRO reversed the IHO decision granting L.B. tuition reimbursement for September 2017 to January 2018. Id. Because the DOE had not appealed the IHO's award for reimbursement of tuition at Solebury from January 2018 onward, the SRO treated that portion of the IHO decision as final and binding. Id. at 13.

On February 4, 2021, L.B. filed this lawsuit to appeal the SRO decision denying tuition reimbursement for the period of September 2017 to January 2018.^[9] Compl. ¶ 3. In her complaint, L.B. asserts that her claim for the 2017-2018 school year is not barred by the statute of limitations and argues that she is entitled to “prevailing party” status and repayment of her attorney's fees and costs with respect to her claims for the 2017-2018, 2018-2019, and 2019- 2020 school years. Id. at ¶¶ 43- 47. On July 16, 2021, L.B. moved for judgment on the administrative record. Not. of Mot., Dkt. 18. On August 13, 2021, the DOE cross-moved for summary judgment. Not. of Mot., Dkt. 20.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

“In considering an IDEA claim, a district court ‘must engage in an independent review of the administrative record and make a determination based on a preponderance of the evidence.'” C.L. v. Scarsdale Union Free Sch. Dist., 744 F.3d 826, 837-38 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir. 2007)). In undertaking this independent review, courts are “restrained by our lack of specialized knowledge and educational expertise; we must defer to the administrative decision particularly where the state officer's review has been thorough and careful.” M.W. ex rel. S.W. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 725 F.3d 131, 138-39 (2d Cir. 2013) (cleaned up); see also M.O. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 793 F.3d 236, 243 (2d Cir. 2015) (“While the district court must base its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, it must give due weight to the administrative proceedings, mindful that the judiciary generally lacks the specialized knowledge and experience necessary to resolve persistent and difficult questions of educational policy.” (cleaned up)).

Two factors guide the level of deference owed to the administrative opinions: “the quality of the [administrative] opinion and the court's institutional competence.” C.F. ex rel. R.F. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 746 F.3d 68, 77 (2d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). To determine whether the SRO's review has been appropriately thorough and careful, “courts must look to the factors that normally determine whether any particular judgment is persuasive, for example, whether the decision being reviewed is well-reasoned, and whether it was based on substantially greater familiarity with the evidence and the witnesses than the reviewing court.” M.W., 725 F.3d at 139 (internal quotations omitted); M.O., 793 F.3d at 243 (quoting R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 184) (“Deference is particularly appropriate when the state officer's review ‘has been thorough and careful,' but still we do not ‘simply rubber stamp administrative decisions.'”). The “institutional competence” question hinges on whether a matter involves “‘persistent and difficult questions of educational policy, '” C.L., 744 F.3d at 838 (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 208 (1982)), or “‘issues of law,' such as ‘the proper interpretation of the federal statute and its requirements, '” Lillbask ex rel. Mauclaire v. State of Conn. Dep't of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Mrs. B. v. Milford Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 1114, 1122 (2d Cir. 1997) (alteration omitted)). “[A]s a general matter, when an IHO and SRO reach conflicting conclusions, [courts should] defer to the final decision of the state authorities, that is, the SRO's decision” unless the SRO's decision “is insufficiently reasoned to merit that deference and the IHO's decision is...