L. W. v. M. W.

208 Conn.App. 497

266 A.3d 189

L. W.

v.M. W.^*

AC 44101, (AC 44184)

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued September 21, 2021

Officially released November 2, 2021

Alexander Copp, Danbury, with whom, on the brief, were Rachel A. Pencu, Bridgeport, and Jenna T. Cutler, for the appellant in Docket No. AC 44101 (plaintiff).

M. W., self-represented, the appellant in Docket No. AC 44184 (defendant).

Alexander Copp, Danbury, with whom, on the brief, was Rachel A. Pencu, Bridgeport, for the appellee in Docket No. AC 44184 (plaintiff).

Bright, C. J., and Moll and Bear, Js.

BRIGHT, C. J.

These two appeals arise out of three separate postjudgment motions for contempt filed by the plaintiff, L. W. In Docket No. AC 44101, the plaintiff appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying her motion for contempt dated November 25, 2019, and filed on November 27, 2019 (November, 2019 motion), alleging that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to find the defendant, M. W., in contempt. In Docket No. AC 44184, the defendant appeals from the judgments of the trial court granting the plaintiff's two motions for contempt dated October 24, 2019, and filed on October 25, 2019 (October, 2019 motions), alleging that the trial court abused its discretion by finding him in contempt.¹ We agree with the plaintiff in AC 44101 and decline to review the defendant's claims in AC 44184 because the defendant has failed to provide us with an adequate record. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court denying the plaintiff's November, 2019 motion for contempt and remand the case for further proceedings on that motion, and we affirm the judgments of the trial court granting the plaintiff's October, 2019 motions for contempt.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to both appeals. "The parties were married on November 27, 1996, and their marriage was dissolved on February 9, 2012. The judgment of dissolution incorporated the parties’ [separation] agreement, which provides, in relevant part, that the defendant is to pay the plaintiff unallocated alimony until September 11, 2019, or until the plaintiff's death, remarriage, or cohabitation for more than three months, whichever event shall occur first. Pursuant to article 3.2 of the agreement, the defendant is required to pay the plaintiff a minimum of $3000 per month, with an additional amount owed based on the annual earnings of the defendant.² ... The agreement also states in article 3.4 that in any year in which the defendant does not pay the maximum annual alimony amount, he shall provide the plaintiff, upon written request, with copies of his quarterly paychecks and his year-end W-2 or 1099 forms reflecting earned income." (Footnote added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Winthrop v. Winthrop , 189 Conn. App. 576, 579–80, 207 A.3d 1109 (2019).

The agreement also addresses the possible eventuality of the parties’ obligation to pay college expenses for the couple's two children, providing that "[t]he [c]ourt shall reserve jurisdiction to enter [an] order concerning post majority education support, as set forth under Connecticut General Statute[s] § 46-[5]6c." On March 27, 2019, the trial court entered an order for the parties’ payment of postsecondary education support in which it required "the defendant to pay 60 percent of the maximum amount of the educational expenses for each minor child and the plaintiff to pay 40 percent."

In October, 2019, the plaintiff filed two postjudgment motions for contempt. In the first motion, the plaintiff alleged that "the defendant failed and refused to provide the plaintiff, or her counsel, with any documentation to establish his 2018 earned income." ³

In the second motion, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had "failed and refused" to pay his share of their child's University of Rhode Island tuition, which forced the plaintiff to take out a loan to cover those expenses. Thereafter, in November, 2019, the plaintiff filed a third motion for contempt, alleging that the "defendant has failed and refused to comply with the court's order to pay the plaintiff any additional unallocated alimony based on the amount of his earned income for the year 2018 as required by the separation agreement ...."

