Labreche v. Brouillette

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JOHN LABRECHE, Plaintiff, v. RICHARD BROUILLETTE and 122 NORWOOD ASSOCIATES, LLC Defendants.

C. A. No. 1:21-CV-00277-JJM-LDA

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island

July 31, 2024

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOHN J. McCONNELL, JR., UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CHIEF JUDGE.

The question presented here is whether John Labreche was an employee of Richard Brouillette and/or his company Norwood Associates, LLC (collectively, “Mr Brouillette”), or an independent contractor. After careful review of all the evidence presented, the Court concludes that, while it is a close call, Mr. Labreche has raised sufficient evidence that a jury should answer the questions.

For 41 years, from 1982 until 2023, Mr. Labreche lived and worked on Richard Brouillette's property at 122 Norwood Avenue in Cranston, R.I. (“Norwood Property”). He made repairs, did maintenance work, performed minor construction projects, and managed the rentals of property that Mr Brouillette owned. While performing this work at the Norwood Property, Mr. Labreche also worked on Mr. Brouillete's property in New Hampshire. ECF No. 1 at 2; ECF No. 50'2 at 2, ¶ 7.

In 2020, Mr. Brouillette sent a letter to Mr. Labreche ordering him to cease work on the property and ending his role as property manager. So, Mr. Labreche sued claiming that, as an employee of Mr. Brouillette, he owes him at least minimum wage compensation for labor under the Rhode Island Payment of Wages Act, § 28-141, et seq. (“RIPWA”) for the projects he undertook. Id. at 4. Before this Court is Mr. Brouillette's Motion for Summary Judgment.^[1] ECF No. 47. Mr. Brouillette alleges that Mr. Labreche was an independent contractor under RIPWA, and therefore RIPWA does not protect him as a matter of law. In response, Mr. Labreche asserts that there is sufficient evidence to produce genuine issues of fact about his employment status and asks this Court to deny summary judgment. ECF No. 50.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Summary judgment is proper if after adequate time to prepare, the nonmoving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

A dispute is genuine when “the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the nonmoving party.” Morris v. Gov't Dev. Bank of P.R., 27 F.3d 746, 748 (1st Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). That said, “mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The court considers facts “in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.” Barbour v. Dynamics Rsch. Corp., 63 F.3d 32, 36 (1st Cir. 1995). A fact is material when it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Morris, 27 F.3d at 748 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). Ultimately, a dispute of material fact “is not required to be resolved conclusively in favor of the party asserting its existence,' rather, all that is required is that sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.” First Natl Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968).

Summary judgment must also be proper as a matter of law. The Court first considers if the nonmoving party has produced “a sufficient showing on an essential element of its case with respect to which it has the burden of proof.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 1319.

II. DISCUSSION

The primary issue to be decided is whether Mr. Labreche is an employee and thus entitled to receive the protections of RIPWA, which is a mixed question of law and fact. Narayanasamy v. Issa, 435 F.Supp.3d 388, 390 (D.R.I. 2020) (quoting DiOrio v. R. L. Platter, Inc., 211 A.2d 642, 644 (R.I. 1965) (“whether a relationship between parties constitutes an employer-employee relationship is a mixed question of fact and law and ‘depends in each case upon its particular facts taken as a whole.'”). Under the RIPWA, the relevant analysis “focuses on the employer's right or power to exercise control over the method and means of performing the work.” Sebren v. Harrison, 552 F.Supp.3d 249, 257 (D.R.I. 2021) (citation and quotes omitted). The employer-employee relationship test is measured by “the employer's right or power to exercise control over the method and means of performing the work and not merely the exercise of actual control.” Absi v. State Dep't of Admin., 785 A.2d 554, 556 (R.I. 2001) (quoting Pasetti v. Brusa, 98 A.2d 833, 834 (R.I. 1953)).

