Highlights
- The U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the case Labcorp v. Davis, where visually impaired patients took legal action against Labcorp after its implementation of self-service check-in kiosks.
- The argument revealed skepticism on the Supreme Court, as the justices displayed little appetite for addressing whether Article III standing should be required for all class members at the class certification stage.
- This Holland & Knight alert details the views and questions asked by individual Supreme Court justices.
The U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Labcorp v. Davis (No. 24-304), a case that arrived at the Court to resolve a fundamental question: "[w]hether a federal court may certify a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) when some members of the proposed class lack any Article III injury." In this case, visually impaired patients initiated legal action against Labcorp following the company's implementation of self-service check-in kiosks. The plaintiffs sought remedies under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and California state law, claiming discrimination because the use of touchscreen devices were inaccessible to visually impaired customers.
The case presented an opportunity to decide a question that has divided the federal circuits into three distinct camps: Some circuits hold that Article III bars certification when the class would include any uninjured persons,1 others permit certification if no more than a de minimis portion of the class lacks injury,2 while a third group (including the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, from which this case originates) largely defers the question to post-certification stages unless a "great many" class members lack standing.3
Oral argument revealed a significant procedural roadblock that may ultimately prevent the Court from reaching the substantive Article III standing question. At the heart of this appellate procedural issue are two different class definitions: an initial definition that excluded individuals who did not know about or did not want to use the kiosks (arguably limiting the class to those who could claim actual injury) and a later, broader definition that included anyone who came into a clinic, regardless of whether they wanted to use the kiosk. The critical procedural complication is that Labcorp appealed only the first, narrower definition - not the second, broader one that it now challenges before the Supreme Court. The petitioner claimed the classes differed in only immaterial ways and noted the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California's specific finding to that effect, which precluded appeal of the second order under Ninth Circuit rules. The petitioner also noted that if the Court did not provide review now, it would be too late for Labcorp to seek interlocutory review of the second order under the text of Rule 23(f).
Supreme Court Viewpoints
Justice Amy Coney Barrett captured this dilemma, noting there would be a risk of "'too bad for you because the 23(f) timeline has run," creating concern about procedural traps for litigants who rely on district courts' characterizations of their own orders. Both...
