L. K. v. K. K.

318 A.3d 243

226 Conn.App. 279

L. K.

v.K. K.^*

(AC 45849)

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued January 11, 2024

Officially Released June 18, 2024

William W. Taylor, Westport, with whom, on the brief, was K. K., self-represented, for the appellant (defendant).

Igor G. Kuperman, Stamford, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Clark, Seeley and Palmer, Js.

SEELEY, J.

₂₈₀In this postjudgment dissolution matter, the defendant, K. K.,¹ appeals challenging the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to modify the amount of unallocated alimony and child support that he is obligated to pay to the plaintiff, L. K. On appeal, the defendant raises various claims concerning the denial of his motion to modify, which we distill to the following: (1) the court, in its written order denying the motion to modify, improperly failed to address the defendant’s ₂₈₁claim that a reduction in the child support component of the unallocated order was warranted due to the fact that one of the parties’ three children had reached the age of majority, and (2) the court abused its discretion in denying the motion to modify by ignoring the tax returns, financial statements and other financial documents that had been submitted into evidence.² We disagree and affirm the judgment of the court.

The following facts and procedural history guide our resolution of this appeal. The plaintiff and the defendant were married on July 19, 1997, and they have three children together. Their marriage was dissolved by a judgment dated June 21, 2016. Pursuant to that judgment, the defendant was ordered to pay unallocated alimony and support to the plaintiff in the amount of $12,500 per month "until the death of either party, the plaintiff's remarriage, or November 3, 2025, whichever [occurred] first," and the duration and amount to be paid were nonmodifiable by either party. In making that order, the court indicated that it was deviating from the presumptive support amount set forth in the child support guidelines "based on the extraordinary disparity in income and the provision of alimony."

The defendant appealed from the dissolution judgment to this court, arguing, inter alia, that the court’s ₂₈₂order for the payment of nonmodifiable, unallocated alimony and child support constituted an abuse of its discretion in that it precluded reductions based on each child attaining the age of majority. This court agreed, concluding in the prior appeal³ that the trial court abused its discretion in making its order of unallocated alimony and child support nonmodifiable as to term and amount.⁴ Therefore, the judgment was reversed only as to the financial orders and the case was remanded for further proceedings.

Following the remand order from this court, the trial court scheduled a hearing for May 2 and 3, 2019, to address the financial issues. On May 2, the first day scheduled for the hearing, the parties entered into a written agreement that resolved the financial issues. The agreement provided in relevant part: "The [defendant] will continue to pay unallocated alimony and child support with the next payment beginning on May 23, 2019, in the amount of [$12,500] monthly for a period of three years. … After three years, he will pay unallocated child support and alimony at the rate of [$7500] per month or until their youngest son is eighteen years old (last payment to be made on October 23, 2025)." The agreement incorporated other provisions from the June 21, 2016 dissolution judgment and provided that "[a]ll other orders not incorporated in this agreement from the June 21, 2016 [dissolution judgment] shall remain null and void." (Emphasis omitted.) The agreement further provides: "The parties have entered into ₂₈₃this agreement freely and voluntarily; [t]he parties find this agreement to be fair and equitable under the circumstances; [and] [t]he parties find this agreement to be in the best interests of their minor children." The court approved the agreement, which was made an order of the court.

On January 22, 2020, the plaintiff filed a motion for contempt, claiming that the defendant was late in making two payments and that he also had failed to pay 50 percent of all unreimbursed medical expenses for the children, as required by their agreement.⁵ The next day, January 23, 2020, the defendant filed the motion to modify that is the subject of this appeal— motion number 432 on the trial court docket (motion to modify 432)—seeking a modification of his unallocated alimony and child support obligation based on a substantial change in circumstances. The defendant filed the motion in a self-represented capacity by filling out a court form. On the form, he checked the box indicating a substantial change in circumstances, with a handwritten notation stating, "[i]n addition to the attach[ed], the motion of contempt in reference to taxes paid on unallocated alimony [and] child support need[s] to be addressed." He also checked the boxes indicating that he was seeking an increase and decrease in child support, as well as a decrease in alimony. Attached to the form is a written motion, which sets forth the following reasons why the defendant was seeking a modification of his unallocated alimony and child support obligation: (1) "Business partner/producer, George Goettlemann, has called the sale of his original book of business"; (2) "Technology upgrades [related to the defendant’s business] had to be made immediately. All computers ₂₈₄are not supported by Microsoft 2007 and had to be upgraded to Microsoft 2010. As well as scanner and software upgrades. Total estimates $25,000"; (3) "Business debt needs to be paid. It has been accruing interest"; (4) "My staff has been completely overworked since 2014. Contingency compensation has decreased 37.5 [percent] among main employees. They are asking for salary increases and better benefits. We need to hire additional employees to relieve workload"; (5) "My personal income has declined"; (6) "We have outstanding fiduciary accounts who have defaulted on premium payments, totaling $30,000 in 2019"; (7) "My credit has been ruined, due [to] the plaintiff not paying the mortgage on the [marital] home … for [seventeen] months"; and (8) "My personal reputation has been defamed and ruined in conjunction with the plaintiff … using numerous protective order [statutes] and creating false allegations that were subsequently published on the Internet. Moreover, this has directly affected my business …. " A remote hearing on the plaintiff's motions for contempt and the defendant’s motion to modify his unallocated alimony and child support obligation commenced on April 8, 2021. The hearing continued, in person, on two more dates—March 17 and April 29, 2022, after which the parties filed simultaneous posthearing briefs on May 31, 2022, as ordered by the court. In a written order dated July 1, 2022, the court denied the defendant’s motion to modify and granted in part the plaintiff's motions for contempt. Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion to reargue and reconsider, which the court denied on August 11, 2022. The defendant subsequently filed a second motion to reargue and reconsider, which the court also denied. This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

[1–5] ₂₈₅Before we address the defendant’s claims on appeal, we set forth our well established standard of review in family matters. We review the trial court’s judgment denying the defendant’s motion to modify his unallocated alimony and child support obligation under an abuse of discretion standard. See Berman v. Berman, 203 Conn. App. 300, 303, 248 A.3d 49 (2021). "An appellate court will not disturb a trial court’s orders in domestic relations cases unless the court has abused its discretion or it is found that it could not reasonably conclude as it did, based on the facts presented. … In determining whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action, … Appellate review of a trial court’s findings of fact is governed by the clearly erroneous standard of review. The trial court’s findings are binding upon this court unless they are clearly erroneous in light of the evidence and the pleadings in the record as a whole. … A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it … or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. … Therefore, to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion, we must find that the court either incorrectly applied the law or could not reasonably conclude as it did." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) De Almeida-Kennedy v. Kennedy, 224 Conn. App. 19, 29-30, 312 A.3d 150 (2024).

[6–8] "General Statutes § 46b-86 governs the modification of an alimony or child support order after the date of a dissolution judgment. Section 4ßb-8ß (a) provides that a final order for alimony or child support may be modified by the trial court upon a showing of a substantial change in the circumstances of either party. Under that statutory provision, the party seeking the modification ₂₈₆bears the burden of demonstrating that such a change has occurred. … To obtain a modification, the moving party must demonstrate that circumstances have changed since the last court order such that it would be unjust or inequitable to hold either party to it. Because the establishment of changed circumstances is a condition precedent to a party’s relief, it is pertinent for the trial court to inquire as to what, if any, new circumstance warrants a modification, of the existing order. …

[9–11] "Once a trial court determines that there has been a substantial change in the financial circumstances of one of the parties, the same criteria that determine an initial award of alimony and support...