Labrot v. Hyundai Motors Am.

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PAULA LABROT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. HYUNDAI MOTORS AMERICA, Defendant and Respondent.

B323255

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Fourth Division

January 31, 2024

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. 19STCV29566 Stephanie M. Bowick, Judge. Affirmed.

MLG Attorneys at Law, John M. Whelan, Jonathan A. Michaels Kseniya Y. Stupak for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard &Smith, Anthony E. Sonnett, Jocelyn A Julian, Robert W. Maxwell for Defendant and Respondent.

COLLINS, ACTING P. J.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Paula LaBrot was getting into her daughter's Hyundai Sonata when her daughter accidentally closed the passenger door window, catching LaBrot's fingers between the window and door frame. LaBrot's ring finger was almost completely severed. LaBrot sued Hyundai Motor America (HMA) the distributor of the vehicle, for strict liability design defect, strict liability manufacturing defect, and negligence on the basis that the vehicle's window system failed to comply with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 118 (49 C.F.R. § 571.118) (FMVSS 118). The trial court granted HMA's motion for summary judgment, and LaBrot appealed.

LaBrot contends the trial court erred in sustaining HMA's objections to portions of her evidence, including the declaration and testing results submitted by LaBrot's expert witness, David Bosch. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's evidentiary rulings.

LaBrot further contends the trial court erred by focusing on FMVSS 118, rather than considering her claims under the consumer expectations test or a risk-benefit analysis. However, LaBrot's complaint alleged that the nature of the defect was HMA's alleged failure to comply with FMVSS 118. Because "'[t]he pleadings delimit the issues to be considered on a motion for summary judgment'" (Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1253 (Laabs), the trial court did not err by limiting the issues to those in LaBrot's pleadings. We further find the trial court did not err in holding that LaBrot failed to present a triable issue of material fact as to each of her causes of action. We therefore affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The incident

Sky LaBrot, LaBrot's daughter, leased a 2017 Hyundai Sonata. In August 2019, Sky,^[1] her two children (ten months and four years old), and LaBrot returned to the car after eating lunch at a restaurant. The adults loaded the children into the back seat. Sky got into the driver's seat and started the car. Sky had left the vehicle's windows open four to six inches to ventilate the car. As LaBrot was preparing to get into the front passenger seat, she placed her right hand on the passenger window for support. Sky, not realizing that LaBrot's hand was resting on the window, rolled up the car's windows.

LaBrot's right ring finger was caught between the window and the window frame. The finger was sliced through just above the first knuckle; the bone was cut and the fingertip remained attached by only a piece of skin. LaBrot's fingertip was surgically reattached.

B. LaBrot's complaint

In August 2019, LaBrot filed a complaint against HMA. She alleged, "The U.S. Department of Transportation promulgates several 'Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards' ('FMVSS') that govern the safety features of motor vehicles. FMVSS No. 118 requires that vehicles equipped with automatic windows . . . contain a 'stop-and-reverse' feature. Specifically, FMVSS 118 requires that automatic windows automatically stop and reverse at 100 newtons of pressure. It takes far greater pressure than 100 newtons to severe a human finger."

LaBrot asserted five causes of action; only three are relevant to this appeal.^[2] In the first cause of action for negligence, LaBrot asserted that HMA had a duty to comply with FMVSS 118, failed to comply with it, and placed the vehicle into the stream of commerce with a defective power window system. She alleged that had HMA complied with FMVSS 118, her finger would still be intact.^[3] In her second cause of action for strict liability design defect, LaBrot alleged the vehicle had a "defect in the form of an automatic power-operated window which was not designed in compliance with FMVSS No. 118. That is, the vehicle did not 'stop and reverse direction' as required in sub-section S5.1 of FMVSS No. 118." She asserted that her "finger would still be intact but for Defendant's neglect in manufacturing its product in compliance with FMVSS No. 118 - an automatic power-operated window which retracts upon encountering an obstruction such as Plaintiff's finger." In the third cause of action for strict liability manufacturing defect, LaBrot alleged the "subject vehicle contained a manufacturing defect in the form of the automatic power-operated unit that had a defective passenger window system." She alleged her "finger would still be intact if Defendant had manufactured its product in compliance with FMVSS No. 118."

