L.J.P. v. Minn. Dep't of Health

L.J.P., Relator, v. Minnesota Department of Health, Respondent.

A20-1433

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS

May 24, 2021

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

Affirmed

Cleary, Judge^*

Minnesota Department of Health

Background Study No. 2278064

L.J.P., Pennock, Minnesota (pro se relator)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Lindsay K. Strauss, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Cleary, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

CLEARY, Judge

In this certiorari appeal, relator L.J.P. challenges Minnesota Department of Health's (MDH) decision on reconsideration to disqualify her from employment as a healthcare professional, arguing that she does not "pose a risk of harm" to vulnerable persons. Because relator has not shown that MDH's conclusion that she poses a risk of harm was arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise erroneous, we affirm.

FACTS

In August 2020, relator received notice that she was disqualified from any employment that requires licensure by MDH. The disqualification decision, made by MDH, stemmed from a background study conducted by the Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS) under the Background Studies Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 245C.01-.34 (2020).¹ The background study on relator revealed three misdemeanor-theft convictions, see Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subds. 2(a)(1) (2012), 3(5) (2018), from January 2020, March 2014, and January 2013. As a result, relator was terminated from her position as a certified medical assistant.

One month later, relator requested reconsideration of MDH's decision and that the disqualification be set aside, claiming that she does not pose a risk of harm to patients.Upon reconsideration, MDH concluded that relator "failed to show that [she] does not pose a risk of harm" to patients, denied the request, and declined to set aside the disqualification.

This certiorari appeal followed.

DECISION

Relator argues that MDH's disqualification decision should have been set aside because she presents no risk of harm to the patients she cares for in her employment within the healthcare field. Before turning to relator's arguments, we first discuss the Background Studies Act and the legal framework governing MDH's decision to deny relator's request to set aside the disqualification.

Disqualification under the Background Studies Act

Minnesota law requires performance of background studies on certain individuals seeking employment that requires licensure by MDH or DHS, chiefly in healthcare, childcare, and related fields. See Minn. Stat. §§ 245C.02, subd. 12 (defining "license"), .03 (specifying individuals to be studied), 245A.03² (explaining who must be licensed) (2020). When a studied individual has been convicted of certain qualifying criminal offenses, that individual is per se disqualified from maintaining employment that requires such licensure. Minn. Stat. §§ 245C.14, subds. 1(1), 2 (explaining when an individual is disqualified from direct contact with and access to persons receiving services from the license holder), .15, subd. 4(a) (providing for a seven-year disqualification for various criminal convictions).

A disqualified person may seek to have their disqualification set aside by timely requesting reconsideration. Minn. Stat. § 245C.21, subds. 1, 3. If the studied individual submits sufficient information to show that they do not pose a risk of harm to the persons served in the course of their employment, MDH is afforded the discretion to set aside a disqualification. Minn. Stat. § 245C.22, subd. 4(a). The legislature has enumerated nine statutory factors to guide this inquiry:

(1) the nature, severity, and consequences of the event or events that led to the disqualification;

(2) whether there is more than one disqualifying event;

(3) the age and vulnerability of the victim at the time of the event;

(4) the harm suffered by the victim;

(5) vulnerability of persons served by the program;

(6) the similarity between the victim and persons served by the program;

(7) the time elapsed without a repeat of the same or similar event;

(8) documentation of successful completion by the individual studied of training or rehabilitation pertinent to the event; and

(9) any other information relevant to reconsideration.

Id., subd. 4(b). "[A]ny single factor . . . may be determinative of [MDH's] decision whether to set aside the individual's disqualification." Id., subd. 3.

Standard of Review

We have appellate jurisdiction to review MDH's decision, which is considered a "quasi-judicial" decision, through a petition for certiorari. Jackson v. Comm'r of Human Servs., 933 N.W.2d 408, 413 (Minn. 2019); see Minn. Stat. § 606.01, .06 (2020). We examine a quasi-judicial decision of this sort to determine whether the agency's decision was "arbitrary, oppressive, unreasonable, fraudulent, under an erroneous theory of law, orwithout any evidence to support it." Jackson, 933 N.W.2d at 413 (quotation omitted). An agency's decision will generally be upheld unless shown to be "arbitrary and capricious," lacking the support of substantial evidence, or otherwise erroneous. Wilhite v. Scott Cty. Hous. & Redevelopment Auth., 759 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Minn. App. 2009); see also Citizens Advocating Responsible Dev. v. Kandiyohi Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 713 N.W.2d 817, 832 (Minn. 2006) ("Agency decisions are reversed when they reflect an error of law, the findings are arbitrary and capricious, or the findings are unsupported by substantial evidence.").