This circuit also employs the “economic reality” test to decide whether a worker is an employee. See, e.g., Baystate Alt. Staffing, Inc. v. Herman, 163 F.3d 668, 675 (1st Cir. 1998); Sigui v. M + M Communications, Inc., 484 F.Supp.3d 29, 36 (D.R.I. 2020). “The touchstone of the ‘economic realities' test is whether the worker is ‘economically dependent on the business to which he renders service or is, as a matter of economic [reality], in business for himself.'” McFeeley v. Jackson Street Ent., LLC, 825 F.3d 235, 241 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Schultz v. Cap. Inti. Sec., Inc., 466 F.3d 298, 304 (4th Cir. 2006)). Relevant to the analysis of the economic reality test is-' (i) the degree of control exercised by the alleged employer; (ii) the extent of the relative investments of the worker and alleged employer! (iii) the degree to which the worker's opportunity for profit and loss is determined by the alleged employer,' (iv) the skill and initiative required in performing the job; (v) the permanency of the relationship; and (vi) the degree to which the alleged employee's tasks are integral to the employer's business. Sigui, 484 F.Supp.3d at 36. Both parties have agreed that the Sigui factors apply.

This Court will now consider the facts in the record before the Court that are relevant to each category to decide whether Mr. Labreche's employment status can be decided as a matter of law, or whether a jury should decide it. The Court tells these facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party-Mr. Labreche-with all reasonable inferences drawn in his favor. LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins., 6 F.3d 836, 841 (1st Cir. 1993) (“review the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and to draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor.”).^[2]

1. Whether Mr. Brouillette had the right to control Mr. Labreche

The first factor of the economic reality test is the degree of control an alleged employer has or exercises over the worker. The primary inquiry is whether “[W]orkers [are] subject to control such that they did not stand as ‘separate economic entities' who were ‘in business for themselves.'” Sigui, 484 F.Supp.3d at 37 (citing Scantland v. Jeffry Knight, Inc., 721 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2013)). At issue is whether Mr. Brouillette had the right to exercise the day to-day control over the means and methods used by Mr. Labreche. Mr. Labreche alleges the facts below would allow a jury to decide that the nature of the working relationship was one of employer-employee.

2. Mr. Labreche's Opportunity for Profit or Loss

This factor focuses on whether the worker “had an opportunity for greater profits” based on managerial skills. Keller v. Miri Microsystems LLC, 781 F.3d 799, 808 (6th Cir. 2015). Mr. Labreche did not perform any work for others, he only worked for Mr. Brouillette. Mr. Brouillette paid Mr. Labreche a flat rate regardless of the vacancy status of the rental properties Mr. Brouillette instructed him to rent out. ECF No. 50'1. Mr. Brouillette did not pay Mr. Labreche any more (or less) depending on his success at renting out Mr. Brouillette's apartments. He had no opportunity to make a profit through his work. This factor favors Mr. Labreche's claim that he was an employee.

3. The Worker's Investment in the Business

A worker's capital investment into the business shows signs of economic independence. Sigiri, 484 F.Supp.3d at 39. Courts “must compare the worker's investment in the equipment to perform his job with the company's total investment.” Id. (quoting Keller, 781 F.3d at 810). This Court weighs this factor by comparing the investments made, and if Mr. Labreche's contributions are “starkly outweighed” by Mr. Brouillette, it points to employment status. Id. at 40.

Mr. Labreche made little to no investment in the business. Mr. Labreche's only investments in the performance of work for Mr. Brouillette were the use of hand tools, some occasional minor expenditures, and his own labor.^[3] ECF No. 50-3 at ¶ 13-16.

Mr. Brouillette requested Mr. Labreche bill him for the work materials used, and he usually reimbursed him. ECF No. 50'1 at ¶ 8. Additionally, Mr. Labreche used Mr. Brouillette's truck to perform work, and he later gifted the truck to Mr. Labreche. Id. at ¶ 18. Mr. Brouillette also supplied the rental agreements for Mr. Labreche to rent to new tenants. ECF No. 50'1 at 14. These facts point to Mr. Labreche's financial dependency on Mr. Brouillette, and favor Mr. Labreche's position that he was an employee.

4. The Degree of Skill and Independent Initiative Required to Perform Work

The next factor considers whether there was “‘initiative, judgmentt,] or foresight of the typical independent contractor,' or whether his...