LaBrot prayed for compensatory damages, interest, and costs.^[4]

C. HMA's motion for summary judgment

HMA moved for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c.)^[5] HMA explained that the vehicle at issue was "equipped with power windows.... The windows have a one-touch convenience feature [that] allows the operator to fully open or close the window by depressing and then releasing the control switch.... In other words, the operator does not need to keep [her] finger on the window switch the entire time for the window to go fully up or fully down. As with most modern cars, the windows on the 2017 Sonata have two closing modes-automatic (i.e., one-touch or auto-up) and manual (i.e., continuous-hold).[ ] The vehicle also has an 'automatic reverse' function" that is "only active when the 'auto up' function is used by fully pulling up the switch." The owner's manual HMA submitted stated that when the "auto up" feature is used, "If a window senses any obstacle while it is closing automatically, it will stop and lower approximately 12 inches (30 cm) to allow the object to be cleared."

HMA attached FMVSS 118, pointing to subsections "S4" and "S5." Section S4 begins, "Operating requirements. Except as provided in S5, power operated window . . . may be closed only in the following circumstances: ...." Section S4 has seven subdivisions setting out how power windows may be closed, such as closing only when the vehicle's key or starting mechanism is in an "on" or "start" position, closing by a remote device operated within six meters of the vehicle, or closing after the engine has been turned off but before the two front doors have been opened. Section S4 says nothing about obstacles blocking the windows or stop-and-reverse mechanisms. Section S5, however, refers to "automatic reversal systems" in a power window system "that is capable of closing or of being closed under any circumstances other than those specified in S4." Section S5 states that such a window "shall stop and reverse direction either before contacting a test rod [of a certain size] or before exerting a squeezing force of 100 newtons (N) or more"; after reversing, the window must open to a certain position.

Regarding LaBrot's cause of action for strict liability design defect, HMA asserted that LaBrot's interpretation of FMVSS 118 was erroneous. HMA asserted that LaBrot's "design defect claims are essentially premised on an allegation that FMVSS 118 requires that vehicles equipped with automatic windows contain an automatic 'stop-and-reverse' feature that will engage at a force not exceeding 100 newtons." HMA asserted, "The plain language of this regulation makes clear that the compliance analysis begins with Section S4 (not S5, which is the section that addresses the stop-and-reverse system requirements). And it is only where a car's windows are designed to operate outside of the operational parameters set out by Section S4 that the Section S5 requirements . . . are even triggered." HMA argued, "Nowhere in her discovery responses or in the Complaint does plaintiff provide any facts to show that Section S5" was applicable. HMA further asserted that "the consumer expectation test does not apply in a case such as this, which involves complex design issues and considerations such as the forces required to trigger the automatic reversal of the vehicle's power windows."

HMA submitted the declaration of its expert witness, Robert Lange, who stated that vehicles must comply with either section S4 or S5 of FMVSS 118: "A vehicle engineered and certified to comply with Section 4 is not required to comply with Section 5." Lange also opined that the vehicle at issue was engineered to comply with section S4.

Regarding the cause of action for strict liability manufacturing defect, HMA noted that a manufacturing defect arises "when a flaw in the manufacturing process creates a product that differs from what the manufacturer intended." (Webb v. Special Electric Co., Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 167, 180 (Webb).) HMA asserted that LaBrot's complaint included only conclusory allegations about a manufacturing defect, and when asked in discovery about evidence of a manufacturing defect, LaBrot only described the incident and her injury. HMA argued, "Plaintiff's recitation of . . . how the incident occurred and description of her alleged injuries do not establish a manufacturing defect.... There is nothing in [LaBrot's discovery responses] stating if and how the subject vehicle differed from the manufacturer's design or specifications or from other typical units of the same product line. "

For the negligence cause of action, HMA focused on the element of duty. HMA noted that it was the...