In two separate orders dated April 21, 2020, the trial court granted both of the plaintiff's October, 2019 motions. The trial court further ordered the defendant "to pay counsel fees to the plaintiff in the amount of $2500 within 30 days" for each contempt finding. In a third order, also dated April 21, 2020, the trial court denied the plaintiff's November, 2019 motion for contempt. According to the court's order, "[t]he defendant was to pay the plaintiff 30 percent of earned income in excess of $102,000 and less than $150,000.... The motion for contempt filed by the plaintiff claims the defendant failed to pay the plaintiff additional alimony in 2018 based on this earned income. Pursuant to the defendant's tax return for 2018, the defendant had business income of $135,569. After [deducting] self-employment tax and self-employed health insurance, the defendant's income was $102,363." The court consequently concluded that, based on the total amount of the defendant's net income, as reflected in his tax return, the plaintiff was not entitled to any additional alimony and the defendant was not in contempt. The plaintiff thereafter appealed to this court from the judgment denying her November, 2019 motion for contempt.

On May 13, 2020, in response to the trial court's orders concerning the October, 2019 motions, the defendant filed two motions to reargue, alleging several factual and legal errors with the court's contempt findings. The trial court denied both motions, and the defendant appealed.

On May 22, 2020, in response to the trial court's order on her November, 2019 motion, the plaintiff filed a motion for articulation, seeking an explanation for how the court reached its conclusion that the defendant's earned income was $102,363, when the defendant's 1099 form for the year showed that his income was $159,079. The trial court denied the motion.

IAC 44101

The plaintiff contends that the trial court erred when it denied her November, 2019 motion for contempt because the court incorrectly calculated the defendant's earned income for the year 2018. We agree.

We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of review and principles of law that guide our analysis. "It is well established that a separation agreement that has been incorporated into a dissolution decree and its resulting judgment must be regarded as a contract and construed in accordance with the general principles governing contracts." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McTiernan v. McTiernan , 164 Conn. App. 805, 821, 138 A.3d 935 (2016). "A contract must be construed to effectuate the intent of the parties, which is determined from the language used interpreted in the light of the situation of the parties and the circumstances connected with the transaction. ... If a contract is unambiguous within its four corners, the determination of what the parties intended by their contractual commitments is a question of law. ... When the language of a contract is ambiguous, [however] the determination of the parties’ intent is a question of fact, and the trial court's interpretation is subject to reversal on appeal only if it is clearly erroneous. ... In interpreting contract items, we have repeatedly stated that the intent of the parties is to be ascertained by a fair and reasonable construction of the written words and that the language used must be accorded its common, natural, and ordinary meaning and usage where it can be sensibly applied to the subject matter of the contract." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hirschfeld v. Machinist , 181 Conn. App. 309, 322–23, 186 A.3d 771, cert. denied, 329 Conn. 913, 186 A.3d 1170 (2018). "The court will not torture words to impart ambiguity where ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity. ... Moreover, the mere fact that the parties advance different interpretations of the language in question does not necessitate a conclusion that the language is ambiguous." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Parisi v. Parisi , 315 Conn. 370, 383, 107 A.3d 920 (2015). Because resolution of the plaintiff's claim requires us to interpret the unambiguous applicable provisions of the agreement, our standard of review is plenary.

In Winthrop v. Winthrop , supra, 189 Conn. App. at 582–83, 207 A.3d 1109, an earlier appeal concerning the application of articles 3.2 and 3.4 of the parties’ agreement, this court had an opportunity to interpret the term " ‘earned income,’ " as used in the agreement. In that case, as in the present case, the plaintiff had filed a motion for contempt claiming that the defendant had failed to pay additional alimony based on his earned income. Id., at 580, 207 A.3d 1109. The plaintiff's motion in that case related to the defendant's 2016 income, which was reported on a W-2 form from the defendant's employer. Id. Although there was no provision in the agreement that authorized the deduction of business expenses from his stated W-2 form income to determine his 2016 earned income, the defendant argued that he owed no additional alimony because, as a commissioned salesperson, he had certain business expenses that needed to be deducted from his W-2 income to accurately state his true earned income. Id., at 583–84, 207 A.3d 1109. The trial court denied the plaintiff's motion for contempt but rejected the defendant's argument that he was entitled to deduct certain business expenses when determining earned income. Id., at 580–81, 207 A.3d 1109. The court concluded that earned income was defined in the separation agreement as the figure set forth on his W-2 form and ordered the defendant to pay additional alimony based on that figure. Id.

On appeal, this court agreed with the trial court and concluded "that the term ‘earned...