With this framework in mind, we now turn our attention to relator's arguments.

Relator's Risk of Harm

The sole issue in this appeal is whether MDH's quasi-judicial determination that relator poses a risk of harm to patients was arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise erroneous in terms of the facts or the law. Agency rulings are arbitrary and capricious if the agency:

(a) relied on factors not intended by the legislature; (b) entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem; (c) offered an explanation that runs counter to the evidence; or (d) the decision is so implausible that it could not be explained as a difference in view or the result of the agency's expertise.

Id. Moreover, substantial evidence supports an agency's decision "if it is supported by such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion." Minn. Ctr. for Envtl. Advocacy v. Minn. Pollution Control Agency, 644 N.W.2d 457, 468 (Minn. 2002).

Here, MDH determined that relator was disqualified from maintaining her employment in the healthcare field because of her three misdemeanor-theft convictions.See Minn. Stat. § 245C.15, subd. 4(a) (prescribing seven-year disqualification for, among other crimes, misdemeanor theft in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.52 (2018)). In support of that decision, MDH considered each of the nine statutory factors and found that they established that relator poses a risk of harm to patients in her role as a certified medical assistant. We consider each of the nine factors in turn.

Factor one considers "the nature, severity, and consequences" of the events that led to relator's disqualification. Minn. Stat. § 245C.22, subd. 4(b)(1). In denying relator's set-aside request, MDH stated, "In all of your offenses, you stole from retail stores." Relator shares in her brief that she understands the nature and impact of her actions, but she does not directly challenge this factor. MDH reasserts here that the nature and relative recentness of relator's offenses amply demonstrates that relator poses a risk of harm to patients because these circumstances raise concern that she might steal from patients or exercise poor judgment while patients are in her care.

Because the record confirms that relator has several misdemeanor-theft convictions, including the third January 2020 conviction, MDH's concern—that relator's criminal conduct exhibits a risk that she might exploit patients or exercise poor judgment while patients are in her care—is not unreasonable. Thus, given the rational connection between the facts and the agency's decision, MDH's reasoning is neither arbitrary nor capricious and its determination is supported by substantial evidence. See In re Review of 2005 Annual Automatic Adjustment of Charges for All Elec. & Gas Utils., 768 N.W.2d 112, 120 (Minn. 2009).

The second factor regards the number of disqualifying events underlying MDH's decision. See Minn. Stat. § 245C.22, subd. 4(b)(2). MDH found on reconsideration, and relator concedes here, that she has "a pattern of theft offenses" based on her three theft convictions. Because even one such conviction is alone disqualifying, there is substantial evidence supporting MDH's determination that three theft offenses establish a pattern of criminality. Minn. Stat. § 245C.15, subd. 4(a). We discern no arbitrary or capricious decision-making on MDH's part in relation to the second factor.

Factor three relates to the age and vulnerability of the victims, and factor four considers any harm they suffered. Minn. Stat. § 245C.22, subd. 4(b)(3), (4). On reconsideration, MDH acknowledged that relator's victims were businesses that suffered financial harm because of relator's theft crimes. And relator again concedes this fact to be true in her brief. But she urges that she only steals or breaks the law while "high" on drugs and she insists that she has never harmed or stolen from another person. In response, MDH argues that relator "seems to minimize her culpability" through her assertions that her substance use led to her offenses and that the affected businesses were able recoup their losses at the time of each offense.

Relator's assertions are unpersuasive because, despite her justification, she has not shown that MDH's consideration of the third and fourth factors was arbitrary or capricious or otherwise unsupported by substantial evidence. See Citizens Advocating Responsible...